Cecilia Hammarlund

The Big, the Bad, and the Average: Hedonic Prices and Inverse Demand for Baltic Cod

ABSTRACT The price of fish depends on quality attributes such as size and freshness. In turn, quality attributes are related to fishery management. This article presents a hedonic analysis where attribute prices of size and quality ratings are estimated for the Swedish Baltic cod fishery. Using information from 5,307 landing days, hedonic inverse demand functions are estimated with a random coefficient (RC) model. Results show that there are price premiums for larger sizes of cod and for cod with the highest quality rating. Results also show that own-quantity and cross-quantity effects are small and negative for most attributes. Thus, there is an indication that the management of a fish stock that changes the quantity of attributes will also change the prices of attributes, although the price effect is small in the case of Swedish Baltic cod. JEL Codes: D21, Q22.

Regulating Multiple Externalities: The Case of Nordic Fisheries

ABSTRACT Open access is a well-known externality problem in fisheries causing excess capacity and overfishing. Due to global warming, externality problems from CO2 emissions have gained increased interest. With two externality problems, a first-best optimum can be achieved by using two regulatory instruments. However, solving the open-access externality problem also affects CO2 emissions. By using a bio-economic model covering Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Faroe Islands, it is shown that regulations of the open-access externality problem have a large effect on both economic performance and CO2 emissions, while an additional CO2 regulation only has minor effects. The second-best solution achieved by only regulating open access reduces emissions by approximately 50% compared to current fisheries, with the exception of Iceland, which already has a well-developed fisheries management system. JEL Codes: Q22, Q54.

Time for Fishing: Bargaining Power in the Swedish Baltic Cod Fishery

ABSTRACT Fishery regulations might not only affect the fleet, but also the relation between fisheries and downstream sectors on the ex-vessel market for fish products. This article estimates the price effects of management reform in the Swedish Baltic Sea cod fishery. In April 2011, as part of a reform process aimed at giving fishers more flexibility, vessels using active gear were given annual non-transferable catch quotas. We examine whether the new management system has altered the bargaining power between fishers and processors in the ex-vessel market for fish. Using a difference-in-differences estimation approach we find that postreform fishers improve their bargaining power and thus are paid a higher price. However, the price increase is small, amounting to around 2% of the pre-reform price. JEL Codes: D47, Q21, Q22.

Reducing Climate Impact from Fisheries : A Study of Fisheries Management and Fuel Tax Concessions in the Nordic Countries

Few doubt the impact from human activities on global warming and the negative consequences of rising temperatures for both terrestrial and marine ecosystems. Efficient policy instruments are needed ...