Caroline Cauffman
Maastricht University
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Featured researches published by Caroline Cauffman.
European Competition Journal | 2012
Caroline Cauffman
A cartel agreement is often followed by a number of contracts concluded between one of the cartelists and a third party to realise the cartel’s profits. In the case of a “traditional” price-fixing cartel, these are the agreements between each of the cartelists and their purchasers, concluded at cartelised prices. In the case of bid-rigging, it is the contract concluded between the procurer and the “winning” bid-rigger. Cartel agreements are considered to be the most harmful competition law infringements because they increase prices and decrease innovation and choice. Article 101 TFEU therefore declares these pernicious agreements void if they have a significant effect on competition within the internal market and on trade between the Member States, and do not fall under any of the exemptions of Article 101(3) TFEU. In addition, the Commission and the national competition authorities may impose severe fines on the cartelists, even when they have not applied the cartelised prices or conditions. The actual harmful effect of a price-fixing cartel is realised, however, when the cartelised goods or services are sold at cartelised prices or conditions. This raises the question whether, in addition to the cartel agreement, the agreements with third parties concluded at cartelised prices or conditions are not, or should not be, entirely or partially (insofar as the contract is affected by the cartel agreement) void, voidable or otherwise not fully binding. In theory, the validity of such contracts with third parties can be affected by: a rule of EU competition law: a rule of national competition law; a national rule of general contract law which extends the consequences of the voidness of a certain contract to related contracts; or national rules of general contract law relating to the validity of the related contract itself. These possibilities are investigated in the following sections. The contribution ends with a conclusion summarising our findings and asks whether the Court of Justice should review its position on this matter. As it is not possible to investigate the legal systems of all EU Member States within the confines of this study, the study is limited to the Western European
The Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law | 2016
Caroline Cauffman; Jan M. Smits
Over the last five years, the sharing economy has enjoyed a real boom. One important example of this is the creation of numerous internet platforms that have made it easier for businesses and citizens to offer goods and services to the public. While the rise of platforms allowing for the sale of goods by commercial parties was openly embraced by society, the rise of platforms such as Uber and Airbnb, allowing non-professionals to offer services, has given rise to quite some social and legal consternation. This brief contribution discusses approach of the European Union towards the sharing economy, including the European Commission’s 2016 Communication on the ‘European agenda for the collaborative economy’.
Springer US | 2016
Caroline Cauffman; Qian Hao
The book examines the rights of defendants in infringement procedures and those of the notifying parties in merger proceedings before the European Commission and the Chinese competition authorities. The initial chapters offer a general introduction to EU and Chinese competition law respectively, paying particular attention to the substantive rules of competition law. Subsequent chapters present an overview of the procedural rights of the notifying parties in merger cases in both legal systems surveyed, address the procedural rights of defendants in infringement cases, and provide an international perspective on differences in the notification and enforcement procedures between legal systems. The final chapter draws comparative conclusions and includes a number of suggestions for improvement.u200b
Ius Commune Europaeum | 2016
Caroline Cauffman
The ADR Directive pursues an honourable aim trying to provide consumers and traders with access to a simple, fast and low-cost method of dispute resolution. In the short term, it will probably improve the position of consumers compared to the status quo ante. However, it does not guarantee consumers the remedy they are entitled to. It institutionalises a system that does not meet the standards for the proper administration of justice and it may jeopardise the efforts made for the harmonization of the material rules of consumer protection and the creation of a level playing field for traders in the internal market in the long term. An EU measure aimed at amending the existing court procedures in the Member States in order to make them better suited to deal with low value consumer claims would have been preferable.
China-EU Law Series | 2016
Caroline Cauffman; Qian Hao
Based on the preceding research reports and some additional sources, this concluding chapter will horizontally compare the EU and Chinese rules on procedural rights in competition law. In line with the sequence of the previous chapters, we will deal, principally, with merger proceedings and, subsequently, with infringement procedures.
The Judiciary, the Legislature and the EU Internal Market and the associated terms and conditions | 2012
Gert Straetmans; Caroline Cauffman
The contribution analyses the relationship between the EU and national legislatures and courts in relation to the control of unfair contract terms.
The Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law | 2010
Caroline Cauffman
The European Commission recently made significant efforts to encourage the private enforcement of EU competition law, by inducing natural and legal persons who suffered damages as a result of competition law infringements, to bring actions for monetary damages before national courts. An important obstacle to the succes of this type of actions is the dificulty to prove and assess the amount of damages. This problem could be evaded by bringing actions for injunctions instead of actions for damages. Surprisingly, however, actions for injunctions have received less attention in the debate as to the private enforcement of competition law. This article investigates the current possibilities to bring actions for such injunctions either in the course of administrative procedures, or in the course of civil procedures and suggests proceeding to the introduction of a harmonized action for the cessation of competition law infringements.
Archive | 2011
Caroline Cauffman
The Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law | 2013
Caroline Cauffman
World Competition | 2012
Caroline Cauffman