Carla Fehr

TIME AND RECRUITMENT COSTS AS CURRENCIES IN MANIPULATION STUDIES ON THE COSTS OF REPRODUCTION

Life history theory predicts that parents will have lower Darwinian fitness if they tend clutches that are above or below the size they naturally produce. We experimentally tested for relationships between fitness and clutch size in Tree Swallow (Tachycineta bicolor) offspring and parents. Over 130 trios of nests initiated on the same day were randomly divided among reduce (-3 eggs), control (3 eggs picked up and replaced), or add (+3 eggs) manipulations. Pre-manipulation modal clutch size was six eggs (range before manipulations was 1-10; afterwards, it was 1-11). Hatching took longer in larger clutches, but the proportion of eggs hatching and fledging was similar for clutches from 4 to 10, so that clutches of 10 produced the maximum number of fledgling. Parental feeding rates were higher for larger broods, but per capita feeds to nestlings were fewer, and nestlings were smaller. Nonetheless, survival of both young and adults, based on recaptures in subsequent years, was not significantly affected by manipulations. Manipulations also had no significant effect on subsequent reproduction, including the number of fledglings produced by either local recruits or returning breeders. Collectively, our results failed to detect fitness costs associated with tending larger clutches for either parents or the offspring reared and suggested directional selection for larger clutch size. However, because clutches that hatch later produce fewer recruits, the extra days required to lay more eggs and to fledge extra young may eliminate a large part of the advantage that would accrue to parents producing enlarged clutches. For example, our data suggest that there may be less than a 16% benefit to producing nine instead of six eggs, rather than 50%, as is suggested by experimentally manipulated egg numbers alone. Thus, time, rather than costs of reproduction, may be the crucial constraint selecting against Tree Swallows laying larger clutches.

Socially relevant philosophy of science: an introduction

This paper provides an argument for a more socially relevant philosophy of science (SRPOS). Our aims in this paper are to characterize this body of work in philosophy of science, to argue for its importance, and to demonstrate that there are significant opportunities for philosophy of science to engage with and support this type of research. The impetus of this project was a keen sense of missed opportunities for philosophy of science to have a broader social impact. We illustrate various ways in which SRPOS can provide social benefits, as well as benefits to scientific practice and philosophy itself. Also, SRPOS is consistent with some historical and contemporary goals of philosophy of science. We’re calling for an expansion of philosophy of science to include more of this type of work. In order to support this expansion, we characterize philosophy of science as an epistemic community and examine the culture and practices of philosophy of science that can help or hinder research in this area.

What Is in It for Me? The Benefits of Diversity in Scientific Communities

I investigate the reciprocal relationship between social accounts of knowledge production and efforts to increase the representation of women and some minorities in the academy. In particular, I consider the extent to which feminist social epistemologies such as Helen Longino’s critical contextual empiricism can be employed to argue that it is in researchers’ epistemic interest to take active steps to increase gender diversity. As it stands, critical contextual empiricism does not provide enough resources to succeed at this task. However, considering this view through an employment equity lens highlights areas where such theories need to be further developed. I argue that views such as Longino’s ought to attend to nuances of community structure and cultural features that inhibit critical social interactions, if we are to maximize the epistemic as well as the ethical improvements associated with a social approach to knowing. These developments advance these epistemic theories for their own sake. They also help develop these theories into a tool that can be used by those calling for increased diversity in the academy.

The Evolution of Sex: Domains and Explanatory Pluralism

The evolution of sexual reproduction is a striking case of explanatory pluralism, meaning that one needs to refer to more than one explanation in order to adequately account for it. I develop the concept a domain of phenomena in order to analysis this pluralism. Pluralism exists when a phenomenon can be included in more that one homogeneous domain or in a heterogeneous domain. I argue that in some cases domain partitioning can be used to decrease pluralism, but that in the case of sex domains are overlapping and interconnecting, or in other words bear an orthogonal relationship to one another, and hence cannot be partitioned in such a way as to eliminate pluralism.

Are Smart Men Smarter than Smart Women? The Epistemology of Ignorance, Women, and the Production of Knowledge

This uniquely interdisciplinary study offers a provocative, contemporary look at the ‘Woman Question’ in relation to higher education at the dawn of the twenty-first century. Leading feminist scholars from a wide variety of perspectives and disciplines — including history, philosophy, education, psychology, sociology, and economics — evaluate the role of biology, discrimination, and choice in rationalizing women’s exclusion from fully participating in the process of knowledge production, as well as examining institutional impediments. Contextualizing arguments against women’s inclusion and including contemporary perspectives on gender, this book offers a rich, multi-layered examination and critical insights into understanding the near universal difficulties that women encounter as they seek to participate fully in the process of knowledge production.

Pluralism and Sex: More Than a Pragmatic Issue

The evolution of sexual reproduction is a case of explanatory pluralism, meaning that there is more than one explanation for this phenomenon. I use the concept of a domain to more clearly explicate the various explananda that can be found in this case. I argue that although pluralism with respect to some types of domains can be decreased using van Fraassens pragmatics of explanation, there remains an important class of domain, an orthogonal domain, for which this is not the case.