Carlos J. Moya

Boghossian's "Reductio" of Compatibilism

In a number of papers,1 Paul Boghossian has argued against the compatibility between content externalism and self-knowledge by trying to show that, if externalism is correct, then there are possible situations in which a subject would be systematically wrong about the identity and difference of his thought contents. These possible situations involve the subjects being unwittingly switched between, say, Earth and Twin Earth. In this case, he would judge that two of his thoughts are of the same type when, on an externalist individuation, they are not. In Boghossians terms, externalism is incompatible with transparency of mental content. This line of

Paraoxonases: metabolic role and pharmacological projection

Atherosclerosis is one of the leading causes of death in Western countries, with high-density lipoproteins (HDL) playing an important protective role due to their ability to inhibit oxidation of low-density lipoproteins (LDL), thus relieving vascular subendothelial damage. One of the proteins constituting HDL particles is paraoxonase-1 (PON1), an enzyme able to hydrolyze aryl esters, lactones, and organophosphates. Other closely related paraoxonases are designated as PON2, which is a protein localized inside many different kinds of cells, and PON3, not only present in HDL but also in mitochondria and endoplasmic reticulum, as well. Given that the amount and the activity of PON1 in human serum are significantly lower in people suffering from cardiovascular diseases, enhancing both parameters might contribute to their treatment and prevention. One of the physiologically interesting substrates for the abovementioned hydrolytic cleavage is homocysteine thiolactone (HTL), an atherothrombotic active form of homocysteine. Although it was therefore postulated that PON1 would participate in preventing the HTL-mediated lipid peroxidation, some attention is recently paid to other enzymes, like biphenyl hydrolase-like protein, that seem to more selectively involved in lowering this risk factor. The aim of this paper is to elucidate the role of paraoxonases, especially PON1, by reviewing the latest studies in order to understand both its physiological role and modulation by drugs, nutrients, and plant extracts.

Alternatives and Responsibility: An Asymmetrical Approach

In this chapter, I defend an asymmetrical view concerning the relationship between alternative possibilities (APs) and moral responsibility (MR), according to which APs are required for being blameworthy, but not praiseworthy, for what one decides or does. I defend the nonnecessity of alternatives for praiseworthiness through an examination of what I call “Luther” examples. My defense of the necessity of alternatives for blameworthiness proceeds instead through an analysis of so-called Frankfurt examples. In both cases, my arguments rest on the contention that, in ascriptions of MR, the primary question is not whether the agent could have done otherwise, but whether she should have done what she did, so that the former question only becomes pressing when the answer to the latter is negative. Concerning MR, then, the concept of moral obligation or duty is prior to that of APs.

Introduction: responsibility for action and belief

Research on moral responsibility and the related problem of free will is among the liveliest areas in contemporary analytical philosophy. Traditionally, these problems have been dealt with in connection with actions and decisions. More recently, they also have been extended to beliefs, and this extension has thrown some more light on the more traditional concerns. These problems were the central subject of a recent philosophical meeting, the International Workshop on Belief, Responsibility, and Action, which took place in Valencia (Spain) in November 2008. This special issue of Philosophical Explorations takes its origin in this meeting. It was a complementary activity of the research project Belief, Responsibility, and Action (HUM2006-04907), financed by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (in collaboration with the European Regional Development fund of the European Community), the Autonomous Government of the Valencian Community, and the University of Valencia. Some of the papers included in this special issue were actually presented and discussed during that meeting, while others have been written especially for the occasion. All the authors and S.E. Cuypers, associate editor of Philosophical Explorations – whose paper does not appear here, owing to the journal’s deontological code – were invited speakers to the workshop in Valencia. The main contenders in the debate on free action, free will, and moral responsibility are the following. Compatibilism is the view that free will, free action, and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism. Incompatibilism is the denial of compatibilism. Libertarians are incompatibilists who believe that at least some of us, at times, perform free decisions and actions for which we are responsible. Therefore, they deny determinism. Hard determinists are incompatibilists who accept determinism and, consequently, hold that there are no free decisions or actions, and no moral responsibility, either. Although incompatibilists may also remain agnostic about determinism, they hold that, if it is true, then hard determinists are right in denying free will and moral responsibility. Hard incompatibilists concur with hard determinists about the contention that free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism, but add that these properties are also incompatible with indeterminism. Hard incompatibilists are, then, sceptical about the reality of free will and moral responsibility at whatever world.

Content, Meaning and Truth

Anil Gupta’s book Empiricism and Experience (2006) is a rich and complex piece of work, whose main aim is to elucidate the rational contribution of experience to knowledge. A minimally complete account and assessment of this work would be too ambitious a task for us to undertake. In fact, our purpose in this contribution will be quite modest. We intend to comment, in a critical spirit, on a distinction that Gupta uses in this work and that he had already introduced in a previous article of his, “Meaning and Misconceptions” (1999), namely the distinction between the absolute and the effective content of an assertion. The distinction is meant to explain how some of our assertions can engage with the world and actually be true even if they involve a wrong, or even incoherent, conception of things. In the context of Empiricism and Experience, one role of the distinction is to help us understand how some assertions about sense-data (such as: “That orange sense-datum is oval”) can have an intelligible, even true, content even if sense-data theories of the given in experience lead to scepticism or to idealism and are quite probably false. The aforementioned distinction may dissipate this apparent conflict. However, we take this distinction to have rather unwelcome consequences and we think Gupta’s work would be better off without it. Let us argue for this contention. An example of Gupta’s may shed some additional light on the nature and role of the distinction we are considering. Suppose that an ancient, geocentric astronomer says, “The Sun is in the constellation Capricorn today.” Intuitively, we feel that there is