Cédric Paternotte

Group adaptation, formal darwinism and contextual analysis

We consider the question: under what circumstances can the concept of adaptation be applied to groups, rather than individuals? Gardner and Grafen (2009, J. Evol. Biol.22: 659–671) develop a novel approach to this question, building on Grafens ‘formal Darwinism’ project, which defines adaptation in terms of links between evolutionary dynamics and optimization. They conclude that only clonal groups, and to a lesser extent groups in which reproductive competition is repressed, can be considered as adaptive units. We re‐examine the conditions under which the selection–optimization links hold at the group level. We focus on an important distinction between two ways of understanding the links, which have different implications regarding group adaptationism. We show how the formal Darwinism approach can be reconciled with G.C. Williams’ famous analysis of group adaptation, and we consider the relationships between group adaptation, the Price equation approach to multi‐level selection, and the alternative approach based on contextual analysis.

Being realistic about common knowledge: a Lewisian approach

Defined and formalized several decades ago, widely used in philosophy and game theory, the concept of common knowledge is still considered as problematic, although not always for the right reasons. I suggest that the epistemic status of a group of human agents in a state of common knowledge has not been thoroughly analyzed. In particular, every existing account of common knowledge, whether formal or not, is either too strong to fit cognitively limited individuals, or too weak to adequately describe their state. I provide a realistic definition of common knowledge, based on a formalization of David Lewis’ seminal account and show that it is formally equivalent to probabilistic common belief. This leads to a philosophical analysis of common knowledge which answers several common criticisms and sheds light on its nature.

Social Norms and Game Theory: Harmony or Discord?

Recent years have witnessed an increased number of game-theoretic approaches to social norms, which apparently share some common vocabulary and methods. We describe three major approaches of this kind (due to Binmore, Bicchieri, and Gintis), before comparing them systematically on five crucial themes: generality of the solution, preference transformation, punishment, epistemic conditions, and type of explanation. This allows us to show that these theories are, by and large, less compatible than they seem. We then argue that those three theories struggle to account for three phenomena pertaining to social norms (namely context dependence, conflicting norms, and self-evidence), with which any complete game-theoretic account should in principle be able to deal. 1 Introduction 2 Accounts   2.1 Binmore: Social norms as equilibrium selection solvers   2.2 Bicchieri: Social norms as conditional behavioural rules   2.3 Gintis: Social norms as choreographers 3 Comparing the Accounts   3.1 Games, cues, and generality of solutions   3.2 Norms and other-regarding preferences     3.2.1 Other-regarding preferences     3.2.2 Artificial utility functions   3.3 The role of sanctions   3.4 Getting the epistemic conditions right     3.4.1 Gintis     3.4.2 Bicchieri   3.5 Proximate and ultimate accounts   3.6 Taking stock 4 Challenges   4.1 The challenge of context-dependent behaviour     4.1.1 Context-dependence: Varying the game   4.2 Conflicting norms   4.3 Self-evidence 5 Conclusion 1 Introduction 2 Accounts   2.1 Binmore: Social norms as equilibrium selection solvers   2.2 Bicchieri: Social norms as conditional behavioural rules   2.3 Gintis: Social norms as choreographers   2.1 Binmore: Social norms as equilibrium selection solvers   2.2 Bicchieri: Social norms as conditional behavioural rules   2.3 Gintis: Social norms as choreographers 3 Comparing the Accounts   3.1 Games, cues, and generality of solutions   3.2 Norms and other-regarding preferences     3.2.1 Other-regarding preferences     3.2.2 Artificial utility functions   3.3 The role of sanctions   3.4 Getting the epistemic conditions right     3.4.1 Gintis     3.4.2 Bicchieri   3.5 Proximate and ultimate accounts   3.6 Taking stock   3.1 Games, cues, and generality of solutions   3.2 Norms and other-regarding preferences     3.2.1 Other-regarding preferences     3.2.2 Artificial utility functions     3.2.1 Other-regarding preferences     3.2.2 Artificial utility functions   3.3 The role of sanctions   3.4 Getting the epistemic conditions right     3.4.1 Gintis     3.4.2 Bicchieri     3.4.1 Gintis     3.4.2 Bicchieri   3.5 Proximate and ultimate accounts   3.6 Taking stock 4 Challenges   4.1 The challenge of context-dependent behaviour     4.1.1 Context-dependence: Varying the game   4.2 Conflicting norms   4.3 Self-evidence   4.1 The challenge of context-dependent behaviour     4.1.1 Context-dependence: Varying the game     4.1.1 Context-dependence: Varying the game   4.2 Conflicting norms   4.3 Self-evidence 5 Conclusion

Constraints on Joint Action

There exist many competing philosophical definitions of joint action and no clear criteria to decide between them; so far the search for definitions has by and large been a semantical enterprise rather than an empirical one. This chapter describes and assesses several constraints that could help converge towards a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for joint action. The tightness constraint favours definitions that fit joint actions in which the links between agents are as relaxed as possible, so as to better pinpoint the conceptual core of jointness. The developmental constraint asks for definitions based on realistic psychological states that could be entertained by agents less cognitively developed than ideal human beings. The motor constraint holds that definitions should refer to psychological mechanisms involved in actual human coordination. These first three constraints are discussed and dismissed, mainly because they manage to establish vague limits at best (for various reasons). I then introduce a fourth one, the efficiency constraint, based on the fact that most of our joint actions are generally successful, and according to which definitions should involve conditions that help justify this success. Finally, the rational and evolutionary versions of the efficiency constraint are examined and defended against objections.

Virtues and vices in scientific practice

The role intellectual virtues play in scientific inquiry has raised significant discussions in the recent literature. A number of authors have recently explored the link between virtue epistemology and philosophy of science with the aim to show whether epistemic virtues can contribute to the resolution of the problem of theory choice. This paper analyses how intellectual virtues can be beneficial for successful resolution of theory choice. We explore the role of virtues as well as vices in scientific inquiry and their beneficial effects in the context of theory choice. We argue that vices can play a role in widening the set of potential candidate theories and support our claim with historical examples and normative arguments from formal social epistemology. We argue that even though virtues appear to be neither necessary nor sufficient for scientific success, they have a positive effect because they accelerate successful convergence amongst scientists in theory choice situations.

Shared adaptiveness is not group adaptation

Climate stresses and monetary resources seem to lead to different collective adaptations. However, the reference to adaptation and to ambiguous collective dimensions appears premature; populations may entertain nothing more than shared adaptiveness. At this point, the intricacy of the underlying evolutionary processes (cultural selection, fitness-utility decoupling) very much obscures any diagnosis based on correlations.