Bülent Aras

From Conflict to Cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey's Relations with Syria and Iran

In recent years, there has been a notable softening in Turkeys foreign policy toward Syria and Iran. How might we explain the change in Turkeys attitude toward these two countries considering the hostile relations of the 1990s and the worsening security situation in the Middle East? Drawing upon securitization theory, this article argues that domestic problems have influenced Turkeys foreign policy toward Iran and Syria in the past, as foreign policymakers have successfully externalized the sources of political Islam and Kurdish separatism. The remarkable softening of Turkeys foreign policy toward Syria and Iran since the beginning of the present decade can best be explained by looking at changes at the domestic level, particularly in terms of the process of desecuritization currently taking place within Turkey. Among other things, this process of desecuritization is the result of the European Union accession process and concomitant steps toward democratization, a transformation of the political landscape, and the appropriation of EU norms and principles in regional politics. Within this process of desecuritization and democratization, formerly securitized and dramatized issues have begun to be perceived as normal political issues. As a result, the policymaking process is now emancipated from ideational barriers, while there has been a substantial increase in the flexibility of foreign policy attitudes and the ability of foreign policymakers to maneuver in regional policy.

National role conceptions and foreign policy orientation: the ideational bases of the Justice and Development Party's foreign policy activism in the Middle East

Turkey’s foreign policy since the end of the cold war has been marked by a significant reorientation from a long-entrenched passive and isolationist stance to one of active engagement particularly in the affairs of the Middle East. This dramatic change in foreign policy outlook has become more pronounced since the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) came to power in 2002. Observers have increasingly noted that Turkey’s previously uncontested Western-oriented identity and foreign policy has come under attack from Islamist forces. Thus, because of its Islamist roots, the AKP government’s active involvement in the Middle East has often been mistaken for signalling a shift in Turkey’s state identity. However, an identity-based explanation for Turkey’s new foreign policy activism in the Middle East is seriously lacking for a number of reasons. First, the main focus of Turkish foreign policy continues to be on European Union (EU) membership, and there has been no departure from the commitment to the EU membership as a seal of approval of Turkey’s Western identity. Although AKP’s initial activism in this process has stalled, this is largely due to the rising ambivalence, if not outright hostility, of a number of EU countries towards Turkey’s membership, and the concomitant disenchantment of a large segment of Turkey’s population with the EU. Turkey’s relations with the USA experienced a major setback in the early years of the Iraq war due to Turkey’s refusal to allow American troops to enter northern Iraq via its territory. However, the two sides have repaired relations, which seemed to reach a new high with President Obama’s visit in April 2009. Thus it is not plausible to argue that the traditional emphasis of Turkish foreign policy on relations with the EU and the USA has been abandoned. Second, Turkey’s engagement with the Middle East does not contradict the expectations and actions necessary for EU membership. On the contrary, Turkey’s actions in the region are guided by a normative and multilateral approach that is very much characteristic of EU foreign policy. Turkey is currently engaging with the Middle East much like a European state, demonstrating its successful socialization into European norms and guidelines, at least in foreign policy.

Turkey's rise in the Greater Middle East: peace-building in the periphery

Turkey’s new dynamism in regional affairs is unprecedented for a country whose rallying cry was the inward-looking ‘Peace at Home, Peace in the World’. In September 2008 alone, the following events occurred that demonstrate Turkey’s new dynamism. Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan met with his Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts in New York on 26 September. Babacan noted that tripartite talks will continue in order to improve political dialogue and create a forum for common understanding. French President Nikolas Sarkozy, who holds the rotating presidency of the EU, highlighted Turkey’s reliability and mediating role in the indirect talks between Syria and Israel in Damascus on 4 September. Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Rangin Spanta informed the international media in early September that a second round of trilateral talks between Turkish President Abdullah Gul, Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari will take place in Turkey in December. While Turkey was seeking a greater involvement in regional peace efforts, Turkey won 151 votes in the UN General Assembly on 17 November 2008 and secured a nonpermanent member seat in the Security Council for the 2009–10 term. The main source of support is Turkey’s successful peace attempts in the Caucasus and the Middle East, and its new openings to Africa and Asia. Turkey’s transformation into a regional peace-maker is the result of a domestic transformation that in turn changed its vision about its neighbourhood and its role in foreign affairs. Turkey’s increasing involvement in the search for solutions to regional problems is a new development. Turkey’s position represents an alternative voice from the periphery for solutions to the decades-long conflicts in a number of problem-prone regions. It is rare to observe strong peace initiatives in the Middle East, the Caucasus and South Asia coming from within the region. The peace-broker role has been played by the USA, European actors and the UN, or sometimes a combination of these actors and regional countries. These countries are at the top of the power echelons of the international system and they have certain interests to preserve the systemic order as it is. In this sense, the usual peace-makers are status quo powers acting pursuant to their projection of power within the international system. For example, US peace attempts were formalized within the framework of US military unilateralism. The imposition of such strong positions creates obstacles to regional politics in different parts of the world, preventing the emergence of solutions from within the regions that are actually facing the problems. Turkey is an interesting case, which challenged the US

Turkey and the Middle East: frontiers of the new geographic imagination

In this article, we will focus on the role of political transformation and reform in the emergence of a new foreign policy line in Turkey. We hold the idea that Turkey adopted a new course in foreign policy due to political transformation at home, which resulted in reconstruction of the previous policy attitudes in policy making circles. The analysis of the change in Turkey’s foreign policy rhetoric provides a useful framework for understanding foreign policy behaviour and we will discuss this premise in the context of Turkish policy toward the Middle East. Political transformation in Turkey, which is partly a result of the European Union membership process, has had two pillars: democratisation and consolidation of stability. This domestic reform process, especially in the fields of civil-military relations, national security, and economic liberalisation and stability, has significant implications for Turkey’s foreign policy. Changes in these realms led to a new awareness of the Middle East and a shift from a badneighbourhood to a zero-problem policy towards this region. The article discusses these ideas by focusing on changes in Turkish foreign policy towards the Palestinian question, Iran and Iraq. Although the article focuses on Turkey’s foreign policy toward the Middle East, the discussion built here is applicable to other regions to understand how reforming politics and improving welfare can contribute to regional security. The article is comprised of two parts. The first part describes the political transformation in Turkey and discusses how this has led to the emergence of a new regional rhetoric with respect to the Middle East. The second part analyses the development of the new regional policy by focusing on Turkey’s new and more proactive foreign policy line towards the Palestinian question, Iraq and Iran. Finally, the article concludes by pointing out the potential

Turkey and Eurasia: Frontiers of a new geographic imagination

Turkey has adopted a new course in foreign policy toward Eurasia. This article employs the notion of geographic imagination to analyze how Turkish policy-makers have developed a new political rhetoric and foreign policy towards the Eurasian region, specifically Central Asia, the Caucasus and Russia. Turkish policy-makers aim to further Turkeys interests ranging from security, over regional trade, to energy issues in this geography, in addition to creating an environment of cooperation and eliminating regional power constellations. We conclude that Turkeys renewed activism has opened new horizons for its relations in this region and that this new foreign policy orientation is linked to reform and change in Turkeys domestic landscape.

Turkey's policy in the former Soviet south: Assets and options

This article explores the reasons behind Turkeys changing role in the Caucasus and Central Asia and some of the assets used to promote Turkish influence in those areas. It exposes the fantasy of a Turkish big brotherhood and shows how Turkish foreign policy has contributed to instability in the region. It also suggests a number of alternative approaches Turkey can follow to improve its relations with the republics of the former Soviet Union.

Authoritarian 'geopolitics' of survival in the Arab Spring

The Arab Spring has shaken not only the state and society dimension in the countries of the MENA region but also the power of authoritarian leaders that had been ensured for a long period of time. This paper takes a critical look at the issue of how authoritarian regimes reacted to the new political atmosphere produced by the Arab Spring. More specifically it attempts to identify how geopolitical reasoning influenced the formulation of new strategies designed to promote the survival of authoritarian regimes. It focuses upon the geopolitical reasoning relied upon by Iran and Saudi Arabia, which included creating threat-enemy chains in domestic politics, shifting alliances in regional policy and taking advantage of relations with external actors to gain support for authoritarian rule at home.

Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy Revisited

The challenges of the Arab Spring and of Syrian unrest in particular have generated scholarly debate on Ahmet Davutoğlus broadly appreciated ‘zero problems with neighbours’ principle in Turkish foreign policy. This paper presents an assessment of the viability of the Davutoğlu vision and the changing parameters of foreign policy in a new era. It concludes with a discussion of a crucial question: ‘Is this the end of Davutoğlus foreign policy vision?’

The limits of the Russian–Iranian strategic alliance: its history and geopolitics, and the nuclear issue

Abstract The Russian and Iranian governments define their relations as “very close” and “strategic” in many areas. The frontiers of this cooperation, in geopolitical terms, include the south Caucasus, central Asia, Afghanistan, and the oil- and natural gas-rich Caspian basin, while, at the issue level, the cooperation includes the nuclear issue, disarmament, the struggle against terrorism, the Iraqi quagmire, the Palestinian problem, and the U.S. military expansion into Eurasia. The signs of cooperation in these areas are, among others, regular political dialogue and similar attitudes in refusing to include the Lebanese Hizballah on terrorist lists, pursuing political relations with Hamas, maintaining a pro-Arab position on the Arab–Israeli question, objecting to foreign military engagement in Eurasia, and having a common voice during the Israeli–Lebanese conflict in 2006. However, we need to discover the nature of these relations in order to decide whether the close Russian–Iranian relations can be descr...

The rise of nationalist action party and Turkish politics

The Nationalist Action Party (NAP) finished second in the April 1999 Turkish parliamentary elections, with 18 per cent of the total vote. The NAPs unprecedented success came as a surprise to Turkish political life. Even the top leaders of the NAP had not anticipated such a resounding success, at least a 100 per cent increase in performance over the previous elections of 1995. This electoral success led many experts to comment that Turkish politics is shifting to nationalist radicalism. This triumph of the NAP, however, in our view, is a product of the events of Turkish political life since 1997. Over this short period of time, Turkeys political system has witnessed a broad set of extraordinary events that have brought a new power configuration to the forefront. This new political atmosphere validated the NAPs ideological compromise between conflicting demands of nationalist, Islamist and secularist positions in the Turkish political system.