Brian Parkinson

Classifying Affect-regulation Strategies

This paper presents a provisional classification of deliberate strategies for improving unpleasant affect based on conceptual judgements concerning their similarities and differences. A corpus of self-reported upward affectregulation strategies was collected using questionnaires, interviews, and group discussions, in conjunction with an examination of existing literature on related topics. A total of 162 distinct strategies were identified and a preliminary categorisation was developed by the investigators. We then conducted a card-sort task in which 24 participants produced separate classifications of the strategies. The similarity matrix arising from co-occurrence data was subjected to hierarchical cluster analysis and the obtained typology provided independent support for our proposed distinctions between strategies implemented cognitively and behaviourally, between diversion and engagement strategies, and between active distraction and direct avoidance, and for specific lower-level groupings of strate...

Do Facial Movements Express Emotions or Communicate Motives

This article addresses the debate between emotion-expression and motive-communication approaches to facial movements, focusing on Ekmans (1972) and Fridlunds (1994) contrasting models and their historical antecedents. Available evidence suggests that the presence of others either reduces or increases facial responses, depending on the quality and strength of the emotional manipulation and on the nature of the relationship between interactants. Although both display rules and social motives provide viable explanations of audience “inhibition ” effects, some audience facilitation effects are less easily accommodated within an emotion-expression perspective. In particular emotion is not a sufficient condition for a corresponding “expression,” even discounting explicit regulation, and, apparently, “spontaneous ”facial movements may be facilitated by the presence of others. Further, there is no direct evidence that any particular facial movement provides an unambiguous expression of a specific emotion. However, information communicated by facial movements is not necessarily extrinsic to emotion. Facial movements not only transmit emotion-relevant information but also contribute to ongoing processes of emotional action in accordance with pragmatic theories.

Untangling the Appraisal-Emotion Connection

This article aims to clarify the nature of the relation between cognitive appraisal and emotion. I distinguish a range of alternative possible hypotheses according to whether this appraisal—emotion connection is assumed to operate at the conceptual or empirical level, whether it is supposed to be a descriptive or causal relation, and whether it is seen as having a contingent or necessary basis. Reviewing the varieties of available evidence for connections at different levels, I find little support for empirical rather than conceptual relations or for necessary as opposed to contingent ones. Ways are suggested in which this evidence might be extended so that more substantive conclusions are possible. I contend that future progress in this research area requires tighter specification of the different kinds of appraisal process that operate during real-time emotional episodes and of their potential interactions with other aspects of the unfolding emotional syndrome. Finally, I develop an alternative perspective on appraisal—emotion relations that views appraisals as representing the message value of interpersonally directed emotions, and I suggest future directions for research based on this approach.

Time Frames for Mood: Relations between Momentary and Generalized Ratings of Affect

A computerized diary method was used to investigate relations between momentary and generalized affect reports. Thirty participants rated current mood at 2-hourly intervals and gave retrospective reports of daily and weekly mood for a 2-week period. Average momentary ratings provided a closer estimate of daily mood than either peak or most recent momentary ratings. Similarly, average daily mood indexes tended to give the best estimates of weekly mood. However, for positive (but not negative) mood, daily reports were consistently higher than average momentary ratings, and weekly reports were consistently higher than average daily ratings. Regression analyses suggested that daily ratings were influenced mainly by average momentary mood but that independent effects of peak and most recent momentary mood were detectable too. Retrospective reports of daily mood were also influenced by current mood. In general, however, memory for affect was rather better than previous research has implied.

Anger on and off the road

Participants reported on two recent experiences of anger, of which one had occurred while they were driving and the other in a non-driving situation. Anger while driving was described as less mixed with other emotions, involving purer appraisals of other-blame, more likely to be caused by communication difficulties, and slower to be noticed by the person who was its target. Levels of negative affect preceding anger were rated as significantly lower in driving than non-driving situations, and mood and unrelated pressure were considered to be less influential causes of the subsequent emotional reaction. Frequency estimates supported the popular notion that anger is relatively more likely while driving than during other activities. Individual difference measures relating to ambivalence over emotional expression, self-consciousness, and empathy showed no reliable correlations with frequency of anger while driving, but previously developed self-report indices of driving anger and aggression made a significant contribution to its prediction even after controlling for anger frequency in other situations. These results support everyday intuitions that certain features of the road situation differentially predispose drivers to become angry and that the resulting anger tends to take a different form from anger experienced off the road.

Relations and Dissociations between Appraisal and Emotion Ratings of Reasonable and Unreasonable Anger and Guilt

Recent studies have used self-report methods to defend a close associative or causal connection between appraisal and emotion. The present experiments used similar procedures to investigate remembered experiences of reasonable and unreasonable anger and guilt, and of nonemotional other-blame and selfblame. Results suggest that the patterns of appraisal reported for reasonable examples of emotions and for situations where there is a near absence of emotion may be highly similar, but that both may differ significantly from the appraisal profiles reported for unreasonable examples of the same emotions. Further, relevant appraisals were not always identified by participants as the most influential determinants of guilt and anger. These findings demonstrate either that the relationship between certain appraisals and emotions is less consistent than implied in some contemporary versions of appraisal theory, or that there are problems with the validity of existing questionnaire-based measures of the variables in...

Emotions in direct and remote social interaction: Getting through the spaces between us

If emotions are oriented to other peoples actions and reactions, then their expression will be affected by available modes of access to interpersonal feedback. This theoretical review paper applies such a relation-alignment perspective to emotions experienced in co-present and remote interpersonal interactions. The role of actual, anticipated, and imagined responses of others in emotion maintenance and adjustment is highlighted. In particular, it is argued that different modes of interpersonal contact afford different styles of emotion presentation, and encourage distinctive varieties of emotional creativity. Thus, although emotion may take different forms in social arrangements distributed through a virtual world, this need not result in more limited forms of interpersonal contact.

Worry spreads: Interpersonal transfer of problem-related anxiety

This paper distinguishes processes potentially contributing to interpersonal anxiety transfer, including object-directed social appraisal, empathic worry, and anxiety contagion, and reviews evidence for their operation. We argue that these anxiety-transfer processes may be exploited strategically when attempting to regulate relationship partners’ emotion. More generally, anxiety may serve as either a warning signal to other people about threat (alerting function) or an appeal for emotional support or practical help (comfort-seeking function). Tensions between these two interpersonal functions may account for mutually incongruent interpersonal responses to expressed anxiety, including mistargeted interpersonal regulation attempts. Because worry waxes and wanes over time as a function of other peoples ongoing reactions, interpersonal interventions may help to alleviate some of its maladaptive consequences.

Getting from situations to emotions: appraisal and other routes.

Comments on the original article by S. Siemer and R. Reisenzein regarding the process of emotion inference. When processing situational information, people can reach emotional conclusions without explicitly registering corresponding appraisals. Does this mean that appraisal cues must be guiding inference in less obvious ways? If one assumes that the emotional meaning of any situation depends on the protagonists relation to what is happening, then emotion inference can never entirely bypass relational information. However, not all relational information is specifically appraisal-based. Further, actual emotion causation, like emotion inference, can involve explicit or implicit appraisals or even no appraisals at all. Indeed, humans do not first learn to associate emotions with situations by extracting appraisal information.

Current Emotion Research in Social Psychology: Thinking about Emotions and Other People

This article discusses contemporary social psychological approaches to (a) the social relations and appraisals associated with specific emotions; (b) other people’s impact on appraisal processes; (c) effects of emotion on other people; and (d) interpersonal emotion regulation. We argue that single-minded cognitive perspectives restrict our understanding of interpersonal and group-related emotional processes, and that new methodologies addressing real-time interpersonal and group processes present promising opportunities for future progress.