Burcu Savun

Democracy, Foreign Policy, and Terrorism

This article takes a closer look at the relationship between democracy and transnational terrorism. It investigates what it is about democracies that make them particularly vulnerable to terrorism from abroad. The authors suggest that states that exhibit a certain type of foreign policy behavior, regardless of their regime type, are likely to attract transnational terrorism. States that are actively involved in international politics are likely to create resentment abroad and hence more likely to be the target of transnational terrorism than are states that pursue a more isolationist foreign policy. Democratic states are more likely to be targeted by transnational terrorist groups not because of their regime type per se but because of the type of foreign policy they tend to pursue. The empirical analysis provides support for the argument.

Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?

Are binding international agreements only valuable as matters stand (rebus sic stantibus), or are pacts respected in good faith regardless of changing circumstances (pacta sunt servanda)? In this article, we examine this question with respect to military alliance agreements, and we find that alliances are more likely to be abrogated opportunistically when one or more members experience changes that affect the value of the alliance, for instance a change in international power, a change in domestic political institutions, or the formation of a new outside alliance. We also find, however, that controlling for such changes, factors that affect the costs of breaking commitments (for example, democracy and issue linkage) reduce the probability that leaders will abandon their alliances in violation of their terms. We evaluate our argument empirically on a sample of bilateral alliances formed between 1816 and 1989 using competing risks duration analysis and find support for our hypotheses.

Exogenous Shocks, Foreign Aid, and Civil War

The recent civil war literature suggests that negative economic shocks in low-income countries increase the risk of civil war. Foreign aid can be an effective conflict-prevention tool in times of severe economic conditions. Aid cushions government spending from the downward pressures of economic shocks, providing recipient governments with resources they can use to make rebellion a less attractive option for aggrieved domestic groups. Using Official Development Assistance (ODA) data covering 1990 through 2004, we find that foreign aid appears to be a useful tool for preventing civil wars in the wake of negative economic shocks, and as such aid should be assessed by donors with these conflict-suppressing aspects in mind.

Foreign Aid as a Counterterrorism Tool

Is foreign aid effective in reducing terrorism? The existing evidence is mostly negative. We argue that this pessimistic outlook on the efficacy of aid as a counterterrorism tool is partly a function of focusing on only one type of aid: economic aid. Governance and civil society aid can dampen the participation in and support for terrorism by altering the political conditions of a country. We expect countries that receive high levels of governance and civil society aid to experience fewer domestic terrorist incidents than countries that receive little or none. Using a sample of aid eligible countries for the period from 1997 to 2010, we find that governance and civil society aid is effective in dampening domestic terrorism, but this effect is only present if the recipient country is not experiencing a civil conflict. Our findings provide support for the continued use of democracy aid as a counterterrorism tool.

New democracies and the risk of civil conflict

Existing theories of regime transitions suggest that new democracies are more prone to political violence than consolidated democracies. We contend that this risk varies based on the political legacy of the new regime. Specifically, we argue that the prior authoritarian regime influences the risk of conflict in new democracies by shaping the nature of the post-transition political environment. In democracies following military rule, the former autocratic leadership often remains an active political force in the new regime. The continued presence of a materially powerful opposition creates a division in the new regime, increasing the risk of conflict by: (i) complicating efforts to consolidate democratic rule and (ii) signaling potential political opportunity to would-be rebels. In line with our argument, we find that only those new democracies emerging from military rule are more likely to experience civil conflict compared with consolidated democracies. These findings have implications for democracy promotion and conflict prevention efforts, suggesting that democratization is not always associated with an increased short-term risk of conflict as is currently assumed.

Reputation, Concessions, and Territorial Civil War: Do Ethnic Dominoes Fall, or Don’t They?

Barbara Walter’s application of reputation theory to self-determination movements has advanced our understanding of why many separatist movements result in armed conflict. Walter has shown that governments of multi-ethnic societies often respond to territorial disputes with violence to deter similar future demands by other ethnic groups. When governments grant territorial accommodation to one ethnic group, they encourage other ethnic groups to seek similar concessions. However, a number of recent empirical studies casts doubt on the validity of Walter’s argument. We address recent challenges to the efficacy of reputation building in the context of territorial conflicts by delineating the precise scope conditions of reputation theory. First, we argue that only concessions granted after fighting should trigger additional conflict onsets. Second, the demonstration effects should particularly apply to groups with grievances against the state. We then test the observable implications of our conditional argument for political power-sharing concessions. Using a global sample of ethnic groups in 120 states between 1946 and 2013, we find support for our arguments. Our theoretical framework enables us to identify the conditions under which different types of governmental concessions are likely to trigger future conflicts, and thus has important implications for conflict resolution.