Caren Schelleman

The Audit Reporting Debate: Seemingly Intractable Problems and Feasible Solutions

While the audit reporting debate has a long history, a number of recent regulatory initiatives and policy reviews increase the likelihood of change in this area. The purpose of this study is to use this momentum and examine whether there is consensus between audit report users and auditors with regard to the form and content of the audit report. This seems necessary because past audit reporting reforms have failed due to a lack of common ground. Based on interviews with users and auditors, we conclude that reaching a level of consensus seems feasible. Using these insights, we propose an alternative audit reporting model that may significantly reduce the information gap between users and auditors and improve transparency on the quality of audit practice.

Auditing private companies: what do we know?

The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of the literature on what we currently know about the costs and benefits of auditing private company accounts. Our main conclusions are the following. First, there is much heterogeneity in factors driving audit demand in private companies and the value derived from the audit. Second, research provides support for improved financial reporting quality due to, and real economic benefits from, private company audits. Third, the cost–benefit analysis for private company audits is firm-specific and mandating the audit does not seem to be cost-effective and thus economically optimal for all private companies. Alternative services may better meet the needs of especially smaller private companies. Furthermore, mandating the audit is not necessarily an optimal solution since private companies with low demand for a high-quality audit are able to find an auditor that meets their requirements even under a mandatory regime. Hence, having a mandatory audit in place is no guarantee for universally high-quality audits and this seems most salient for private companies where auditors may be more prone to independence issues. We conclude by providing a number of directions for future research.

An Examination of the Relation between Market Structure and the Profitability of Audit Engagements

Due to increasing supplier concentration, there is growing concern regarding the lack of competition in the audit market. Theory based on Cournot oligopoly predicts that increasing concentration will facilitate monopolistic behaviour. Conversely, if the market for audit services has more in common with a Bertrand oligopoly, concentration may not lead to higher fees. We evaluate whether increased audit supplier concentration leads to economic rents by investigating audit profitability. Using proprietary data from a (then) Big 6 audit firm, we find that local market structure has a significant and positive association with audit profitability, but not auditor effort for large clients.