C. Mantzavinos

The Institutional-Evolutionary Antitrust Model

The purpose of this article is to provide an alternative antitrust model to the mainstream model that is used in competition policy. I call it the Institutional-Evolutionary Antitrust Model. In order to construct an antitrust model one needs both empirical knowledge and considerations of how to adequately deal with norms. The analysis of competition as an evolutionary process that unfolds within legal rules provides the empirical foundation for the model. The development of the normative dimension involves the elaboration of a comparative approach. Building on those foundations the main features of the Institutional-Evolutionary Model are sketched out and it is shown that its use leads to systematically different outcomes and conclusions than the dominant antitrust ideals.

Zur Verteidigung des institutionenökonomisch-evolutionären Wettbewerbsleitbildes / A Defense of the Institutional-Evolutionary Antitrust Model

Zusammenfassung Dieter Schmidtchen hat mein institutionenökonomisch-evolutionäres Wettbewerbsleitbild einer kritischen Würdigung unterzogen. In dieser Replik werden drei Arten von Argumenten zugunsten meines Wettbewerbsleitbildes vorgetragen. Zunächst wird mit Hilfe von wissenschaftstheoretischen Argumenten gezeigt, daß die Konkurrenz von Erkenntnisprogrammen auch im Fall der Wettbewerbstheorie durchaus wünschenswert ist. Dann werden die normativen Grundlagen des Leitbildes erläutert und gezeigt, wie das Prinzip der Kritischen Prüfung zum Tragen kommt. Schließlich wird für eine regelgeleitete Wettbewerbspolitik plädiert, die den Schutz des Wettbewerbs als minimalistisches Ziel anstrebt. Summary Dieter Schmidtchen has provided a detailed critical appraisal of my institutional-evolutionary antitrust model. Three kinds of arguments come into fore in this reply of mine. Firstly, I show with the aid of methodological arguments that the competition between research programmes is desirable also in the case of the theory of competition. In a second step the normative foundations of the model are illustrated and it is argued that the principle of critical examination should be applied to issues of antitrust analysis. I plead finally for a rule-based competition policy that aims at the protection of competition as its objective

On the Legitimacy of Intervention

My comment on the Legitimacy of Intervention has two interrelated parts. The first part is of a general nature and concerns the problem of the justification of legitimate intervention. The second part will address the main theme of the paper by Frederick Schauer (2014), i.e., the problem of intervention under conditions of epistemic and normative uncertainty. My comment will be based on a philosophical puzzle which is called the Munchhausen Trilemma. The Baron von Munchhausen was a German nobleman who lived in the 18th century and has become famous as a storyteller. In one of his famous stories he managed to pull himself and the horse on which he was sitting out of a swamp by his own hair. It was the German philosopher Hans Albert who first drew attention to how this story by Munchhausen is analogous to the following situation, which is typical not only of epistemology, but also of ethics and political philosophy. The search for truth or other values seems to be inseparably tied to the search for secure ground, for an absolute foundation or an ultimate justification. The search for an Archimedean point, the quest for an ultimate justification of values is a manifestation of the vain quest for certainty originating in the idea of a positive, sufficient justification. This general philosophical idea, operative both in epistemology and philosophy of science as well as in ethics and political philosophy, mandates the quest for an adequate foundation, a sufficient justification, for all convictions and principles. The demand for a justification of everything leads to a situation with three alternatives, all of which are unacceptable: the Munchhausen Trilemma, named such because of the analogy existing between this problem and one which that baron once had to solve in the story mentioned above. It is a situation characterized by three alternatives, all of them seemingly unacceptable or in other words a trilemma. “One must choose [...] between

The Ethical Project. A Dialogue

Abstract In this dialogue the position of Pragmatic Naturalism as defended in Philip Kitcher’s The Ethical Project is presented and criticized. The approach is developed dialectically by the two interlocutors and a series of critical points are debated. The dialogical form is intended to honor the main objective in The Ethical Project: to establish an ongoing conversation on ways to improve moral conceptions and processes, which grow naturally out of the very conditions of human life.

Apprentissage, institutions et performance économique

Dans cet article, nous offrons un large apercu des interactions entre cognition, systemes de croyances et institutions, et comment elles affectent la performance economique. Nous estimons qu’une meilleure comprehension de l’emergence des institutions, de leurs proprietes de fonctionnement et de leurs effets sur les resultats politiques et economiques doit commencer par une analyse des processus cognitifs. Nous explorons la nature de l’apprentissage individuel et collectif, en soulignant que la question n’est pas de savoir si les agents ont une rationalite parfaite ou limitee, mais plutot de savoir comment les etres humains raisonnent ou choisissent reellement, individuellement et collectivement. Nous avons ensuite lie les processus d’apprentissage a l’analyse institutionnelle, fournissant des arguments en faveur de ce qui peut etre qualifie d’ « institutionnalisme cognitif ». En outre, nous montrons qu’un traitement complet du phenomene de sentier de dependance devrait commencer au niveau cognitif, se poursuivre au niveau institutionnel, et aboutir au niveau economique.

Was für ein Problem ist der hermeneutische Zirkel

Abstract The hermeneutic circle serves as a standard argument for all those who raise a claim to the autonomy of the human sciences. The proponents of an alternative methodology for the human sciences present the hermeneutic circle either as an ontological problem or as a specific methodological problem in the social sciences and the humanities. In this paper I would like to check the soundness of this argument. I will start with listing and shortly sketching out three variations of the problem. I will then critically discuss these and appeal to alternative solutions and I will close with a short conclusion.

Lernen, Institutionen und Wirtschaftsleistung

Abstract This article provides a broad overview of the interplay among cognition, belief systems and institutions, fleshing out a position best characterized as ‚cognitive institutionalism‘. We argue that a deeper understanding of institutions’ emergence, their working properties and their effect on economic performance should start with the analysis of cognitive processes. Exploring the nature of individual and collective learning the article suggests that the issue is not whether agents are perfectly or boundedly rational, but rather how human beings actually reason and choose. We also show how a full treatment of the phenomenon of path dependence should look like; there is a path dependence at the cognitive level, at the institutional level and at the economic level and there are links among them.