Catriona Mackenzie

Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self

Balbus, Isaac D. 1982. Marxism and domination: A neo-Hegelian, feminist, psychoanalytic theory of sexual, political, and technological liberation. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Galston, William. 1991. Liberal purposes: Goods, virtues, and diversity in the liberal state. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. Weber, Max. 1958. Science as a vocation. In From Max Weber: Essays in sociology, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press.Introduction: Autonomy refigured PART 1: AUTONOMY AND THE SOCIAL 1. Autonomy, social disruption and women 2. Autonomy and the social self 3. Feeling crazy: self worth and the social character of responsibility 4. Autonomy and the feminist intuition 5. Individuals, responsibility and the philosophical imagination 6. Imagining oneself otherwise 7. Intersectional identity and the authentic self?: Opposites attract 8. The perversion of autonomy and the subjection of women: discourses of social advocacy at centurys end PART II: RELATIONAL AUTONOMY IN CONTEXT 9. Choice and control in feminist bioethics 10. Autonomy and interdependence: quandaries in genetic decision-making 11. Relational autonomy, self-trust, and health care for patients who are oppressed 12. Relational autonomy and freedom of expression

Practical identity and narrative agency

Contributors Acknowledgments 1. Introduction: Practical Identity and Narrative Agency Catriona Mackenzie Part I: Personal Identity and Continuity 2. Staying Alive: Personal Continuation and a Life Worth Having Marya Schechtman 3. Personal Identity: Practical or Metaphysical? Caroline West 4. Narrative Identity and Embodied Continuity Kim Atkins Part II: Practical Identity and Practical Deliberation 5. Personal Identity Management Jan Bransen 6. Imagination, Identity and Self-Transformation Catriona Mackenzie 7. Why Search for Lost Time: Memory, Autonomy, and Practical Reason John Christman Part III: Selfhood and Normative Agency 8. The Way of the Wanton J. David Velleman 9. Losing Ones Self Cheshire Calhoun 10. Normative Agency Jeanette Kennett and Steve Matthews 11. Remorse and Moral Identity Christopher Cordner Part IV: Selfhood, Narrative and Time 12. Shaping a Life: Narrative, Time and Necessity Genevieve Lloyd 13. How to Change the Past Karen Jones

Placing ethics in the centre: negotiating new spaces for ethical research in conflict situations.

Abstract Issues of power and consent, confidentiality, trust, and benefit, risks to researchers, and potential harm to participants, are all contested when working with different cultures and within environments marked by violence and insecurity. Difficulty resolving these dilemmas may paralyse ethics committees, may fail to give the guidance sought by researchers, and will not help populations who are among the worlds most vulnerable. Even where efforts are made to respond to ethical guidelines and to improve practice, considerable impediments are present in many developing countries, including lack of formal ethical review structures in unstable settings, lack of required skills, limited political and institutional recognition of ethical issues, competing interests, and limitations in clinical and research practice (Elsayed 2004, Macklin 2004). In conflict settings, these limitations are more marked, and the responsibilities of the researcher for ethical practice are greater, but the mechanisms for oversight are weaker. Moreover, the constant focus on vulnerabilities and problems, and the often almost total lack of recognition of strengths and resilience, can further disempower already exploited groups and individuals. The capacity of refugees and communities in conflict to take an active role in the research process is seldom acknowledged, and undermines the potential for more innovative research which can help generate the evidence for better policy and practice.

Imagination, identity and self-transformation

Contributors Acknowledgments 1. Introduction: Practical Identity and Narrative Agency Catriona Mackenzie Part I: Personal Identity and Continuity 2. Staying Alive: Personal Continuation and a Life Worth Having Marya Schechtman 3. Personal Identity: Practical or Metaphysical? Caroline West 4. Narrative Identity and Embodied Continuity Kim Atkins Part II: Practical Identity and Practical Deliberation 5. Personal Identity Management Jan Bransen 6. Imagination, Identity and Self-Transformation Catriona Mackenzie 7. Why Search for Lost Time: Memory, Autonomy, and Practical Reason John Christman Part III: Selfhood and Normative Agency 8. The Way of the Wanton J. David Velleman 9. Losing Ones Self Cheshire Calhoun 10. Normative Agency Jeanette Kennett and Steve Matthews 11. Remorse and Moral Identity Christopher Cordner Part IV: Selfhood, Narrative and Time 12. Shaping a Life: Narrative, Time and Necessity Genevieve Lloyd 13. How to Change the Past Karen Jones

On Bodily Autonomy

There is a scene in Monty Python’s film Life of Brian in which, in the midst of a discussion amongst a group of revolutionaries enjoying the spectacles at the colosseum, a man from the Judean Liberation Front expresses a strong desire to have a baby. He is told gently that this is an unrealistic desire, but his failure to respond to reason on this issue finally exasperates those around him until one of them (played by John Cleese) shouts at him “But you can’t have a baby. Men can’t have babies!” The man from Judea shrieks back “Don’t you oppress me!” It is obvious that the Judean has misunderstood the meaning of oppression and this is what makes his accusation, and hence this scene in the movie, so funny. But his confusion would not be amusing in the same way if he were simply wrong about oppression. It is only amusing because he has partially grasped the meaning of the concept. What then is the nature of his confusion? The Judean is correct in realizing that, at least in part, oppression involves a denial of a person’s autonomy. He is affronted because he feels that his autonomy with respect to his body, or what I am referring to as bodily autonomy, has somehow been infringed or denied. He is also affronted because he understands that oppression is a function of social relationships of power — hence the accusation. However, what the Judean has failed to grasp is that in the exercise of autonomy there must be some correlation or match between our goals and desires, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, our natural or acquired skills, talents and capacities. Although it may be a source of frustration to me that I am not a virtuoso musician, if I lack the necessary talents my inability to satisfy this desire clearly involves no infringement of my autonomy. My autonomy can be infringed only if I have been prevented in some way from realizing my desire to exercise or develop my musical talents, for example because of lack of opportunity due to parental disapproval, or poverty or discrimination. The Judean’s thinking scrambles the relationships between desires, capacities, autonomy and oppression, leading him to conclude that if he desires to bear children but lacks the capacity, then his autonomy has somehow been infringed and this must be the result of someone else’s attitude or actions.

Autonomy, vulnerability and capacity: a philosophical appraisal of the Mental Capacity Act

The UK Mental Capacity Act provides an important legislative framework for protecting persons who are vulnerable, by virtue of partial or total lack of capacity, from abuse, coercion, exploitation, disrespect or unwarranted intrusions on their privacy and liberty. In this article we argue, however, that in order to effectively implement the Acts governing principles and promote the autonomy of persons whose capacities are impaired, health and social welfare professionals must go beyond a primarily cognitive approach to capacity assessment and refer to a range of more demanding autonomy conditions relating to authenticity, diachronic coherence and consistency, accountability to others, and affective attitudes towards oneself. We suggest that these conditions are in fact implicit in the guidelines, scenarios and practical advice contained in the Acts accompanying Code of Practice . To ground our analysis, we discuss two cases of end-of-life decision-making, and consider how these cases might have been assessed had the Mental Capacity Act been applied. We also address the question of whether the conditions for autonomy we identify raise the bar too high to be met by persons who are vulnerable because their capacity is partially compromised.

Emotions, imagination, and moral reasoning

R. Langdon, C. Mackenzie, Introduction. Section 1. Empathic Responsiveness and Moral Reasoning. M. de Rosnay, E. Fink, The Development of Moral Motivation at Six Years of Age. D.J. Hawes, M.R. Dadds, Re-visiting the Role of Empathy in Childhood Pathways to Antisocial Behavior. I. Ravenscroft, Fiction, Imagination and Ethics. R. Langdon, K. Delmas, Moral Reasoning and Psychopathic Tendencies in the General Community. D. McIlwain, J. Evans, E. Caldis, F. Cicchini, A. Aronstan, A. Wright, A. Taylor, Strange Moralities. R. de Oliviera-Souza, J. Moll, The Neurology of Morality. Section 2. Methodological and Philosophical Responses to Experimental Moral Psychology. N. Levy, J. McGuire, Cognitive Enhancement and Intuitive Dualism. T.I. Case, M.J. Oaten, R.J. Stevenson, Disgust and Moral Judgment. C. FitzGerald, P. Goldie, Thick Concepts and Their Role in Moral Psychology. C. Mackenzie, Emotions, Reflection and Moral Agency. J. Kennett, Living with Ones Choices. B.F. Malle, S. Gugliemo, Are Intentionality Judgments Fundamentally Moral? V. McGeer, Co-reactive Attitudes and the Making of a Moral Community. W. Christensen, J. Sutton, Conclusion.

Imagining Other Lives

Abstract In his recent book Reflective Democracy, Robert Goodin argues that ‘external-collaborative’ models of democratic deliberation procedures need to be supplemented by ‘internal-reflective’ deliberation. The exercise of the moral imagination plays a central role in Goodins account of ‘democratic deliberation within’. By imaginatively putting ourselves in the place of a range of different others, he argues, including those who may not be able to represent their own interests, we can make their points of view ‘communicatively present’ in deliberation. Goodins argument emphasises the role of art and other forms of cultural representation in helping to bring about this expansion of moral imagination. Drawing on debates in philosophy of mind concerning the cope and limits of our capacities to simulate other minds, I argue that Goodins analysis of ‘democratic deliberation within’ conflates different kinds of imaginative project. In doing so, it underestimates both the difficulties of imaginatively putting ourselves in the place of others and the political risks of doing so. I argue, alternatively, that moral engagement with others involves the capacity for sympathy and that art and other forms of cultural representation can enlarge the cope of our sympathies by assisting us to overcome imaginative resistance to alien points of view. In developing this argument, I provide a qualified defence of Iris Youngs claim that respect for others involves ‘asymmetrical reciprocity’.

Introduction: Practical identity and narrative agency

Contributors Acknowledgments 1. Introduction: Practical Identity and Narrative Agency Catriona Mackenzie Part I: Personal Identity and Continuity 2. Staying Alive: Personal Continuation and a Life Worth Having Marya Schechtman 3. Personal Identity: Practical or Metaphysical? Caroline West 4. Narrative Identity and Embodied Continuity Kim Atkins Part II: Practical Identity and Practical Deliberation 5. Personal Identity Management Jan Bransen 6. Imagination, Identity and Self-Transformation Catriona Mackenzie 7. Why Search for Lost Time: Memory, Autonomy, and Practical Reason John Christman Part III: Selfhood and Normative Agency 8. The Way of the Wanton J. David Velleman 9. Losing Ones Self Cheshire Calhoun 10. Normative Agency Jeanette Kennett and Steve Matthews 11. Remorse and Moral Identity Christopher Cordner Part IV: Selfhood, Narrative and Time 12. Shaping a Life: Narrative, Time and Necessity Genevieve Lloyd 13. How to Change the Past Karen Jones

Bare Personhood? Velleman on selfhood

In the Introduction to Self to Self, J. David Velleman claims that ‘the word “self” does not denote any one entity but rather expresses a reflexive guise under which parts or aspects of a person are presented to his own mind’ (Velleman 2006, 1). Velleman distinguishes three different reflexive guises of the self: the self of the persons self-image, or narrative self-conception; the self of self-sameness over time; and the self as autonomous agent. Vellemans account of each of these different guises of the self is complex and repays close philosophical attention. The first aim of this paper is therefore to provide a detailed analysis of Vellemans view. The second aim is more critical. While I am in agreement with Velleman about the importance of distinguishing the different aspects of selfhood, I argue that, even on his own account, they are more interrelated than he acknowledges. I also analyse the role of the concept of ‘bare personhood’ in Vellemans approach to selfhood and question whether this concept can function, as he wants it to, to bridge the gap between a naturalistic analysis of reasons for action and Kantian moral reasons.