Charilaos Kephaliacos

Acceptance of a Payment for Ecosystem Services Scheme: The Decisive Influence of Collective Action

As scholars have shown, acceptance is key to the success of Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) scheme. While many studies adopt a static cost-benefit perspective, few address the social process leading to acceptance. Drawing on Suchman (1995), this article examines the legitimacy process underlying the acceptance of a PES in agriculture. In particular, the role of collective action in the legitimisation process is analysed, using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods of discourse analysis. Data from an agro-environmental PES scheme in France on water quality shows that acceptance depends on the normative and cognitive legitimacy that actors confer upon a public policy.

Private transaction costs and environmental cross compliance in a crop region of Southwestern France

The 2003 review of the common agricultural policy (CAP) has introduced several new policy tools, among which is cross compliance. The introduction of this new policy entails production costs, along with other types of costs arising at the farm level: administrative, information and organisational costs, called transaction costs. The purpose of this paper is to determine the nature of transaction costs and to assess them. A survey conducted in 2006 among a sample of 39 farmers followed by a descriptive statistical analysis (multiple correspondence analysis, MCA) permits to associate farmer profiles with different levels of incurred transaction costs. These profiles reveal the impact which the farmers responsibilities (professional networks) and the role of voluntary commitments previously undertaken may have on the nature and importance of transaction costs. This paper opens up new perspectives on the adoption criteria that should be taken into account in the evolution of agri-environmental regulations.

The role of risk aversion and labor constraints in the adoption of low input practices supported by the CAP green payments in cash crop farms

Since the late 1980s, many alternative practices have been proposed to European farmers to reduce pesticide and input use in general. These practices have been promoted by agro-environmental contracts signed between individual farmers and the European Union and by which farmers engage themselves in changing their practices. The adoption rate of these measures has remained very low in many European regions particularly in Southwestern France. This article aims at stressing the role played by risk attitude and labor constraint in farmers’ adoption decision. After presenting a static theoretical model which assesses the impact of labor constraints and risk attitude on the level of adoption of low input practices supported by agro-environmental contracts, the article proposes a numerical application based on a mathematical programming risk-model implemented on two typical crop farms in South-western France. Three kinds of contracts (no tillage, long rotation, lower pest treatments) are tested, two of them (long rotation and lower pest treatments) aiming at directly reducing input use. The results show that, despite the overall positive impact of alternative practices under contract on environment and farmers’ income, increased yield variability under positive risk aversion and larger labor requirements are actual barriers to adoption.