Cas Mudde

The Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Normalcy

In recent years more and more studies have pointed to the limitations of demand-side explanations of the electoral success of populist radical right parties. They argue that supply-side factors need to be included as well. While previous authors have made these claims on the basis of purely empirical arguments, this article provides a (meta)theoretical argumentation for the importance of supply-side explanations. It takes issue with the dominant view on the populist radical right, which considers it to be alien to mainstream values in contemporary western democracies – the ‘normal pathology thesis’. Instead, it argues that the populist radical right should be seen as a radical interpretation of mainstream values, or more akin to a pathological normalcy. This argument is substantiated on the basis of an empirical analysis of party ideologies and mass attitudes. The proposed paradigmatic shift has profound consequences for the way the populist radical right and western democracy relate, as well as for how the populist radical right is best studied. Most importantly, it makes demand for populist radical right politics rather an assumption than a puzzle, and turns the prime focus of research on to the political struggle over issue saliency and positions, and on to the role of populist radical right parties within these struggles.

The single‐issue party thesis: Extreme right parties and the immigration issue

This article examines the single‐issue party thesis for the specific case of contemporary extreme right parties (ERPs) and the immigration issue. I define the single‐issue party as (1) having an electorate with no particular social structure; (2) being supported predominantly on the basis of one single issue; (3) lacking an ideological programme; and (4) addressing only one all‐encompassing issue. On the basis of a comprehensive analysis of electoral studies and party literature the single‐issue party thesis is rejected on all counts. At best, immigration has been a catalyst for most ERPs in certain periods of time. Their ideology and broader programe will keep ERPs in the political arena for some time to come, even in the unlikely event that immigration would cease to be an important political issue.

The war of words defining the extreme right party family

This article presents an overview of the writings on the extreme right party family of the third wave (1980–95). First, the prime criterion for the classification of the party family is discussed. Second, the main critiques of, and alternatives to, the term right‐wing extremism are evaluated. Third, the political parties that are generally considered to be members of the party family are identified. Fourth, subgroups within the larger party family are examined. In the conclusion, the various writings are structured on the basis of four theoretical schools within the broader study of right‐wing extremism.

Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe

Based in part on the results of a unique, comparative research project, the aim of this article is threefold: (1) to provide a comparative summary of racist extremism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE); (2) to compare the situation of racist extremism in CEE to that in Western Europe; and (3) to come to some further insights about racist extremism in the region. It concludes, in contrast to many of the alarming statements on the topic, that CEE is neither a hotbed of racist extremism nor a safe haven for racist extremists. In fact, if one compares the state of racist extremism in CEE to that in Western Europe, the differences seem less striking than is often assumed. Yet while the impact of racist extremism in CEE might not be as great as is often assumed, a lot remains to be done, particularly now that these countries are or will soon be members of the European Union.

How Populist Are the People? Measuring Populist Attitudes in Voters

The sudden and perhaps unexpected appearance of populist parties in the 1990s shows no sign of immediately vanishing. The lion’s share of the research on populism has focused on defining populism, on the causes for its rise and continued success, and more recently on its influence on government and on public policy. Less research has, however, been conducted on measuring populist attitudes among voters. In this article, we seek to fill this gap by measuring populist attitudes and to investigate whether these attitudes can be linked with party preferences. We distinguish three political attitudes: (1) populist attitudes, (2) pluralist attitudes, and (3) elitist attitudes. We devise a measurement of these attitudes and explore their validity by way of using a principal component analysis on a representative Dutch data set (N = 600). We indeed find three statistically separate scales of political attitudes. We further validated the scales by testing whether they are linked to party preferences and find that voters who score high on the populist scale have a significantly higher preference for the Dutch populist parties, the Party for Freedom, and the Socialist Party.

The Paradox of the Anti-Party Party Insights from the Extreme Right

On the basis of an extensive analysis of the party literature of three extreme-right parties, the paradox of the anti-party party is studied. Two types of anti-party sentiments are distinguished: extremist and populist. The first type holds a rejection of the political party per se and seems to have gone out of vogue. The second type holds a critique of certain parties either on the basis of their policies or their behaviour. It is these sentiments that are (omni)present, in different interlinked themes, in the literature of extreme-right parties. They serve, on the one hand, to help them to profit from the existing anti-party sentiments at the mass level and, on the other hand, to help them present themselves in a positive manner, by self-defining the party as the opposite of the other parties. It is thus that the paradox of the anti-party parties can exist.

The Right and the Righteous? European Norms, Domestic Politics and the Sanctions Against Austria

In February 2000, 14 EU Member States collectively took the unprecedented step of imposing bilateral sanctions on their Austrian EU partner. How can this be explained? Was it, as the 14 governments argued, because the inclusion in the Austrian government of Jorg Haiders extreme right FPo opposes many of the ideas making up the common identity of the EU? Or, were the sanctions motivated, as the Austrian government argued, by narrow-minded party political interests that lurked beneath the rhetoric of shared European norms and values? Our analysis suggests that, without the particular concerns about domestic politics of certain politicians, it is unlikely that the sanctions against Austria would have been adopted in this form. On the other hand, without the recent establishment of concerns about human rights and democratic principles as an EU norm, it is unlikely that these particular sanctions would have been adopted collectively by all member governments. Thus, while norms might have been used instrumentally, such instrumental use only works, in the sense of inducing compliant behaviour, if the norms have acquired a certain degree of taken-for-grantedness within the relevant group of actors or institution.

In the Name of the Peasantry, the Proletariat, and the People: Populisms in Eastern Europe

In the last decade, many scholars have proclaimed the re-emergence of populism in European politics. In Western Europe the term is generally used to denote postmodern or ‘more moderate’ types of ‘Extreme Right’ or ‘Radical Right’ parties, but in Eastern Europe it is considered to be a more general phenomenon, spread across the ideological spectrum.1 Like nationalism, populism has become a catchword for both the western media and the academic community that deal, often only in passing, with the post-communist East. For example, as early as 1990 Time ran a story under the title ‘Populism on the March’ (Walsh 1990), while seven years later the journal Communist and Post-Communist Studies published an article entitled ‘Slovakia and the Triumph of Nationalist Populism’ (Carpenter 1997).

Fighting the system? Populist radical right parties and party system change

This article assesses the impact of populist radical right parties on national party systems in Western Europe. Has the emergence of this new party family changed the interaction of party competition within Western European countries? First, I look at party system change with regard to numerical and numerical–ideological terms. Second, I evaluate the effect populist radical right parties have had on the different dimensions of party systems. Third, I assess the claim that the rise of populist radical right parties has created bipolarizing party system. Fourth, I look at the effect the rise of the populist radical right has had on the logic of coalition formation. The primary conclusion is that, irrespective of conceptualization and operationalization, populist radical right parties have not fundamentally changed party systems in Western Europe.

Extreme Right Parties in Eastern Europe

Abstract From the moment the Berlin Wall came down scholars and politicians around the world expressed concern about an upsurge of extreme-right politics in Eastern Europe. Dramatic events like the Yugoslav conflict and even the so-called ‘velvet split’ of Czechoslovakia only strengthened this fear. Despite these many general warnings about the rise of extreme right parties (ERPs) in Eastern Europe very little empirical work has appeared on the subject. Muddes article provides an analytical tool which will help to further understanding of the extreme right in the region. It presents and applies a fairly straightforward typology of ERPs in Eastern Europe based on the (ideological) character of the parties. The pre-Communist ERP locates the origin of its ideological identity in political parties and ideas of the pre-Communist period, generally harking back to national-conservative, monarchist, or indigenous or foreign fascist ideals. The character of the party might be expressed in the open espousal of pre-Communist ideas or by using the associated ‘folklore’, while in some cases there might even be continuity in personnel or organizations (often through the émigré community). With the notable exceptions of Croatia and Slovakia, pre-Communist ERPs have remained marginal in post-Communist political life. The Communist ERP looks for ideological inspiration in the Communist period and includes nationalist splits of the (former) Communist parties as well as new parties that combine a nationalist ideology with a nostalgia for Communist rule. They are mainly successful in countries where the Communist regime had a strong nationalist undercurrent and the party is still in the hands of hardliners (e.g. Romania and Russia). Post-Communist ERPs, finally, locate the source of their identities in the post-Communist period: these organizations are new and their focus is on current political issues. They harbour no feelings of nostalgia, either for the pre-Communist or the Communist period. Post-Communist ERPS have developed in most East European countries but, although some have achieved remarkable electoral successes, in general they have been only moderately successful (similar to ERPs in Western Europe).