Campbell Sharman

Trading party preferences: the Australian experience of preferential voting

Abstract Political parties respond to electoral rules in ways which gain them partisan advantage and enable them to make strategic choices about the use of their electoral support. The alternative vote (AV) and proportional representation by the single transferable vote (STV) provide considerable opportunity for this kind of partisan activity. The ability of the voter under such electoral systems to rank candidates in order of the voters preference creates a kind of property which can be used by parties, especially minor parties, to influence the behaviour of both candidates and other parties. The paper investigates this aspect of preferential voting systems and the extent to which the context of electoral rules can encourage or discourage a trade in partisan preferences. Elections for the Australian House of Representatives and Senate are used to show how political actors can respond to electoral rules which permit the control and trading of preferences to be developed into a series of sophisticated transactions.

The Representation of Small Parties and Independents in the Senate

Minor party and independent senators have played a critical role in supporting procedural changes which have given the Australian Senate the ability to play an independent role in the legislative process, and to scrutinise the executive branch effectively. This article examines how this situation has followed from the adoption of proportional representation (PR) for Senate elections since 1949. In looking at the evidence available in 1948, it is argued that the current symbiotic relationship between minor parties and the Senate could not have been foreseen. Whether intended or not, the adoption of PR and the representation of minor parties has done more to enhance the operation of parliamentary democracy in Australia than any institutional change since federation.

∗The Senate, Small Parties and the Balance of Power

Abstract The recent change to the number of senators to be elected from each state will alter the quota for election of senators in a way which will have the consequence of making it harder for minor party and independent candidates to secure representation in the Senate. This, in turn, will have the effect of reducing the likelihood that minor party and independent senators will hold the balance of power in the Senate with a consequent decline in the ability of the chamber to continue to make the major contribution to the governmental process at the national level that it has done in recent times. This proposition is examined first in terms of the logic of the quota system of proportional representation given various patterns of voting support for large and small parties, and secondly in terms of the performance of minor party and independent candidates in Senate elections since 1949.

Political Efficacy, Involvement and Trust: Testing for Regional Political Culture in Australia

Data from the 1993 Australian Election Study are used in this article to test whether the Australian states have discernible regional political cultures. This study is based on the approach of Simeon and Elkins (1974) who examined this question in the Canadian context. Responses from the 1993 Australian survey dealing with political efficacy, involvement and trust were analysed in a variety of ways to see if significant state differences emerged. The findings indicate that, for two of the three components of regional political culture—political efficacy and involvement—no significant differences between the states could be found. For political trust, however, respondents from the various states did show differences in attitude. This effect was accentuated when respondents were able to differentiate between trust in the federal government and trust in the state government. These findings raise methodological questions about the notion of regional political culture and about the broader issue of the interac...

The Strange Case of a Provincial Constitution: The British Columbia Constitution Act

Provincial constitutional documents have not usually been the subject of scrutiny by those concerned with the governmental process at the provincial level. It has been assumed that the major characteristics of provincial government have been shaped by constitutional rules derived from the British North America Act and from the conventions of British-style parliamentary government. A case study of the British Columbia Constitution Act shows that such assumptions are only partially true. The powers of the provinces to shape their governmental structures through constitutional adaptation are extensive and have been used in the case of British Columbia to make broad modifications to the style of constitutionalism in the province since its entry to Confederation in 1871. It is not that the term provincial constitution should become a household word but that the investigation of the operation and potential of provincial constitutions should be seen as an essential component to an understanding of the provincial governmental process.

Uncontested Seats and the Evolution of Party Competition The Australian Case

Representative democracy presumes competitive elections at which voters have a choice of candidates. This is consistent with the current nature of electoral campaigning, which is system-wide and embraces every opportunity for partisan competition. From this perspective, uncontested seats in parliamentary systems are associated with earlier stages of representative government before modern parties emerged. Yet a survey of Australian state and federal general elections since 1890 shows that uncontested seats persisted in most systems well after the establishment of the current party system and, in two states, until the 1980s. In examining various explanations for the existence of uncontested seats in parliamentary systems, the article finds that the nature of the electoral system, the characteristics of the party system and party organization are key factors. Given a single-member district electoral system, the pattern of uncontested seats can be used as an indicator of the evolution of the party system and the structure of partisan competition.

The party system and change of regime: The structure of partisan choice in Tasmania and western Australia*

tag=1 data=The Party system and change of regime: the structure of partisan choice in Tasmania and Western Australia. by Campbell Sharman, Graham Smith... tag=2 data=Sharman, Campbell%Smith, Graham%Moon, Jeremy tag=3 data=Australian Journal of Political Science, tag=4 data=26 tag=5 data=3 tag=6 data=1991 tag=7 data=409-428. tag=8 data=POLITICAL PARTIES tag=10 data=The theory of representative government espoused by liberal democracies rests in large part on the assumption that the elected component of government can make the whole machinery of the state responsive to the preferences of citizens, manifested at periodic elections. tag=11 data=1992/4/1 tag=12 data=92/0047 tag=13 data=CAB

National party structure in parliamentary federations: subcontracting electoral mobilisation in Canada and Australia

National parties in the Canadian and Australian parliamentary federations, despite the differences in their federal systems, are dependent for their success in mobilising electoral support on a similar network of local and subnational partisan activity over which they have, at best, only limited control. We find that, over the last 100 years, national parties in both federations have moved through a similar sequence of structural changes, none of which has altered their reliance on subnational agencies for mobilising local support. We argue that these regularities flow from the nature of parliamentary government in these two federations, their origins as federations by aggregation, and the use of single member districts for electing the lower house of their national legislatures.

Leadership Selection Processes and Careers: A Comparison of Australian and Canadian Premiers

In a recent analysis of the role and office of premier in Australia, Sharman, Hughes and Tuffin demonstrate that its fundamental characteristics derive ‘not from interaction with the broader political context but from the inherent logic of [the] constitutional system’. In this paper we test this argument by comparing Australian state premiers with their Canadian provincial counterparts. If Sharman et al. are correct about the institutional imperatives of leadership careers, Canadians and Australians ought to have similar career patterns given the basic similarities between the two systems. Where differences exist, they may be explained by the selection processes used by parties to choose their leaders.

Federalism and New Party Insurgency in Australia

The multiple forums for electoral competition that characterize a federal system might be expected to provide opportunities for new parties to use regional support as a springboard for success in national elections. Yet, since the 1950s, this has not been the pattern for new parties in the Australian federation; three of the four substantial party insurgencies in this period have had national, protest-based, origins. The exception has been the emergence of the Australian Greens with the partys origins in locally based environmental groups and its state organization. This study suggests that a subnationally orientated structure enables a party to take advantage of its federal institutional context and enhances the prospect of a new party enjoying a lasting presence in the party system.