Cara Nine

A Lockean Theory of Territory

In this article I defend a straightforward application of Lockean property arguments to territorial rights. The article is divided into three parts. In the first part I explain the difference between two rights to land: property rights and territorial rights. In the second part I explain why an individualistic account of a Lockean theory of territory cannot be used to theorise about territorial rights. In the third part I defend a collectivist version of Lockean theory of territory. I argue that it is possible to apply directly Lockean principles regarding land use to territorial rights. I punctuate my defence with examples where Lockean principles are intuitively helpful in resolving conflicts over territorial rights.

Global Justice and Territory

Introduction 1. Territorial Rights 2. Natural Law Theory and the General Right to Territory 3. The People and Self-Determination 4. A Lockean Theory of Territory 5. Arbitrariness and Territorial Borders 6. Resource Rights 7. Global Justice and Territory 8. The Lockean Proviso and Ecological Refugee States Bibliography

Symposium ‘Theories of Territory beyond Westphalia’

Is territory a trap? Does the concept of territory trap us into false assumptions of internally homogeneous, externally bounded political communities that exercise uniform sovereignty across their domain? Against the background of debates about territory and the territorial state in international relations, this symposium brings together five contributions in political theory that advance a nuanced and systemic understanding of what territory is. Taken together, they indicate that there is much to the territorial paradigm beyond the modern, sovereign, and territorial state model. There are diverse conceptions of territory, which may be relevant across different legal and political orders. The various conceptual analyses of territory in this symposium suggest that the sovereign state model is only one way in which a sovereign political authority can be territorial. These essays provide the conceptual tools to formulate (and subsequently test) the hypothesis that the transformations in statehood may not be best described in terms of the rise and decline of territorial sovereignty, but as moves from one model of territorially bounded political authority to another. In political theory, it is only in recent years that this foundational concept has received sustained attention from political theorists. This symposium aims to take forward this welcome theoretical development.

When affected interests demand joint self-determination: learning from rivers

International Theory / Volume 6 / Issue 01 / March 2014, pp 157 174 DOI: 10.1017/S1752971914000086, Published online: 06 March 2014 Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1752971914000086 How to cite this article: Cara Nine (2014). When affected interests demand joint self-determination: learning from rivers . International Theory, 6, pp 157-174 doi:10.1017/ S1752971914000086 Request Permissions : Click here

Territory is Not Derived from Property: A Response to Steiner

An individualistic Lockean theory of territory holds that territorial rights are coextensive with and arise from the private property rights of individuals. In this essay I extend and deepen my arguments against this view. This essay is a rejoinder to Hillel Steiners critique of my earlier arguments against the individualistic Lockean theory of territory.

Superseding historic injustice and territorial rights

This essay discusses Jeremy Waldron’s article, ‘Superseding historic injustice’ in which he argues that, in some cases, the historical injustice of territorial conquest and colonization should not be redressed. I argue that Waldron’s argument fails because it does not take into consideration the difference between a right to territorial sovereignty and the right to reside in a territory.

The Emergence of Borders: Moral Questions Mapped Out

In this paper, we examine the extent to which the concept of emergence can be applied to questions about the nature and moral justification of territorial borders. Although the term is used with many different senses in philosophy, the concept of “weak emergence”-advocated by, for example, Sawyer (2002, 2005) and Bedau (1997)-is especially applicable, since it forces a distinction between prediction and explanation that connects with several issues in the dis-cussion of territory. In particular, we argue, weak emergentism about borders allows us to distinguish between (a) using a theory of territory to say where a border should be drawn, and (b) looking at an existing border and saying whether or not it is justified (Miller, 2012; Nine, 2012; Stilz, 2011). Many authors conflate these two factors, or identify them by claiming that having one without the other is in some sense incoherent. But on our account-given the concept of emergence-one might unproblematically be able to have (b) without (a); at the very least, the distinction between these two issues is much more significant than has often been recognised, and more importantly gives us some reason to prefer “statist” as opposed to “cultural” theories of territorial borders. We conclude with some further reflections on related matters concerning, firstly, the apparent causal powers of borders, and secondly, the different ways in which borders are physically implemented (e.g., land vs. water).

Territory in a world of limits: Exploring claims to oil and ice

Abstract Purpose To determine the normative philosophical legitimacy of territorial claims to the Arctic high seas. Methodology/approach In this chapter I sketch a philosophical guideline for determining the scope of territorial rights based on established theories of territorial claims. Findings The scope of territorial rights should be limited to a geographical domain within which a group can establish a site of justice. Because currently a site of justice is not possible in the Arctic high seas, no state can extend a territorial claim to that area. Implications If adopted, this theory would prohibit the establishment of claims to the Arctic high seas made by countries such as Russia, Denmark (via Greenland) and Canada.