Brian Michael Jenkins

A System Approach to Deterring and Influencing Terrorists

Counterterrorism efforts in the United States focus largely on a combination of offensive actions against terrorists abroad and defense of the U.S. homeland and U.S. and allied interests worldwide. This paper provides a framework for conceiving another necessary component of the struggle, the influence component. Classic deterrence is but one influence among many. This paper recommends approaching the issue as a “system problem” in which the many different components of terrorist organizations are considered and appropriate influences applied accordingly. The influences discussed range from various forms of coercion to the competition of ideas.

The Terrorist Mindset and Terrorist Decisionmaking: Two Areas of Ignorance

Abstract : The following paper identifies two areas of ignorance in the current study of the phenomenon of terrorism: how terrorists think (is there such a thing as a terrorist mind?) and how terrorists groups make their decisions. The organization, financing weaponry, and tactics of terrorist groups have been studied. We have acquired a great deal of what might be called order of battle information about terrorist groups. In some cases, a sizable portion of their membership has been identified; we know their names. Articles, or in some cases, books have been written about a few of the more notable leaders of terrorists groups: Ulrike Meinhof, Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, Leila Khaled, Yasir Arafat. A few have written about their own experiences in terrorist groups; Sean MacStiofain about his Irish Republican Army career and Susan Stern about her experiences in the Weather Underground. Some terrorists in prison have agreed to interviews. Some terrorists still at large have even been interviewed by journalists. It has been reported that the West German Bundeskriminalamt maintains a vast file that includes information on the reading habits, dental records, and musical preferences of known terrorists.

International cooperation in locating and recovering stolen nuclear materials

Abstract With the expansion of terrorist activities in the last fifteen years there has been increasing concern that groups might be able to steal nuclear materials and use nuclear weapons for terrorist purposes. The last fifteen years have also seen growing criminal activity in the nuclear domain including thefts of nuclear material, attacks on nuclear facilities, and threats against American cities, although these latter threats turned out to be hoaxes. Nuclear experts have stated that a relatively few technicians could fabricate a nuclear bomb. The principal impediment is access to nuclear material. Although terrorists usually would not be able to further their aims by threats of mass destruction, it is increasingly conceivable that some group might go for the nuclear jackpot. Congress has recently passed legislation designed to protect nuclear materials and to make nuclear thefts and threats subject to severe penalties. This legislation is geared into a recent U.N. convention providing for internation...

Research note: Rand's research on terrorism

Repeatedly, during the last few years, small groups of extremists have demonstrated that by using terrorist tactics they can achieve disproportionate effects. They attract worldwide attention to themselves and their causes; they arouse worldwide alarm, and can create international incidents that national governments are compelled to deal with, often before a worldwide audience. To protect against their attacks or to respond to crisis situations they create, they force governments to expend resources—manpower, money, the attention of senior officials—vastly out of scale with the magnitude of the actual threat they pose.1