C. Newman

Differentiating among prefrontal substrates in psychopathy: Neuropsychological test findings

Frontal lobe and consequent executive dysfunction have long been related to psychopathy. More recently, there have been suggestions that specific regions of frontal cortex, rather than all of frontal cortex, may be implicated in psychopathy. To examine this issue, the authors presented 25 individuals with psychopathy and 30 comparison individuals with measures preferentially indexing the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC; object alternation task), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; spatial alternation task), and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; number-Stroop reading and counting tasks). The individuals with psychopathy showed significant impairment on the measure preferentially sensitive to OFC functioning. In contrast, the 2 groups did not show impairment on the measures preferentially sensitive to the functioning of the DLPFC or ACC. These results are interpreted with reference to executive dysfunction accounts of the disorder.

The perceived position of the hand in space

This paper reports a series of experiments of the perceived position of the hand in egocentric space. The experiments focused on the bias in the proprioceptively perceived position of the hand at a series of locations spanning the midline from left to right. Perceived position was tested in a matching paradigm, in which subjects indicated the perceived position of a target, which could have been either a visual stimulus or their own fingertip, by placing the index finger of the other hand in the corresponding location on the other side of a fixed surface. Both the constant error, or bias, and the variable error, or consistency of matching attempts, were measured. Experiment 1 showed that (1) there is a far-left advantage in matching tasks, such that errors in perceived position are significantly lower in extreme-left positions than in extreme-right positions, and (2) there is a strong hand-bias effect in the absence of vision, such that the perceived positions of the left and right index fingertips held in the same actual target position in fact differ significantly. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that this hand-bias effect is genuinely due to errors in the perceived position of the matched hand, and not to the attempt at matching it with the other hand. These results suggest that there is no unifying representation of egocentric, proprioceptive space. Rather, separate representations appear to be maintained for each effector. The bias of these representations may reflect the motor function of that effector.

On the perceived time of voluntary actions.

When do we think we move when we make a voluntary action? Previous studies have pointed to an anticipatory awareness of action (i.e. we think we move before we actually do), but have not investigated the content or locus of motor awareness. In the experiment reported here the authors localize the time of awareness of the first movement in a sequence within the context of a specific information-processing model. The results suggest that our awareness of our own actions is associated with some pre-motor event after the initial intention and preparation of action, but before the assembly and dispatch of the actual motor command to the muscles.

Instrumental learning and relearning in individuals with psychopathy and in patients with lesions involving the amygdala or orbitofrontal cortex

Previous work has shown that individuals with psychopathy are impaired on some forms of associative learning, particularly stimulus-reinforcement learning (Blair et al., 2004; Newman & Kosson, 1986). Animal work suggests that the acquisition of stimulus-reinforcement associations requires the amygdala (Baxter & Murray, 2002). Individuals with psychopathy also show impoverished reversal learning (Mitchell, Colledge, Leonard, & Blair, 2002). Reversal learning is supported by the ventrolateral and orbitofrontal cortex (Rolls, 2004). In this paper we present experiments investigating stimulus-reinforcement learning and relearning in patients with lesions of the orbitofrontal cortex or amygdala, and individuals with developmental psychopathy without known trauma. The results are interpreted with reference to current neurocognitive models of stimulus-reinforcement learning, relearning, and developmental psychopathy.