Chad W. Seagren

A Replication and Analysis of Tiebout Competition Using an Agent-Based Computational Model

Replication is a critical element of the scientific process. This article is an effort to contribute to the slowly growing literature concerning the replication of agent-based computational models. We present a replication of Kollman, Miller, and Page’s model of Tiebout sorting. In that model, individual agents with heterogeneous preferences for government policies select among jurisdictions that offer the most satisfactory package of government services. This project makes three contributions to the literature. First, our successful replication provides the research community with a modernized version of that seminal model. Second, we confirm that earlier results with respect to the single jurisdiction setting are highly robust with respect to voter preferences, while the results for multiple jurisdiction settings are more sensitive. Finally, we demonstrate a technique for conducting sensitivity analyses that leverages a high-dimensional experimental design.

Military Ethics and Moral Blame Across Agency Lines

ABSTRACT In this article, I examine the extent to which military officers are morally responsible for the actions of others by virtue of shared membership in various groups. I argue that career military officers share membership in morally relevant groups that include their branch of service, Department of Defense and the entire Executive Branch of Government, and I outline the circumstances under which career officers bear moral culpability for the actions of members of this group. A number of implications arise from these findings. The first and most important is that military officers have an interest in ensuring the moral rectitude of government agents specifically as it pertains to their official capacities. Additionally, military officers have a duty not only to be informed about problematic government policies but also to educate themselves on the pertinent legal jurisprudence or ethical considerations. Finally, the Constitutional Paradigm of Military Ethics may be an insufficient guide for the particular sort of moral dilemma dealt with in this article.

War versus peace: does military officer quality adjust?

ABSTRACT In this study, we demonstrate the quantity–quality trade-off between the size of the U.S. military force and the quality of its junior military leaders. We employ a difference-in-differences methodology and compare measures of job performance before and after to show that in periods of military force expansion, the average quality of U.S. Marine officers decline; the converse holds in times of relative peace. This has implications for both military effectiveness and understanding labour market dynamics.