Brian L. Connelly

Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment

Signaling theory is useful for describing behavior when two parties (individuals or organizations) have access to different information. Typically, one party, the sender, must choose whether and how to communicate (or signal) that information, and the other party, the receiver, must choose how to interpret the signal. Accordingly, signaling theory holds a prominent position in a variety of management literatures, including strategic management, entrepreneurship, and human resource management. While the use of signaling theory has gained momentum in recent years, its central tenets have become blurred as it has been applied to organizational concerns. The authors, therefore, provide a concise synthesis of the theory and its key concepts, review its use in the management literature, and put forward directions for future research that will encourage scholars to use signaling theory in new ways and to develop more complex formulations and nuanced variations of the theory.

International Diversification: Antecedents, Outcomes, and Moderators

Pursuit of international markets and resources from foreign sources has increased dramatically during the past two decades, and the academic study of international diversification has increased concurrently. Reviewing the literature in management and related disciplines, the authors discuss recent findings of research on international diversification. A conceptual model groups key relationships, including antecedents, environmental factors, performance and process outcomes, moderators, and the characteristics of international diversification. The authors synthesize intellectual contributions, highlight unresolved issues, and provide recommendations for future research.

Ownership as a Form of Corporate Governance

Firm ownership is an increasingly influential form of corporate governance. Although firms might be owned by different types of owners, most studies examine owner influence on a particular firm outcome in isolation. This study synthesizes research from multiple disciplines on different types of owners and offers a unifying framework of governance through ownership. Using this framework, we describe the motivations of various types of owners, the tactics owners use to affect firms in which they are invested, and the dominant firm outcomes these owners seek to influence. We note how heightened managerial awareness of heterogeneous owner interests increases owner influence on firm-level outcomes. We also provide a roadmap for future study and offer research questions about where scholars might turn their attention to better understand the role of owners in directing firm actions. Our study draws attention to emerging forms of ownership, such as hedge funds and sovereign wealth funds, and highlights the changing (and often competing) interests of shareholders and how this impacts theories of governance.

Tournament Theory Thirty Years of Contests and Competitions

Tournament theory is useful for describing behavior when reward structures are based on relative rank rather than absolute levels of output. Accordingly, management scholars have used tournament theory to describe a wide range of inter- and intraorganizational competitions, such as promotion contests, innovation contests, and competition among franchisees. While the use of tournament theory has gained considerable momentum in recent years, the ideas that underlie the theory have become blurred and potentially useful insights remain trapped within disciplines. We, therefore, provide a synthesis of the theory’s foundational concepts, review its use in the management literature, identify advancements from related disciplines that may be imported to management research, and delineate the steps likely to be critical to moving the theory forward. Our hope is this review will make tournament theory more accessible and salient to management researchers with a view toward developing more nuanced versions of the theory and applying it in a wider range of contexts.

Minding the Gap Antecedents and Consequences of Top Management-To-Worker Pay Dispersion

Management researchers have long been concerned with the antecedents and consequences of managerial compensation. More recently, scholarly and popular attention has turned to the gap in pay between workers at the highest and lowest levels of the organization, or “pay dispersion.” This study investigates the performance implications of pay dispersion on a longitudinal (10-year) sample of publicly traded firms from multiple industries. We combine explanations based on tournament theory and equity theory to develop a model wherein pay dispersion has opposing effects on a firm’s short-term performance and their trend in performance over time. We also show that ownership is a key antecedent of pay dispersion. Specifically, transient institutional investors (who have short time horizons and equity stakes in a wide variety of firms) positively influence pay dispersion whereas dedicated institutional investors (who have longer investment time horizons and equity stakes in fewer firms) negatively influence pay dispersion. We discuss the wide-ranging implications of these findings for scholars, managers, and policy makers alike.

More Than Adopters: Competing Influences in the Interlocking Directorate

This study explores the competing influences of different types of board interlocks on diffusion of a strategic initiative among a population of firms. We examine a broad social network of interlocking directors in U.S. firms over a period of 17 years and consider the likelihood that these firms will adopt a strategy of expansion into China. Results show that ties to adopters that unsuccessfully implement this strategy have a nearly equal and opposing effect on the likelihood of adoption as do ties to those that successfully implement the strategy. Ties to those that do not implement the strategy also have a suppressive effect on the likelihood of adoption. Furthermore, we examine a firms position in the core-periphery structure of the interlocking directorate, finding that ties to adopters closer to the network core positively affect the likelihood of adoption. We discuss the implications of our study for social network analysis, governance, and internationalization research.

The Power and Effects of Entrepreneurship Research

This study summarizes and analyzes average statistical power and effect sizes in empirical entrepreneurship research. Results show that statistical power was higher than expected, and was particularly high in studies employing archival measures. Statistical power has also increased over time. Effect sizes were higher than expected, a finding that remained consistent for different levels of analysis and across multiple subdomains. We discuss these findings, compare them to related disciplines, and draw implications for the design of future studies.

Of Scapegoats and Signals Investor Reactions to CEO Succession in the Aftermath of Wrongdoing

If an organization’s management is caught in the act of misconduct, it may call for a changing of the guard. Surprisingly, though, there is little empirical evidence examining the presumed benefits of executive turnover in the aftermath of wrongdoing. In this study, we explore investor reactions to CEO turnover following financial misrepresentation. We theorize and find that firms can be successful at managing investor reactions to organizational misconduct by either scapegoating or signaling change, but middle-ground approaches that do not commit to one or the other are less successful. We test our ideas in a firm-level event study of market reactions to CEO successions following a material financial statement restatement. We discuss the results, which generally support our predictions, and their implications for development of the scapegoating and signaling literatures and research on both executive succession and restoring corrupt organizations.

Competence- and Integrity-Based Trust in Interorganizational Relationships Which Matters More?

Trust is an important factor for managing transaction costs within interorganizational relationships (IORs). Research on trust indicates that separate dimensions of trust arise from a partner’s competence (i.e., technical skills, experience, and reliability) and integrity (i.e., motives, honesty, and character), and that these dimensions have potentially unique effects. Because scholars rarely apply this distinction within IOR research, past studies may have masked important relationships involving competence- and integrity-based trust. In response, we build and test theory that explains how competence- and integrity-based trust have asymmetric effects on different kinds of transaction costs. In particular, we build on theory that describes how parties process positive and negative information about others’ behavior to predict that integrity-based trust in IORs is more potent for reducing transaction costs than is competence-based trust. We also theorize that building strong IORs requires more up-front investment with competence-based but not with integrity-based trust. By applying meta-analytic structural equation modeling to data on 37,366 IORs drawn from 150 samples, we find that integrity-based trust is about 10 times more effective at reducing these costs. A key implication is that managers seeking to improve the efficiency of their IORs may do well by performing competently, but they can do even better by building perceptions of integrity.

Return Time Leniency in Online Retail: A Signaling Theory Perspective on Buying Outcomes

Merchandise return policies (MRPs) have long been an important area of interest for operations and supply chain management researchers, who have identified some key advantages and disadvantages of offering comprehensive and convenient return policies. However, there is a lack of rigorous scholarship on one key dimension of MRPs—return time leniency. Understood as the amount of time that buyers have within which to return purchased items, return time leniency is often considered one of the leading indicators of a retailers MRP friendliness. In the current study, we extend prior work on MRPs by introducing a signaling theory perspective to return time leniency. This allows us to develop a more nuanced interpretation of the underlying economics associated with extending the window of time during which returns are accepted. We do so by positioning our study in a retail context where such issues are highly important to consumers—online retail.