Charles A. Ellwood

The Social Function of Religion

It ought to be possible in this twentieth century for the scientific man to believe in religion in the same way in which he believes in education: not half-heartedly and quizzically, but positively and constructively. Just as there are many metaphysical questions which can be raised concerning education, which admittedly cannot yet be given final answers, but which, nevertheless, the scientific man does not concern himself about but goes on with the work of education as if they were settled, so, too, there are metaphysical questions concerning religion to which as yet no one would pretend that final answers could be given, but which need not hinder the most scientific-minded man from taking a practical and constructive interest in religious activities. Our faith in education, for example, as being able to shape, more or less, the destiny of the individual and of society implies that this is not a rigid universe, held in the iron grasp of blind forces acting even in the most distant past. Education, in other words, implies not only a modifiable human nature and human society, but also that such modifications can be intelligently planned and executed; in short, that consciousness in the highest form of which we know, the human reason, can and does control, to some extent, human life. Now no one thinks that it is necessary to demonstrate this metaphysical view before one can have a practical faith in the

Prolegomena to Social Psychology. II. The Fundamental Fact in Social Psychology

IN spite of the remarkable development which this century has witnessed in the science of psychology from the time of Fechner to the present, most psychologists will admit that the science has as yet contributed little to the development of the social sciences, to the solution of the problems of societary life. A beginning, it is true, has been made in some of the social sciences in applying psychological principles to the solution of their problems. This is the case, for example, in political economy, especially in the attempt which the Austrian school has made to build up a theory of value upon principles furnished by the older individual psychology. But the contributions which psychology has thus far made to social science have been, with a few exceptions, small and insignificant compared with what has been expected from it. The reasons for this failure of psychology to contribute materially to the solution of social problems have been many. One has already been suggested in the preceding article of this series, namely, the dominance of the individualistic method and point of view in psychological investigation. Another is to be found, perhaps, in the failure to develop a comparative or genetic psychology. The reason, however, which appears to us fundamental and inclusive of the others is that psychology has not been developed from the point of view of function or lifeprocess. A mere st;ructural2 psychology of the adult human individual cannot, from its very nature, give an interpretation of life in its broadest phases, much less of the activities of society.

The Social Problem and the Present War

An American publicist2 recently predicted that the end of our present social order would come before I930. He points out that many of the social tendencies of the present are strikingly like those which preceded the French Revolution. He cites the mental opacity of our ruling classes as in many respects similar to the stupidity of the old French nobility when they were faced by the necessity of social readjustment in their time. The parallel between recent social unrest and that which preceded the storm of the French Revolution would probably be assented to by nearly all students of social history. Indeed, it requires no profound scientific mind to see the parallel. The blindness and ultraconservatism of many in our privileged classes on the one hand, the fanatic radicalism and one-sidedness of many of the leaders of the non-privileged on the other, would breed trouble in any social order. Unless plasticity of mind and a sense of social obligation can be instilled into our socially fortunate classes, and broadminded and constructive views shall dominate the leaders of our masses, western civilization is indeed brewing for the world something worse than a French Revolution. The problem of our civilization is something more than the mere threatened overthrow of existing political and industrial institutions. This the present European war (I9I4) makes evident. The problem before us is not how to avoid political revolution, but rather how to avoid the decay and disintegration of civilization itself. Many writers have recently told us that our civilization is on the wane, and many things might be cited in the present European war to show that such a conclusion is no mere

Lester Frank Ward

The men who are best qualified by their debt to Professor Ward, and by their consciousness of it, to form a just estimate of his works, shrink from the responsibility ofattempting immediately a formal appreciation of his meaning for sociology. While it is too early for the estimate, at once critical and comprehensive, which those to whom Dr Ward has been preceptor and mentor, hope to put on record after due deliberation, the following tributes will sufficiently mark the place which he has occupied in the esteem of his colleagues, among whom his primacy was always uncontested.

Reviews : Buddhist India. By T. W. RHYS-DAVIDS, LL. D.. Ph. D. Pp. 332. Price,

Buddhist India. By T. W. RHYS-DAVIDS, LL. D.. Ph. D. Pp. 332. Price,

1.50 net. New York : G. P. Putnam's Sons, I903

1.50 net. New York : G. P. Putnam’s Sons, I903. This book, by the eminent Pali scholar, Professor Rhys-Davids, is not so much a history, in the sense of a narrative of events, as a description of the social, economic and religious conditions of India at the time of the rise of Buddhism. The work reflects in every chapter the author’s high scholarship and wide knowledge of the original sources from which he draws his facts. It is, therefore, of great value to the student of early institutions. Historical research has been so mtich confined to European peoples as to deserve Spencer’s criticism that it affords too narrow a basis of induction for the con-