Charles D. Bailey

An empirical reanalysis of the selection-socialization hypothesis: a research note

Abstract Ponemon [Ponemon, L. (1988). A cognitive–developmental approach to the analysis of Certified Public Accountants’ ethical judgments . PhD dissertation, Union College of Union University; Accounting, Organizations and Society 17 (1992) 239] contends that a selection–socialization process exists in which (1) senior-level public accountants in the United States have less capacity to comprehend and resolve basic ethical problems than do accountants in subordinate ranks, and (2) the senior-level accountants perpetuate their ranks by promoting persons of low moral reasoning capacity. Using large, national random samples from 1995 and 2001, and correcting for inherent problems in the key study supporting this hypothesis, the current study yields results that materially contradict that earlier research. The sample sizes provide ample statistical power to conclude that, in the United States, capacity for moral judgment does not differ across rank (position) and this is not a factor in promotion in the public accounting profession as a whole. The study examines both political conservatism and gender as potential confounding variables, but finds that they do not drive the results. A sample of attorneys also gives no hint of selection–socialization. Instead, differences in moral cognition seem to be most relevant when people are making a choice of profession and less so after entering a particular profession.

Revitalizing Accounting Ethics Research in the Neo-Kohlbergian Framework: Putting the DIT into Perspective

The authors briefly review neo-Kohlbergian theory and provide an updated, contemporary view of the DIT. With this background, they present a framework for research using the DIT, drawing on Rest’s 1986 Four-Component Model. They note the existence of recent developments, including “intermediate concepts” that decision-makers normally invoke before falling back upon the “bedrock schema” that the DIT measures. Metrics available from the DIT, but generally neglected, are discussed, including the Utilizer score reflecting reliance upon ethical factors versus competing factors and Consolidation Transition Type indicating whether an individual relies upon a clear schema or is torn between competing schemas . Using this framework, they review the status of some well-known controversies in the accounting and auditing literature and suggest a number of research areas and approaches for future work. As such, the work complements and extends existing review articles that have included DIT-based literature in accounting and auditing.

Using Parameter Prediction Models to Forecast Post-Interruption Learning

Industrial learning curves are well-established tools for estimation of labor times and costs during the start-up, or learning, phase of a production activity. Their accuracy is impressive given a stable environment and continuous production. One of the problems that users face, however, is dealing with interruptions of the learning process. An improved ability to predict the course of learning after interruptions of production would enable manufacturers, service companies and others to improve their cost estimates and plan for resource requirements. Recent research has addressed the effects of interruption (and forgetting) as well as the nature of the relearning curve. This project represents an attempt to predict the parameters of relearning curves based on information available at the time that production resumes—including the original learning curve parameters, the amount of original learning, and the length of the production interruption. We develop and test parameter prediction models (PPMs) for estimating the parameters of relearning curves, then compare the predictive ability of such “estimated relearning curves” to the predictive ability of relearning curves (RLCs) that use only the relearning data. The PPMs perform well, showing lower mean absolute percentage errors than the best RLC model for this task until several relearning data points become available.

The effects of monitoring environment on problem-solving performance

ABSTRACT While effective and efficient solving of everyday problems is important in business domains, little is known about the effects of workplace monitoring on problem-solving performance. In a laboratory experiment, we explored the monitoring environment’s effects on an individual’s propensity to (1) establish pattern solutions to problems, (2) recognize when pattern solutions are no longer efficient, and (3) solve complex problems. Under three work monitoring regimes—no monitoring, human monitoring, and electronic monitoring—114 participants solved puzzles for monetary rewards. Based on research related to worker autonomy and theory of social facilitation, we hypothesized that monitored (versus non-monitored) participants would (1) have more difficulty finding a pattern solution, (2) more often fail to recognize when the pattern solution is no longer efficient, and (3) solve fewer complex problems. Our results support the first two hypotheses, but in complex problem solving, an interaction was found between self-assessed ability and the monitoring environment.

Does Monitoring Affect the Agent's Preference for Honesty?

Abstract Traditional agency theory assumes monitoring is good for the principal, but we investigate an unintended effect: diminishment of the agent’s preference for honesty. We hypothesize greater dishonest behavior in a monitored environment than in a non-monitored environment, when the agent has the opportunity to cheat outside the scope of monitoring. Relevant theories to explain such behavior are behavioral agency theory, where trust and reciprocity are thought to alter contractual outcomes, and the fraud-triangle theory, where the ability to rationalize deviant acts affects behavior. We utilize participants who have been acclimated to either a monitored or an unmonitored condition in an immediately preceding experiment and seamlessly continue that treatment. Within each of these conditions, participants perform a simple task with a performance-based monetary reward. Half self-report and can safely cheat, while the other half are verified; the difference between verified and self-reported scores is a proxy for dishonest reporting. As hypothesized, unmonitored individuals reciprocate with honest behavior, while monitored individuals tend toward dishonest behavior when the opportunity arises. Implications for fraud prevention are discussed.

Publication trends in research on professional responsibility and ethics in accounting and research on accounting ethics, and a database of the articles

The authors have developed, and intend to maintain indefinitely, a current database of articles published in Research on Professional Responsibility and Ethics in Accounting and its predecessor, Research on Accounting Ethics. Authors of all articles in volumes 1 (1995) through 13 (2008) were contacted for key words, and the authors assigned key words in the event of nonresponse. The database is in an Excel 2007 “xlsm” (macro-enabled) file, and is searchable by words or phrases in the key words, author names, and title fields. Feedback from authors and users is encouraged. The article includes instructions on use of the database. In addition, some observations are offered about trends, based on the increased and decreased use of key words across the life of the series, and a table allows the readers to draw their own conclusions about words of interest.

When Individuals Form Teams: Experimental Evidence Regarding Links Among Monetary Incentives, Stress, Effort, Attractiveness and Performance

This study extends research on the determinants of performance by examining the effect of compensation scheme and perceptions of task attractiveness on team performance. In a laboratory experiment all participants completed a cognitively difficult task both individually and in teams of three individuals. Both individuals and teams were asked to self-report their perceptions of the task’s attractiveness before and after completing the task for compensation, and were compensated for their task performance using one of two compensation schemes: fixed-wage or incentive-based. All links in the theoretical model were supported. Team results provide support for links between Compensation and Stress; Effort and Performance; Attractiveness and Effort; and finally, between Stress and Change in Attractiveness. Individual results provide support for links between Compensation and Stress; Stress and Effort; Effort and Performance; Attractiveness and Performance; Compensation and Change in Attractiveness; Stress and Change in Attractiveness; and finally, between Change in Attractiveness and Performance. Additionally, we find evidence that Attractiveness is a more important determinant of Effort and Performance in the absence of incentive-based compensation.