Carl Kitchens

A Dam Problem: TVA's Fight Against Malaria, 1926–1951

The TVA has been applauded for its anti-malaria programs in the Southeast during the 1930s and 1940s. However, the TVA developed their anti-malaria programs because they created lakes suitable for mosquito breeding. To estimate the relationship between the TVA and malaria, I construct a county-level panel data from the Southeast United States. I find that the net effect of the TVA was to increase malaria rates following its construction. Using statistical life value estimates, I find that the hidden malaria cost of the TVA offset 24 percent of the fiscal stimulus multiplier generated by the TVA.

Flip the Switch: The Impact of the Rural Electrification Administration 1935–1940

To isolate the impact of access to electricity on local economies, we examine the impact of the Rural Electrification Administration low-interest loans in the 1930s. The REA provided loans to cooperatives to lay distribution lines to farms and aid in wiring homes. Consequently, the number of rural farm homes electrified doubled in the United States within five years. We develop a panel data set for the 1930s and use changes within counties over time to identify the effect of the REA loans on a wide range of socio-economic measures. The REA loans contributed significantly to increases in crop output and crop productivity and helped stave off declines in overall farm output, productivity, and land values, but they had much smaller effects on nonagricultural parts of the economy. The ex-ante subsidy from the low-interest loans was large, but after the program was completed, nearly all of the loans were fully repaid, and the ultimate cost to the taxpayer was relatively low.

The Impact of Award Uncertainty on Settlement Negotiations

Legal disputes are often negotiated under the backdrop of an adjudicated award. While settlements are common, they are not universal. In this paper, we empirically explore how uncertainty in adjudicated awards impacts settlement negotiations. To do so, we develop an experimental design to test how increases in variance and positive skewness of the award distribution impact negotiations and settlement rates. We find increases in variance decrease settlement rates, while increases in skewness generally increases settlement rates. We also gather individual measures of risk aversion and prudence, and incorporate these measures into the analysis to test for heterogeneous treatment effects. Overall, our results suggest that highly variable adjudicated awards can contribute to the excess use of inefficient litigation, while more positively skewed awards can reduce the use of inefficient litigation.

Identifying Changes in the Spatial Distribution of Crime: Evidence from a Referee Experiment in the National Football League

Between the 2009–2010 and 2010–2011 seasons, the National Football League (NFL) repositioned one of its officials in order to prevent injuries among officials. This creates a quasi‐experiment for studying how a change in the extent of policing affects detection of offenses. Using play‐by‐play data from the 2009–2010 and 2010–2011 NFL season, I estimate how the detection of offensive holding changes when the positioning of an official changes. I find that there is approximately a 20 increase in the number of offensive holding penalties called after the NFL repositioned the official. Penalties called on defensive linemen fell as a result of the repositioning. Overall, there was no change in the total number of penalties called. Using the estimated change in the probability of a penalty, I estimate the probability of an official calling a penalty. I infer that NFL officials detect approximately 60% of crimes committed on the field.