Carolina Sartorio

Making a Difference in a Deterministic World

Determinism precludes moral responsibility, some think, because causally determined agents cannot make a difference in the world. Let’s say that I raise my arm at a certain time. If determinism is true, there is nothing I could have done that would have resulted in a different state of affairs, that is, in my not raising my arm at that time. For my raising my arm was bound to happen, given the remote past and the laws of nature. In addition, there is nothing I could have done to make it the case that the remote past or the laws were different. Hence, there is nothing I could have done to make it the case that I didn’t raise my arm at the time. It follows that all of our choices and acts are unavoidable, and so is everything that happens in the world (see van Inwagen 1983, chap. 3; and Ginet 1990, chap. 5). In response, some philosophers have conceded that causally determined agents cannot make a difference in the world, but they have argued that it doesn’t follow from this that determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility, for causally determined agents can be respon-

TWO WRONGS DO NOT MAKE A RIGHT: RESPONSIBILITY AND OVERDETERMINATION

In this paper I critically examine Michael Moores views about responsibility in overdetermination cases. Moore argues for an asymmetrical view concerning actions and omissions: whereas our actions can make us responsible in overdetermination cases, our omissions cannot. Moore argues for this view on the basis of a causal claim: actions can be causes but omissions cannot. I suggest that we should reject Moores views about responsibility and overdetermination. I argue, in particular, that our omissions (just like our actions) can make us responsible in overdetermination cases. I go on to provide an account of how this may be possible.

Resultant Luck and the Thirsty Traveler

Resultant luck (luck about outcomes or consequences) is typically considered to be the most problematic form of moral luck. In this paper I argue that there is a different and as of yet unexplored reason to think this. For there is a manifestation of the phenomenon of resultant luck that seems especially puzzling, much more puzzling than the standardly recognized forms of luck: one that has its source, not in the agents’ lack of control over their own contributions, but exclusively in their lack of control over the contributions of other agents or mechanisms. I illustrate with the famous example of the thirsty traveler from the literature on causation in the law.

[Reply] Reply to Talbert

I respond to two of Talbert’s comments. The first point concerns his diagnosis of the source of the puzzles in thirsty-traveler type cases; the second concerns his views on blameworthiness and moral luck.