Carlos Cornejo

ERPs and contextual semantic discrimination: Degrees of congruence in wakefulness and sleep

This study explores whether the brain can discriminate degrees of semantic congruency during wakefulness and sleep. Experiment 1 was conducted during wakefulness to test degrees of congruency by means of N400 amplitude. In Experiment 2, the same paradigm was applied to a different group of participants during natural night sleep. Stimuli were 108 sentences (definitions with two attributes) with four possible degrees of congruence as ending targets. In both studies, the amplitude of N400-like effect showed modulation according to the degree of congruency. The results indicate that the brain can accomplish sentential semantic discriminations not only in wakefulness but also in sleep.

Gesture and Metaphor Comprehension: Electrophysiological Evidence of Cross-Modal Coordination by Audiovisual Stimulation.

In recent years, studies have suggested that gestures influence comprehension of linguistic expressions, for example, eliciting an N400 component in response to a speech/gesture mismatch. In this paper, we investigate the role of gestural information in the understanding of metaphors. Event related potentials (ERPs) were recorded while participants viewed video clips of an actor uttering metaphorical expressions and producing bodily gestures that were congruent or incongruent with the metaphorical meaning of such expressions. This modality of stimuli presentation allows a more ecological approach to meaning integration. When ERPs were calculated using gesture stroke as time-lock event, gesture incongruity with metaphorical expression modulated the amplitude of the N400 and of the late positive complex (LPC). This suggests that gestural and speech information are combined online to make sense of the interlocutors linguistic production in an early stage of metaphor comprehension. Our data favor the idea that meaning construction is globally integrative and highly context-sensitive.

High contextual sensitivity of metaphorical expressions and gesture blending: A video event-related potential design

Human communication in a natural context implies the dynamic coordination of contextual clues, paralinguistic information and literal as well as figurative language use. In the present study we constructed a paradigm with four types of video clips: literal and metaphorical expressions accompanied by congruent and incongruent gesture actions. Participants were instructed to classify the gesture accompanying the expression as congruent or incongruent by pressing two different keys while electrophysiological activity was being recorded. We compared behavioral measures and event related potential (ERP) differences triggered by the gesture stroke onset. Accuracy data showed that incongruent metaphorical expressions were more difficult to classify. Reaction times were modulated by incongruent gestures, by metaphorical expressions and by a gesture-expression interaction. No behavioral differences were found between the literal and metaphorical expressions when the gesture was congruent. N400-like and LPC-like (late positive complex) components from metaphorical expressions produced greater negativity. The N400-like modulation of metaphorical expressions showed a greater difference between congruent and incongruent categories over the left anterior region, compared with the literal expressions. More importantly, the literal congruent as well as the metaphorical congruent categories did not show any difference. Accuracy, reaction times and ERPs provide convergent support for a greater contextual sensitivity of the metaphorical expressions.

Intersubjectivity as Co-phenomenology: From the Holism of Meaning to the Being-in-the-world-with-others

I outline in this paper a pragmatical approach to meaning. Meaning is defined as a phenomenologically experienced construal. As such, it is a dynamic object whose first evidence comes from the first person rather than the third one. At the same time, the approach assumes that meaning is not an individual creation, but rather an intersubjective one. Origins of meaning are also to be founded not ‘in the head’ of a cognitive system or subject, but in the intersubjective space contingently formed between a subject (S), an other (O) and a common object (R), which they talk about. Approaching this minimal communicative situation therefore requires realizing that the phenomenological dimension is always implied in any intersubjective encounter. The observed synchronized co-feeling among subjects, upon which language comprehension takes place, I call ‘co-phenomenology’. When analyzed in this way, intersubjectivity shows at the same time its social, phenomenological and biological dimensions.

Contrasting Vygotsky’s and Bakhtin’s approaches to consciousness

Matusov (2011) sustains that Vygotsky and Bakhtin represent irreconcilable theoretical approaches. In his view, Vygotsky’s model is monologic and universalist, while Bakhtin’s is dialogic and pluralist. Although the two authors differ importantly, one cannot speak of irreconcilability for two main reasons. First, Vygotsky’s approach is much more multifaceted and even contradictory than usually thought. In fact, his concept of sense echoes the Romanticist claim that experience exceeds the limits of language. Second, a dialogical conception of mind is not outside the reach of Hegelian tradition, which, in Matusov interpretation, is where Vygotsky’s approach comes from. I emphasize that Bakhtin’s unit of analysis is the voice—a concept more sociologic than psychological. “Voice” is insensitive to selfhood and should not be taken as synonymous of “person.” Notwithstanding, Vygotsky and Bakhtin share beliefs with respect to the social constitution of the mind that allow including them in the same research program.

The physiognomic and the geometrical apprehensions of metaphor

This article presents the evolution of Heinz Werner’s thought on metaphor from 1919 until Symbol Formation (1963). Early on, he distinguished between the logical and the psychological approach to metaphor, where the former analyzes the conceptual conflation produced by metaphor and the latter centers on the subjective experience of this incongruence. Starting with an inquiry into direct experience, he initially develops the notion of pneuma and later that of physiognomy. In Symbol Formation, Werner and Kaplan (1963) expand this distinction by introducing the concept of physiognomic and geometric properties of language in general. We argue that the holistic-developmental approach is deeply related to the vitalist and romantic traditions of the 19th century. We analyze three theories of metaphor after 1963: conceptual metaphor, semiotic anthropology, and contextual approaches to metaphor. We argue that while the first of these follows the traditional logical–geometrical approach to language, the latter two may better reflect the spirit of Werner and Kaplan.

Neurodynamics of Mind: The Arrow Illusion of Conscious Intentionality as Downward Causation

In cognitive neuroscience, the reissue of the notion of emergence and downward causation has been used as an interlevel model of mind-brain interactions from different perspectives. Within this perspective, intentionality has been interpreted as global to local determination (downward causation) on the neurophysiological level. Consciousness would act as the large-scale, global activity of the system that governs or constrains local interactions of neurons. This argument seems to solve several difficulties with regard to descriptions of consciousness on a neurophysiological and mental level. Nevertheless, the inconsistencies of this argument are shown, and a contextual and pragmatic explanation of the downward causation of consciousness is given.

Theories and Theorizers: A Contextual Approach to Theories of Cognition

An undisputable characteristic of cognitive science is its enormous diversity of theories. Not surprisingly, these often belong to different paradigms that focus on different processes and levels of analysis. A related problem is that researchers of cognition frequently seem to ascribe to incompatible approaches to research, creating a Tower of Babel of cognitive knowledge. This text presents a pragmatic model of meta-theoretical analysis, a theory conceived of to examine other theories, which allows cognitive theories to be described, integrated and compared. After a brief introduction to meta-theoretical analysis in cognitive science, the dynamic and structural components of a theory are described. The analysis of conceptual mappings between components and explanation strategies is also described, as well as the processes of intra-theory generalization and inter-theory comparison. The various components of the meta-theoretical model are presented with examples of different cognitive theories, mainly focusing on two current approaches to research: The dynamical approach to cognition and the computer metaphor of mind. Finally, two potential counter arguments to the model are presented and discussed.

Psychology is About Persons: On Brinkmann’s Expansion of Harré’s Hybrid Psychology

Brinkmann has recently put forward an integrative theory of the mind by expanding Harré’s hybrid psychology. The theory is integrative because it establishes that in order for one to gain a full understanding of the mind—which is represented as a set of dispositions—one has to take into account theories about the brain, the body, social practices, and technological artifacts. All of these are said to be ‘mediators’ upon which the mind depends. An important claim underlying the theory is that in psychology the basic ontological unit is the person. We agree with Brinkmann both on this and on the dispositional nature of the mind. Still, he does not make a strong case for the latter. Furthermore, we believe the concept of mediation is by no means helpful to produce an integrative view in psychology, not only because the theoretical job of such a concept is unclear but also because qua unifying concept it may end up undermining the ontological primacy of the person (in psychology). In this paper we refer to these issues and suggest some ideas that may help improve Brinkmann’s (and Harré’s) proposal.

Commentary: Using ‘Use’: Pragmatic Consequences of the Metaphor of Culture as Resources

In this essay I comment on the paper by Gillespie and Zittoun (2009). I argue that the metaphor of culture as a set of resources entails that there be an agent with a certain purpose, whose action converts something into an instrument. In this sense, the metaphor is cryptointentionalist. This arises from the fact that every use of a cultural resource is an action, that is, something done with intention. I also argue that being aware of this intention is part of the basic condition for understanding human action. I analyze the problems of cultural psychology in adopting intentionalist terminology, showing that this rests on the inclusion of a dyadic conception of meaning for a considerable part of the field. In contrast, the adoption of a triadic conception of meaning—e.g., C.S. Peirce’s semiotics—avoids the difficulties of integrating social meaning with personal intentionality. I question Vygotsky’s inherited sign/tool distinction, arguing that it poses a problem for the analysis offered by Gillespie and Zittoun. Finally, I recommend making an explicit connection between phenomenological descriptions of human action and the culture-psychological concepts concerning the internalization of cultural resources.