Charles E. M. Dunlop

Controversies about computerization and the character of white collar worklife

Abstract The way that computerization changes white collar work is the subject of significant controversies in the research and professional communities. This paper examines some of the key controversies about the way that computerization influences patterns of coordination control in workplaces, including monitoring. It examines debates about upskilling and deskilling, and the role of organizational infrastructure in making computerized systems more usable. It also examines the ways that computerization might foster new forms of work organization.

M. Gams, M. Paprzycki and X. Wu, eds., Mind Versus Computer: Were Dreyfus and Winograd Right?, Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, Vol. 43, Amsterdam: IOS Press, 1997, xiii + 235 pp. (paper), ISBN 90-5199-357-9.

This collection consists of twenty essays, most of which originally appeared in the journalInformatica, Volume 19, Number 4 (abstracts are available on the Web at<http://orca.st.usm.edu/informatica/vols/vol19.html >). The essays fall into two primary categories: (1) diagnoses of why artificial intelligence has not lived up to its early hype, along with proposals for new research directions, and (2) discussions of the relationship between computation, intentionality, and consciousness. Most of the material covers pretty familiar territory, and – given that much of it had already seen the light of day – the question naturally arises as to why the editors thought it worth reprinting in book form. Unfortunately, this question is not answered either by Terry Winograd’s preface (which, strangely, makes no specific mention of any of the book’s content) or by the editors’ brief introduction, which mainly provides meager (and often inaccurate) glosses on each article. Readers who have previously tracked issues in artificial intelligence or cognitive science will discover little here that is new, and the book’s nine-point typeface and numerous typographical errors will surely daunt all but the most dogged inquirers. Although the table of contents lists an Author Index, none was included in the copy received for review. Following is an overview of the essays, along with some critical commentary, organized by the two categories mentioned earlier. 1

Conceptual dependency as the language of thought

Roger Schanks research in AI takes seriously the ideas that understanding natural language involves mapping its expressions into an internal representation scheme and that these internal representations have a syntax appropriate for computational operations. It therefore falls within the computational approach to the study of mind. This paper discusses certain aspects of Schanks approach in order to assess its potential adequacy as a (partial) model of cognition. This version of the Language of Thought hypothesis encounters some of the same difficulties that arise for Fodors account.

Mentalese semantics and the naturalized mind

In a number of important works, Jerry Fodor has wrestled with the problem of how mental representation can be accounted for within a physicalist framework. His favored response has attempted to identify nonintentional conditions for intentionality, relying on a nexus of casual relations between symbols and what they represent. I examine Fodors theory and argue that it fails to meet its own conditions for adequacy insofar as it presupposes the very phenomenon that it purports to account for. I conclude, however, that the ontological commitments of intentional psychology survive within a broader conception of naturalism than the one adopted by Fodor.

William H. Calvin, How Brains Think: Evolving Intelligence, Then and Now

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