Catherine Pattillo

Are Currency Crises Predictable? A Test

This paper evaluates three models for predicting currency crises that were proposed before 1997. The idea is to answer the question: if we had been using these models in late 1996, how well armed would we have been to predict the Asian crisis? The results are mixed. Two of the models fail to provide useful forecasts. One model provides forecasts that are somewhat informative though still not reliable. Plausible modifications to this model improve its performance, providing some hope that future models may do better. This exercise suggests, though, that while forecasting models may help indicate vulnerability to crisis, the predictive power of even the best of them may be limited.

Predicting currency crises:: The indicators approach and an alternative

Abstract In recent years, a number of researchers have claimed success in systematically predicting which countries are more likely to suffer currency crises, most notably Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998). This paper evaluates the KLR approach to anticipating currency crises and develops and tests an alternative. First, we try to answer the question: if we had been using the KLR model in late 1996, how well armed would we have been to predict the Asia crisis? Second, we analyze a more general probit-based model of predicting currency crises. In the process, we test several basic assumptions underlying the indicators approach.

Do African Manufacturing Firms Learn from Exporting

We use firm-level panel data for the manufacturing sector in four African countries to investigate whether exporting impacts on efficiency, and whether efficient firms self-select into the export market. Based on simultaneous estimation of a production function and an export regression, our preferred results indicate significant efficiency gains from exporting, which can be interpreted as learning by exporting. We show that modelling unobserved heterogeneity by a flexible approach is important for deriving this conclusion. A policy implication of our results is that Africa would gain from orientating its manufacturing sector towards exporting.

What Are the Channels Through Which External Debt Affects Growth

This paper investigates the channels through which debt affects growth, specifically whether debt affects growth through factor accumulation or total factor productivity growth. It also tests for the presence of nonlinearities in the effects of debt on the different sources of growth. We use a large panel dataset of 61 developing countries over the period 1969-98. Results indicate that the negative impact of high debt on growth operates both through a strong negative effect on physical capital accumulation and on total factor productivity growth. On average, for high-debt countries, doubling debt will reduce output growth by about 1 percentage point and reduce both per capita physical capital and total factor productivity growth by somewhat less than that. In terms of the contributions to growth, approximately one-third of the effect of debt on growth occurs via physical capital accumulation and two-thirds via total factor productivity growth. The results are generally robust to the use of alternative estimators to control (to different extents) for biases associated with unobserved country-specific effects and the endogeneity of several regressors, particularly the debt variables. In particular, the results are shown to be compatible with a simultaneous significant effect of growth on debt ratios, as suggested by Easterly (2001).

Rates of Return on Physical and Human Capital in Africa's Manufacturing Sector

In this paper two sets of issues are addressed using panel data from the manufacturing sector of five African countries. First, how high are the returns to human relative to physical capital. Second, what is the relative importance of technology and endowments of human and physical capital in determining differences in earnings and productivity across the countries. Evidence from earnings functions shows that the private returns to both experience and education rise with the level of education. Private returns rise from 3 per cent at the primary level, to 10 per cent at the secondary level and 35 per cent for tertiary. Evidence from the production function gives lower returns on education than from the earnings function. Rates of return on physical capital exceed 20 per cent and greatly exceed the average return on human capital. Data is available on the stocks of human and physical capital across the countries. Productivity and earnings differentials are shown to be large between Cameroon and Ghana. These differences are due almost entirely to differences in physical, not human, capital endowments.

The Monetary Geography of Africa

Africa is working toward the goal of creating a common currency that would serve as a symbol of African unity. The advantages of a common currency include lower transaction costs, increased stability, and greater insulation of central banks from pressures to provide monetary financing. Disadvantages relate to asymmetries among countries, especially in their terms of trade and in the degree of fiscal discipline. More disciplined countries will not want to form a union with countries whose excessive spending puts upward pressure on the central banks monetary expansion. In The Monetary Geography of Africa , Paul Masson and Catherine Pattillo review the history of monetary arrangements on the continent and analyze the current situation and prospects for further integration. They apply lessons from both experience and theory that lead to a number of conclusions. To begin with, West Africa faces a major problem because Nigeria has both asymmetric terms of trade --it is a large oil exporter while its potential partners are oil importers --and most important, large fiscal imbalances. Secondly, a monetary union among all eastern or southern African countries seems infeasible at this stage, since a number of countries suffer from the effects of civil conflicts and drought and are far from achieving the macroeconomic stability of South Africa. Lastly, the plan by Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda to create a common currency seems to be generally compatible with other initiatives that could contribute to greater regional solidarity. However, economic gains would likely favor Kenya, which, unlike the other two countries, has substantial exports to its neighbors, and this may constrain the political will needed to proceed. A more promising strategy for monetary integration would be to build on existing monetary unions --the CFA franc zone in western and central Africa and the Common Monetary Area in southern Africa. Masson and Pattillo argue that the goal of a creating a single African currency is probably beyond reach. Economic realities suggest that grand new projects for African monetary unions are unlikely to be successful. More important for Africas economic well-being will be to attack the more fundamental problems of corruption and governance.

Anticipating Balance of Payments Crises--The Role of Early Warning Systems; The Role of Early Warning Systems

Recent years have witnessed an increase in the frequency of currency and balance of payments crises in developing countries. More important, the crises have become more virulent, have caused widespread disruption to other developing countries, and have even had repercussions on advanced economies. To predict crises, their causes must be clearly understood. Two competing strands of theories are reviewed in this paper. The first focuses on the consequences of such policies as excessive credit growth in provoking depletion of foreign exchange reserves and making a devaluation enevitable. The second emphasizes the trade-offs between internal and external balance that the policymaker faces in defending a peg.

Investment and risk in Africa

Until recently Africa has been an unambiguously capital-hostile environment. During 1960 to 1990 the return on capital in Africa was on average around a third below that elsewhere.1 Because the returns on capital were low there was little private investment. However, during the 1990s some African governments have reformed policies sufficiently that returns are now probably quite high: there is evidence that the return on FDI is now higher in Africa than in other developing areas.2 Despite these improved returns, private investment has remained low. Whereas in other developing areas it is currently averaging 18 per cent of GDP, in Africa even by 1994 it was only 10 per cent, little changed from the 1980s. (World Bank, 1996).

Investment, Uncertainty, and Irreversibility in Ghana

Panel data on Ghanaian manufacturing firms are used to test predictions from models of irreversible investment under uncertainty. Information on the entrepreneurs subjective probability distribution over future demand for the firms products is used to construct the expected variance of demand, which is used as a measure of uncertainty. Empirical results support the prediction that firms wait to invest until the marginal revenue product of capital reaches a firm-specific hurdle level. Moreover, higher uncertainty raises the hurdle level that triggers investment, and uncertainty has a negative effect on investment levels that is greater for firms with more irreversible investment.

Public Investment, Growth, and Debt Sustainability: Putting Together the Pieces

We develop a model to study the macroeconomic effects of public investment surges in low-income countries, making explicit: (i) the investment-growth linkages; (ii) public external and domestic debt accumulation; (iii) the fiscal policy reactions necessary to ensure debt-sustainability; and (iv) the macroeconomic adjustment required to ensure internal and external balance. Well-executed high-yielding public investment programs can substantially raise output and consumption and be self-financing in the long run. However, even if the long run looks good, transition problems can be formidable when concessional financing does not cover the full cost of the investment program. Covering the resulting gap with tax increases or spending cuts requires sharp macroeconomic adjustments, crowding out private investment and consumption and delaying the growth benefits of public investment. Covering the gap with domestic borrowing market is not helpful either: higher domestic rates increase the financing challenge and private investment and consumption are still crowded out. Supplementing with external commercial borrowing, on the other hand, can smooth these difficult adjustments, reconciling the scaling up with feasibility constraints on increases in tax rates. But the strategy may be also risky. With poor execution, sluggish fiscal policy reactions, or persistent negative exogenous shocks, this strategy can easily lead to unsustainable public debt dynamics. Front-loaded investment programs and weak structural conditions (such as low returns to public capital and poor execution of investments) make the fiscal adjustment more challenging and the risks greater.