Carine Franc

Why Did Most French GPs Choose Not to Join the Voluntary National Pay-for-Performance Program?

Background In 2009, a voluntary pay for performance (P4P) scheme for primary care physicians was introduced in France through the ‘Contract for Improving Individual Practice’ (CAPI). Although the contract could be interrupted at any time and without any penalty, two-thirds of French general practitioners chose not to participate. We studied what factors motivated general practitioners not to subscribe to the P4P contract, and particularly their perception of the ethical risks that may be associated with adhering to a CAPI. Method A cross-sectional survey among French general practitioners using an online questionnaire based on focus group discussion results. Descriptive and multivariate statistical analyses with logistic regression. Results A sample of 1,016 respondents, representative of French GPs. The variables that were associated with the probability of not signing a CAPI were “discomfort that patients were not informed of the signing of a P4P contract by their doctors” (OR = 8.24, 95% CI = 4.61–14.71), “the risk of conflicts of interest” (OR = 4.50, 95% CI = 2.42–8.35), “perceptions by patients that doctors may risk breaching professional ethics” (OR = 4. 35, 95% CI = 2.43–7.80) and “the risk of excluding the poorest patients” (OR = 2.66, 95% CI = 1.53–4.63). Conclusion The perception of ethical risks associated with P4P may have hampered its success. Although the CAPI was extended to all GPs in 2012, our results question the relevance of the program itself by shedding light on potential adverse effects.

Obstacles to the uptake of breast, cervical, and colorectal cancer screenings: What remains to be achieved by French national programmes?

BackgroundIn France, equality in access to screening has been one of the main thrusts of public policies implemented between 2009 and 2013 (the national cancer plan). Our aim in this study was to analyse the obstacles to and levers for breast, cervical, and colorectal cancer screening uptake and their trends over time.MethodsBased on representative data from the French Health Care and Health Insurance Survey (three independent, cross-sectional surveys: 2006, 2008, and 2010), multivariate logistic regressions were used to model the association between the nonuse of screening for the three cancers and various independent variables. Then, interactions with survey year dummies allowed the changes in the determinants of these cancer screenings over time to be estimated.ResultsWhereas the incentives for screening were strengthened during the period considered, cervical and breast cancer screenings decreased, and colorectal cancer screenings increased sharply (from 18.2% (95% CI = [17.0-19.4]) in 2006 to 38.9% (95% CI = [37.4-40.5] in 2010. Under-users of the three cancer screenings were primarily unskilled workers (ORcervix = 1.64 [1.38-1.95]), individuals without complementary health insurance (ORbreast = 2.05 [1.68-2.51]), or individuals with free complementary health insurance who more rarely use outpatient care. Moreover, individuals reporting either risky behaviours, namely heavy smokers (ORcolorectal = 1.70) and high-risk drinkers (ORcervix = 1.42) or very safe behaviours, namely neither smoking nor drinking, underused screenings. Despite the implementation of national programmes for breast and colorectal cancer screenings, the disparities and inequalities in screening uptake did not decrease over the study period.ConclusionsThese results demonstrate the need for additional primary prevention efforts targeting the identified under-users by focusing on, for instance, individuals with a very healthy lifestyle. Health authorities could also intensify their efforts to promote increased access to screening for the most disadvantaged individuals.

What determines the income gap between French male and female GPs - the role of medical practices

BackgroundIn many OECD countries, the gender differences in physicians’ pay favour male doctors. Due to the feminisation of the doctor profession, it is essential to measure this income gap in the French context of Fee-for-service payment (FFS) and then to precisely identify its determinants. The objective of this study is to measure and analyse the 2008 income gap between males and females general practitioners (GPs). This paper focuses on the role of gender medical practices differentials among GPs working in private practice in the southwest region of France.MethodsUsing data from 339 private-practice GPs, we measured an average gender income gap of approximately 26% in favour of men. Using the decomposition method, we examined the factors that could explain gender disparities in income.ResultsThe analysis showed that 73% of the income gap can be explained by the average differences in doctors’ characteristics; for example, 61% of the gender income gap is explained by the gender differences in workload, i.e., number of consultations and visits, which is on average significantly lower for female GPs than for male GPs. Furthermore, the decomposition method allowed us to highlight the differences in the marginal returns of doctors’ characteristics and variables contributing to income, such as GP workload; we found that female GPs have a higher marginal return in terms of earnings when performing an additional medical service.ConclusionsThe findings of this study help to understand the determinants of the income gap between male and female GPs. Even though workload is clearly an essential determinant of income, FFS does not reduce the gender income gap, and there is an imperfect relationship between the provision of medical services and income. In the context of feminisation, it appears that female GPs receive a lower income but attain higher marginal returns when performing an additional consultation.

Compulsory private complementary health insurance offered by employers in France: Implications and current debate

In January 2013, within the framework of a National Inter-professional Agreement (NIA), the French government required all employers (irrespective of the size of their business) to offer private complementary health insurance to their employees from January 2016. The generalization of group complementary health insurance to all employees will directly affect insurers, employers and employees, as well as individuals not directly concerned (students, retirees, unemployed and civil servants). In this paper, we present the issues raised by this regulation, the expected consequences and the current debate around this reform. In particular, we argue that this reform may have adverse effects on equity of access to complementary health insurance in France, since the risk structure of the market for individual health insurance will change, potentially increasing inequalities between wage-earners and others. Moreover, tax exemptions given to group contracts are problematic because public funds used to support these contracts can be higher at individual level for high-salary individuals than those allocated to improve access for the poorest. In response to the criticism and with the aim of ensuring equity in the system, the government decided to reconsider some of the fiscal advantages given to group contracts, to enhance programs and aids dedicated to the poorest and to redefine an overall context of incentives.

Effect of pay-for-performance on cervical cancer screening participation in France

Pay-for-performance (P4P) has been increasingly used across different healthcare settings to incentivize the provision of targeted services. In this study, we investigated the effect of a nationwide P4P scheme for general practitioners implemented in 2012 in France, on cervical cancer screening practices. Using data from a nationally representative permanent sample of health insurance beneficiaries, we analyzed smear test use of eligible women for the years 2006–2014. Our longitudinal sample was an unbalanced panel comprising 180,167 women eligible from 1 to 9 years each. We took into account that during our study period some women were exposed to another incentive for screening participation: the implementation in 2010 of organized screening (OS) in a limited number of areas. To evaluate the effect of P4P, we defined three different measures of smear utilization. For each measure, we specified binary panel-data models to estimate annual probabilities and to compare each estimate to the 2011 baseline level. To explore the combined effect of P4P and OS in areas exposed to both incentives, we computed interaction terms between year dummies and area of residence. We found that P4P had a modest positive effect on recommended screening participation. This effect is likely to be transient as annual smear use, both for the whole sample and among women overdue for screening, increased only in 2013 and decreased again in 2014. The combined effect of P4P and OS on screening participation was not cumulative during the first years of coexistence.

Supplemental Health Insurance and Healthcare Consumption—A Dynamic Approach to Moral Hazard

We analyze the existence and persistence of moral hazard over time to test the assumption of pent-up demand. We consider the effects of supplemental health insurance provided by a private insurer when added to compulsory public insurance that is already supplemented by private insurance. Using original panel data from a French mutuelle, we study the influence of insurance on all of the dimensions of healthcare expenditures: (1) the probability of using health care, (2) the number of uses conditional on use, and (3) the per unit cost of care. To conduct this study, we control, to the extent possible, for endogeneity because of adverse selection using the characteristics of our panel data. Our study allows us to confirm a positive and significant effect of the extra complementary health insurance on healthcare consumption, primarily in terms of the probability of using care. More interestingly, our results show that these effects are principally transitory mainly for the probability of using dental care and optical care and depend on income. Finally, we show that individuals did not postpone health care before enrollment. Copyright