Caren Sureth-Sloane

Can the CCCTB alleviate tax discrimination against loss-making European multinational groups?

In March 2011, the European Commission submitted a proposal for a Council Directive on an optional common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB). If this proposed CCCTB system comes into force, taxes calculated under the currently existing system of separate accounting might be replaced by a system of group consolidation and formulary apportionment. Then, multinational groups (MNGs) would face the decision as to whether to opt for the CCCTB system. Prior research focuses mainly on the differences in economic behaviour under both systems in general. By con-trast, we study the conditions under which one or the other tax system is preferable from the per-spective of an MNG, with a particular focus on loss-offsets. We identify four effects that determine the decision of an MNG: the tax-utilization of losses, the allocation of the tax base, the dividend and intragroup interest taxation. We find mixed results, e.g., that the CCCTB system proves ad-vantageous for increasing loss/profit streams (e.g. from start-ups or R&D projects) of the individual group entities, whereas the system of separate accounting is beneficial for decreasing profit/loss streams (e.g. caused by a decrease in return from a mature product). The results of our analysis are helpful for MNGs facing the decision as to whether to opt for the CCCTB system and can also support legislators and politicians in the EU but also in other regions in their tax reform discussions.

Interest Barrier and Capital Structure Response

The literature suggests that when taking tax effects into account, debt ought to be preferable to equity. Thus, with all else being equal, levered firms are expected to show higher firm values. However, there are no uniform predictions of the size of this tax benefit from interest deductibility nor on the effect of changes in interest deductibility. We believe that the German corporate tax reform in 2008, which introduced an interest barrier, can serve as a promising “quasi-experiment” to investigate the effects from a reform of interest deductibility. A study of this reform on the basis of German financial statement data is of general interest because, first, similar interest barriers have been introduced in several countries and proposed by the OECD to fight BEPS. Second, the major characteristics of the German tax system can be regarded as representative for most European and major Asian countries. Third, single entity financial statements for German companies allows us to capture tax and capital structure details that have not been available in most prior studies. With significance at the 5% level, we find evidence that the companies that are affected by the interest barrier reduce their leverage by 4.7 percentage points more than companies that are not affected by the interest barrier. We are the first to employ a detailed matching approach to the underlying rich dataset, which enables us to overcome several limitations of previous studies. Our results imply that capital structure reactions most likely have been underestimated in previous studies. JEL Classification: F34, H21, H24The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) recently proposed an interest barrier to fight tax base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS). We use the introduction of such an interest deductibility restriction in Germany as a quasi-experiment and find significant corporate capital structure responses. Using single entity financial statements and a detailed matching approach, we find evidence that companies that are affected by the interest barrier reduce their leverage by 4.7 percentage points more than non-affected companies. The effects are stronger among non-financially constrained firms. Our results imply that interest barrier effects on capital structure have so far been heavily underestimated.

Hold or Sell? How Capital Gains Taxation Affects Holding Decisions

An investment that is characterized by exit flexibility requires both decisions on investment and holding period. As selling an investment often leads to tax-liable capital gains and capital gains crucially depend on the duration of an investment we investigate the impact of capital gains taxation on the holding period under three different tax systems. In our analytical investigation we examine whether there is an optimal exit time and if there is no optimal exit time, what would be an appropriate time of sale. Moreover, we determine the worst exit time which should be avoided by investors. We find that while often an immediate sale is optimal longer holding periods may be beneficial under certain conditions. Beyond the well-known impact of the retention policy we clarify that the minimal holding period particularly depends on the degree of income and corporate tax integration. We find, e.g., a high retention rate to extend the minimum holding period under a shareholder relief tax system but is likely to accelerate sales under a classic corporate tax system. These results help to anticipate the economic implications of capital gains taxes on investment. Obviously, depending on the underlying tax system the after-tax profitability of long-term and sustainable investments is particularly affected by capital gains taxes. These results are interesting for both investors and tax politicians.Investments with exit flexibility require decisions regarding both the investment and holding period. Because selling an investment often leads to taxable capital gains, which crucially depend on the duration of an investment, we investigate the impact of capital gains taxation on exit timing under different tax systems. We observed that capital gains taxation delays exit decisions but loses its decision relevance for very long holdings. Often the optimal exit time, which indicates the maximal present value of future cashflows, cannot be determined analytically. However, we identify the breakeven exit time that guarantees present values exceeding those of an immediate sale. While, after-taxes, an immediate sale is often optimal, long holding periods might also be attractive for investors depending on the degree of income and corporate tax integration. A classic corporate tax system often indicates holdings over more than 100 periods. By contrast, a shareholder relief system indicates the earliest breakeven exit time and thus the highest level of exit timing flexibility. Surprisingly, high retention rates are likely to accelerate sales under a classic corporate system. Additionally, the worst exit time, which should be avoided by investors, differs tremendously across tax systems. For an integrated tax system with full imputation, the worst time is reached earlier than under partial or non-integrated systems. These results could help to predict investors’ behavior regarding changes in capital gains taxation and thus are of interest for both investors and tax policymakers. Furthermore, the results emphasize the need to control for the underlying tax system in cross-country empirical studies.

Investment Effects of Wealth Taxes Under Uncertainty and Irreversibility

The growing dissatisfaction with perceived distributional inequality and budgetary constraints gave rise to a discussion on the (re-)introduction of wealth taxes. Wealth taxes are typically levied on private wealth, in some countries also on corporate wealth. To avoid misleading statements concerning possible distributional consequences of wealth taxes, preceding analyses of the economic and particularly investment effects are necessary. As investments drive job creation, tax-induced changes in investment timing may significantly affect the income and wealth distribution. We analyze the impact of wealth taxes on investment timing under uncertainty and irreversibility and the propensity to carry out risky projects. Using a Dixit/Pindyck type real options model we find that wealth taxes have real effects. This means that higher wealth tax rates can either stimulate or depress the propensity to invest in risky projects. We find that apparently paradoxical wealth tax effects (accelerated investment due to higher wealth tax rates) are more likely for low interest rates and for high-risk investments. Using either historical cost or fair value accounting may affect investment timing ambiguously. Thus, the design of wealth taxes is crucial for the resulting delay or acceleration of investment. Although our model takes an individual perspective, our findings are also relevant for the current tax policy discussion on the introduction of wealth taxes. Our results indicate that wealth taxes are particularly harmful for specific classes of investments, for example low-risk investments.

The Impact of Corporate Taxes and Flexibility on Entrepreneurial Decisions with Moral Hazard and Simultaneous Firm and Personal Level Taxation

In this paper we investigate the incentive effects of corporate taxes in an agency setting with a principal facing an investment opportunity including an abandonment option. We are particularly interested in the interplay of taxation and the real option on the principals incentives to motivate the agent to work hard. First, we extend the well-known studies on tax effects on decision making under uncertainty to moral hazard settings. In a benchmark case we find that, as confirmed in current literature, the corporate income tax has no incentive effect. If the principal accounts for the real option we show that paradoxical tax effects may occur. Also, with respect to the effect of the real option on the incentive problem we show that the option makes it less attractive for the principal to induce the agent to exert a high effort.

Tax Loss Offset Restrictions and Biased Perception of Risky Investments

We investigate how tax loss offset restrictions affect an investors evaluation of risky investments under bounded rationality. We analytically identify behavioral tax effects for different levels of loss offset restrictions, tax rate and prospect theoretical biases (loss aversion, probability weighting and reference dependence) and find tax loss offset restrictions significantly bias investor perception, even more heavily than the tax rate. If loss offset restrictions are rather generous, investors are very loss averse or assign a huge weight to loss probabilities, taxation is likely to increase the preference value of risky investments (behavioral tax paradox). Surprisingly, the identified significant perception biases of tax loss offset restrictions occur under both high and low tax rates and thus are relatively insensitive to tax rate changes. Finally, we identify huge differences in behavioral tax effects across countries indicating that tax loss offset restrictions crucially determine the perceived tax quality of a country for risky investments. Our analysis is relevant for policy makers discussing future tax reforms as well as for investors assessing risky investment opportunities.

What are the Drivers of Tax Complexity for Multinational Corporations? Evidence from 108 Countries

All over the world, firms and governments are increasingly concerned about the rise in tax complexity. To manage it and develop effective simplification measures, detailed information on the current drivers of complexity is required. However, research on this topic is scarce. This is surprising as the latest developments - for example, triggered by the BEPS project - give rise to the conjecture that complexity drivers may have changed, thus questioning the findings of prior studies. In this paper, we shed light on this issue and provide a global picture of the current drivers of tax complexity that multinational corporations face based on a survey of 221 highly experienced tax practitioners from 108 countries. Our results show that prior complexity drivers of the tax code are still relevant, with details and changes of tax regulations being the two most influential complexity drivers. We also find evidence for new relevant complexity drivers emerging from different areas of the tax framework, such as inconsistent decisions among tax officers (tax audits) or retroactively applied tax law amendments (tax enactment). Based on the responses of the practitioners, we develop a concept of tax complexity that distinguishes two pillars, tax code and tax framework complexity, and illustrates the various aspects that should be considered when assessing the complexity of a countrys tax system.

Does Capital Tax Uncertainty Delay Irreversible Risky Investment

Tax uncertainty is often claimed to be harmful for investments. Capital taxes, such as property and wealth taxes, are particularly exposed to tax uncertainty. Capital tax uncertainty emerges from expected tax reforms, the unclear outcome of future tax audits, and simplified estimates of capital tax bases in investment models. Uncertain returns on investment as well as stochastic taxation contribute to overall uncertainty and may significantly affect investment decisions. Hitherto, it is unknown how capital tax uncertainty affects investment timing. However, it is well known that both uncertainty and capital tax may be harmful for investment and decelerate investment activities. We are the first to study the investment timing effects of stochastic capital taxes in a real options setting with risky investment opportunities. Our results indicate that even risk neutral investors are sensitive with respect to capital tax risk and may react in a surprising manner to a newly introduced stochastic capital tax. As an apparently paradoxical investment effect, we find that increased capital tax uncertainty can accelerate risky investment if such uncertainty is sufficiently low compared to cash flow uncertainty. In contrast, high capital tax risk delays high-risk innovative investment projects. To reduce unintended consequences of uncertain tax policy, tax legislators and tax authorities should avoid high levels of capital tax uncertainty. Broadening the capital tax base or increasing the capital tax rate induces ambiguous timing effects. Furthermore, high-growth investments are likely to be postponed if they experience a capital tax cut. Since investment reactions upon tax reforms are well-known to affect income and wealth distribution, reliable estimations of the impact of taxes on economic decisions are necessary.

Internationalisierung, Unternehmensgröße und Konzernsteuerquote (Internationalization, Enterprise Size, and Effective Tax Rate)

Als Steuerbelastungsindikator findet die Konzernsteuerquote trotz ihrer methodischen Schwachen zunehmend Verbreitung. Aus steuerlicher Sicht stellt sich die Frage, ob die quantitative Messung der vollstandigen und realitatsnahen unternehmerischen Steuerbelastung mit Hilfe der Konzernsteuerquote branchenindividuell schwankt und welche Faktoren fur diese moglichen Schwankungen ursachlich sind. Im vorliegenden Beitrag werden erstmals die Internationalisierung und die Unternehmensgrose als branchenindividuelle Einflussfaktoren der Konzernsteuerquote ausgewahlter deutscher Konzerne empirisch analysiert. Die Studie legt den Schluss nahe, das allgemeingultige und damit zeitpunkt- und branchenunabhangige Aussagen uber die Wirkung der untersuchten Einflussfaktoren auf die Steuerbelastung nicht gewonnen werden konnen. Despite its well-known shortcomings, scientists and analysts frequently employ the effective tax rate as an indicator of the tax burden. From a tax perspective, the question arises whether the total and realistic corporate tax burden measured by the effective tax rate varies with sectors and, if so, which are the underlying factors of this variation. For the first time, this paper empirically analyzes the influence of internationalization and business size of selected German groups on the effective tax rate. Our findings suggest that no unequivocal statements regarding the effects of these sector-dependent parameters on the corporate tax burden can be made.

Proposals for a European Corporate Taxation and their Influence on Multinationals' Tax Planning

In this paper we analyze reform concepts aiming to harmonize group taxation throughout the EU. The Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) enables European multinationals to determine their tax burden using a common tax base. By contrast, the European Tax Allocation System (ETAS) is based on the tax systems across the EU. We analyze both concepts’ impact on the required minimum rate of return on marginal investment using a dynamic capital budgeting model. Performing various scenarios, we investigate whether the implementation of ETAS or CCCTB fosters or discriminates real investments. We find that tax planning is still possible under both concepts. However, with respect to retention policy, tax planning under ETAS is less feasible than under CCCTB. Under ETAS, investment decisions are more sensitive towards tax rate differentials in the EU. However, a mechanism is implemented in ETAS to prevent a “race to the bottom” of tax rates and to prohibit the relocation of active operations (EU tax credit carry forward). The CCCTB concept does not have such a mechanism. Consequently, ETAS can prevent tax planning by relocating the holding’s domicile from a high-tax to a low-tax country. We highlight the sensitivities, advantages, and drawbacks of both concepts that should be considered when developing a European corporate tax reform and refining the idea of CCCTB.