Bruce Aune

Theories of Action

The first part of this chapter is concerned with three rival theories of action. Each theory conceives of an action as an event or process in time, or as an aggregate of such events and processes; and each conceives of an action as adequately individuated by virtue of its causes and effects. I shall argue that, if a metaphysical commitment to events is accepted, no one of the theories is clearly preferable to the others. This is a surprising result, since the theories are espoused by philosophers as diverse in orientation as H. A. Prichard, Donald Davidson and R. G. Collingwood. In the last section of the chapter I argue that a metaphysical commitment to events is actually questionable and that, if it is rejected, a theory of agents must be accepted as clearly preferable to any theory that is explicitly concerned with actions and attempts to specify the conditions of their identity.

Determinate Meaning and Analytic Truth

Although I have been an admirer of Quine’s philosophy for many years, I have become convinced that his attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction has had some unfortunate consequences for epistemology (Quine 1953). Perhaps the most striking of these consequences is the recent revival of epistemologi-cal Cartesianism. Instead of concluding from Quine’s criticism that purely a priori knowledge is nonexistent — that all our beliefs must face the tribunal of sense-experience — a growing number of philosophers, having retained their conviction that the existence of purely a priori knowledge is beyond question, simply insist that a priori knowledge cannot be achieved by mere analysis but requires, and gets, the support of “intuition” (Bealer 1987). Since I am as critical of intuition as Frege or Peirce and, at the same time, convinced that some genuine a priori knowledge is possible, I believe that a doctrine of analytic truth must be rehabilitated. A promising strategy for doing so can be found, I believe, in Peirce’s writings. I intend to develop it here.

Epistemically Justified Opinion

The theories of epistemic justification advanced in recent years are commonly offered as contributions to an adequate conception of knowledge and are, perhaps in consequence, either foundational or coherentist.1 I take exception to such theories here, arguing that they exaggerate the importance of knowledge for an adequate epistemology. I claim that an adequate epistemology requires a central concept of epistemic justification not subordinate to the concept of knowledge and that the needed concept (which I attempt to identify) should presupppose a new theory of empirical justification — one that is neither foundational nor coherentist. Since the theory I accept has interesting affinities with the coherence theory recently developed by Laurence BonJour,2 I comment freely on his theory in supporting my alternative.

Formal Logic and Practical Reasoning

In the past couple of decades several different accounts of the logic (the deductive logic) of practical reasoning have been proposed.1 The account I have recommended on a number of occasions is probably the simplest, for it requires no special logical principles, holding that, in respect of deduction, practical reasoning is adequately understood as involving only standard “assertoric” principles. My account has recently encountered various objections, the most dismissive of which is that it is too simple to deal with complicated cases of practical inference. I am not daunted by these objections. My aim here is to offer some observations that, I hope, will make the merits of my account a bit easier to appreciate.

Fisk on Capacities and Natures

Fisk begins his discussion by asserting, that the FS model attempts to complete the SR model by accounting for the necessity with which, according to the SR model, a capacity will be exercised when certain operations are performed. He argues that the FS model ultimately fails in this task, and he seeks to improve upon the FS approach by grounding the relevant necessity in an entity’s nature — a component that defenders of the FS model ignore or misinterpret. For the most part my comments will concern the general strategy of his paper rather than details of the arguments he offers.

Castañeda’s Theory Of Morality

My aim in this paper is to discuss the theory of morality that appears as Chapter 8 of CastaŇeda’s Structure of Morality.Though CastaŇeda’s theory is set forth in only twenty-seven pages of text, it is one of the most intricate theories of morality to have appeared in recent years and also, to my mind, one of the most interesting. Since CastaŇeda’s exposition is both complicated and highly condensed, it is difficult to understand even on second or third reading — the reason, no doubt, why his theory has provoked little response from other writers on morality. In what follows I shall try to explain the main points of Castaiieda’s theory, place some of those points in historical perspective, and then offer some critical remarks

The Logic of Practical Reasoning

The aim of this chapter is to clarify the formal logic appropriate for practical reasoning. Several theories of practical reasoning have been proposed in recent years, of which Kenny’s theory, discussed in the last chapter, is a representative example. Although in criticizing Kenny’s theory I raised no doubts about the need for a special logic, involving special operators like Kenny’s ‘Fiat(…)’, I shall argue that practical reasoning can be interpreted as requiring no more than ordinary ’assertoric’ first-order logical principles. My view here is not based on general considerations or on philosophical ideology. I think there is a good prima facie case for a special logic of practical inference, and any dissenting view, such as mine, requires careful, detailed defense. I shall therefore proceed by considering important alternative views and develop my own position in the process of criticizing them.

The Springs of Action

An assumption common to the theories of action discussed in the last chapter is that voluntary action has a distinctive mental aspect. Although I raised a general metaphysical doubt about the basis for those theories, I shall now put that doubt aside, at least initially, and attempt to work out a plausible view of how the mental aspects of action are best understood. Toward the end of the chapter I shall show how a philosophical opponent of actions and states can come to terms with the view I develop.

On Postulating Universals

Although philosophy has undergone a number of revolutions since the turn of the century, the existence of universals is still debated largely in the terms employed by Moore and Russell around 1910. A recent article by Alan Donagan illustrates this nicely, for Donagan expounds and defends what he takes to be the principal argument for universals given by Russell in The Problems of Philosophy.*1 I shall comment critically on the case Donagan makes for Russells metaphysical realism, but my main concern is to establish a point of more general interestnamely, that the most plausible strategy for defending a commitment to universals actually raises more problems than it promises to solve. According to Donagan, Russells principal argument is implicit in the following passage: