Carlos Chávez

Effective Enforcement of a Transferable Emissions Permit System with a Self-Reporting Requirement

We propose an enforcement strategy to achieve complete compliance in a transferable emissions permit system when firms are required to provide reports of their own emissions. Like the literature on self-reporting in the enforcement of standards, we find that self-reporting can conserve monitoring costs, but for a different reason. In addition, we show that targeted monitoring—the practice of monitoring some firms more closely than others—is not necessary in a competitive permit system. Furthermore, tying penalties to the equilibrium permit price can stabilize the monitoring effort necessary to maintain full compliance in the face of permit price fluctuations.

Enforcing Transferable Permit Systems in the Presence of Market Power

We derive an enforcementstrategy for a transferable permit system inthe presence of market power that achievescomplete compliance in a cost-effective manner.We show that the presence of a firm with marketinfluence makes designing an enforcementstrategy more difficult than enforcing aperfectly competitive system. We alsore-consider Hahns (1984) suggestion that afirm with market influence should be allocatedpermits so that it chooses to not participatein the permit market. When enforcement and itscosts are taken into account, Hahns suggestiondoes not hold except in a very special case.

The optimal pricing of pollution when enforcement is costly

We consider the pricing of a uniformly mixed pollutant when enforcement is costly with a model of optimal, possibly firm-specific, emissions taxes and their enforcement. We argue that optimality requires an enforcement strategy that induces full compliance by every firm. This holds whether or not regulators have complete information about firms’ abatement costs, the costs of monitoring them for compliance, or the costs of collecting penalties from noncompliant firms. Moreover, ignoring several unrealistic special cases, optimality requires discriminatory emissions taxes except when regulators are unable to observe firms’ abatement costs, the costs of monitoring individual firms, or any firm-specific characteristic that is known to be jointly distributed with either the firms’ abatement costs or their monitoring costs. In many pollution control settings, especially those that have been subject to various forms of environmental regulation in the past, regulators are not likely to be so ill-informed about individual firms. In these settings, policies that set or generate a uniform pollution price like conventional designs involving uniform taxes and competitive emission trading with freely-allocated or auctioned permits will not be efficient.

Determinants of compliance in the emissions compensation program in Santiago, Chile

The Emissions Compensation (EC) Program in Santiago, Chile, has been affected from the beginning by the incidence of individual violations of maximum-emission capacity permits. Based on information at the individual source level, in this paper we develop and estimate a model explaining the individual compliance decision with emission capacity permits. Our results indicate that the compliance behavior of sources during the period 1993–1999 do in fact depend on their individual characteristics. Among other factors, type of equipment used, industrial sector to which the source belongs, fuel type used, the initial allocation of emission capacity permits to the source, and population density as well as average income in the area where the source is located, turn out to be relevant. Furthermore, the evidence does not allow us to reject the presence of structural change in the individual decision to comply with permit holdings because of the introduction of natural gas in the Metropolitan Region of Santiago at the end of 1997.

Controlling Urban Air Pollution Caused by Households: Uncertainty, Prices, and Income

We examine the control of air pollution caused by households burning wood for heating and cooking in the developing world. Since the problem is one of controlling emissions from nonpoint sources, regulations are likely to be directed at household choices of wood consumption and combustion technologies. Moreover, these choices are subtractions from, or contributions to, the pure public good of air quality. Consequently, the efficient policy design is not independent of the distribution of household income. Since it is unrealistic to assume that environmental authorities can make lump sum income transfers part of control policies, efficient control of air pollution caused by wood consumption entails a higher tax on wood consumption and a higher subsidy for more efficient combustion technologies for higher income households. Among other difficulties, implementing a policy to promote the adoption of cleaner combustion technologies must overcome the seemingly paradoxical result that efficient control calls for higher technology subsidies for higher income households.

Who Should Pay the Administrative Costs of an ITQ Fishery

Abstract Implementation and management of an ITQ fishery involves significant and costly administrative activities. These activities include formulating and implementing policy rules, monitoring and enforcement to deter illegal behavior, and economic and marine research. In this article we construct a model of a competitive ITQ system to analyze how the distribution of administrative costs between the public and a fishing industry can affect the equilibrium in the quota market, including equilibrium level of administrative costs, and derive results about the optimal distribution of these costs. JEL Classification Codes: L51, Q22

The Choice of Policy Instruments to Control Pollution under Costly Enforcement and Incomplete Information

We analyze the cost of enforcing a system of firm specific emissions standards vis a vis a transferable emissions permit system in the context of complete and incomplete information. We also examine the optimality of a transferable emissions permit system when abatement costs and enforcement costs are considered. We show that under incomplete information, regulation based on each firm-specific emissions standards cannot be less costly than a transferable emissions permit system. In addition, we find that the distribution of emissions that minimize aggregate program costs differ from the distribution of emissions generated by a competitive transferable emissions permit system.

A Note on Emissions Taxes and Incomplete Information

In contrast with what we perceive is the conventional wisdom about setting emissions taxes under uncertainty, we demonstrate that setting a uniform tax equal to expected marginal damage is not generally efficient under incomplete information about firms’ abatement costs and damages from pollution. We show that efficient taxes will deviate from expected marginal damage if there is uncertainty about the slopes of the marginal abatement costs of regulated firms. Moreover, efficient emissions tax rates will vary across firms if a regulator can use observable firm-level characteristics to gain some information about how the firms’ marginal abatement costs vary.

Using stated preference methods to design cost-effective subsidy programs to induce technology adoption: An application to a stove program in southern Chile

We study the design of an economic incentive based program - a subsidy - to induce adoption of more efficient technology in a pollution reduction program in southern Chile. Stated preferences methods, contingent valuation (CV), and choice experiment (CE) are used to estimate the probability of adoption and the willingness to share the cost of a new technology by a household. The cost-effectiveness property of different subsidy schemes is explored numerically for different regulatory objectives. Our results suggest that households are willing to participate in voluntary programs and to contribute by paying a share of the cost of adopting more efficient technologies. We find that attributes of the existing and the new technology, beyond the price, are relevant determinant factors of the participation decision and payment. Limited access to credit markets for low income families can be a major barrier for an effective implementation of these types of programs. Variations in the design of the subsidy and on the regulators objective and constraints can have significant impact on the level and the cost of reduction of aggregate emissions achieved.

Determinants of economic performance for coastal managed areas in central-southern Chile

We study the economic performance of Benthic Resource Management Areas (BRMAs) in central-southern Chile. The analysis considers 26 managed areas with Agreements of Use declaring Chilean abalone ( Concholepas concholepas ) to be the main exploited benthic resource from 2001 to 2003. Our analysis explores the role played by several characteristics thought to be potential BRMA performance determinants. These variables were defined and grouped into four types: economic, environmental–biological, institutional–organizational, and organizational leader. Our results indicate that the price of Chilean abalone, the size of the habitable area, the target resource density, the density of other resources, and leader experience are determinant factors for the economic performance of the BRMAs under study.