Celim Yildizhan

Is There a Distress Risk Anomaly? Corporate Bond Spread as a Proxy for Default Risk

Although financial theory suggests a positive relationship between default risk and equity returns, recent empirical papers find anomalously low returns for stocks with high probabilities of default. We show that returns to distressed stocks previously documented are really an amalgamation of anomalies associated with three stock characteristics leverage, volatility and profitability. In this paper we use a market based measure corporate credit spreads to proxy for default risk. Unlike previously used measures that proxy for a firm’s real-world probability of default, credit spreads proxy for a riskadjusted (or a risk-neutral) probability of default and thereby explicitly account for the systematic component of distress risk. We show that credit spreads predict corporate defaults better than previously used measures, such as, bond ratings, accounting variables and structural model parameters. We do not find default risk to be significantly priced in the cross-section of equity returns. There is also no evidence of firms with high default risk delivering anomalously low returns. JEL Classifications: G11, G12, G13, G14.

Firm Complexity and Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift

The paper shows that the post earnings announcement drift is stronger for conglomerates, despite conglomerates being larger, more liquid, and more actively researched by investors. We attribute this finding to slower information processing about complex firms and show that the post earnings announcement drift is positively related to measures of conglomerate complexity. We also find that the post earnings announcement drift is stronger for new conglomerates than it is for existing conglomerates and that investors are most confused about complicated firms that expand from within rather than firms that diversify into new business segments via mergers and acquisitions.

Do Individual Investors Ignore Transaction Costs

Using close to 800,000 transactions by 66,000 households in the United States and close to 2,000,000 transactions by 303,000 households in Finland, this paper shows that individual investors with longer holding periods choose to hold less liquid stocks in their portfolios, consistent with Amihud and Mendelson’s (1986) theory of liquidity clienteles. The relationship between holding periods and transaction costs is stronger among more financially sophisticated households. Households whose holding periods are positively related to transaction costs also earn higher gross returns on their investments before accounting for transaction costs, suggesting that attention to non-salient transaction costs is an indication of investing ability. The main findings are confirmed by analyzing changes in investors’ holding periods around exogenous shocks to stock liquidity. Our findings challenge the notion that individual investors ignore non-salient costs when making investment decisions and suggest that they are cognizant of at least one particular type of non-salient cost, namely the cost of trading stocks, revealing a unique aspect of their rationality.