Charles F. Doran

War and the Cycle of Relative Power

Relative nation-state capability follows a generalized nonlinear pattern over long periods. Empirical evidence indicates that between 1816–1975 nine major powers have traversed at least a segment of this relative capability cycle of political ascendancy, maturation and decline. Specific changes in a states relative capability dynamics increase its propensity to initiate extensive war. Whether the extensiveness of a war is defined in terms of duration, intensity or magnitude, major powers are likely to initiate more extensive wars at the critical inflection and turning points on the curve of relative capability where the linear role perceptions held by government and society change pervasively. This analysis involves a new theoretical focus for examining the causes of war, shifting attention from interactions between nations to the consequences of changes in relative power and to the political evolution of the nation-state itself.

Why Forecasts Fail: The Limits and Potential of Forecasting in International Relations and Economics

A forecast is a prediction based on knowledge of past behavior. The forecaster must consider to what extent past trends will continue in the future. In linear forecasts, the past is prologue, and forecasting amounts to linear extrapolation of the past trend into the future. When conditions are propitious and behavior over time is approximately linear, the linear forecast will fit the data tolerably well. But forecasts ultimately fail because no technique has been developed that allows the forecaster to predict, prior to the event itself, when a nonlinearity will occur. This essay argues that a nonlinearity is a critical point at which expectations (predictions) induced by the prior trend suddenly confront a profound alteration in that trend, indeed, an abrupt inversion. A nonlinearity is a total break from the past trend, a discontinuity. The theory of relative power (systemic structure) dynamics known as power cycle theory provides both a thorough, graphic explanation of this discontinuity in expectations that occurs at critical points in the process, and the reason why nonlinearities are impossible to derive from prior trends. Theoretical and empirical assessment of a process and its dynamics makes possible an explanation of the conditions that give rise to such nonlinearity. Hence such dynamical analysis can predict that such a nonlinearity will occur, but in all but a closed system it still cannot predict when the nonlinearity will occur.

Systemic Disequilibrium, Foreign Policy Role, and the Power Cycle

Confronting widespread ambiguities of theory and research design, this article establishes conditions underlying international political stability for state and system. In turn, it (1) dissects the cycle of relative power and role to elucidate the concept of general equilibrium, depicting graphically the trauma of role adjustment that accompanies critical changes in relative power; (2) compares the empirical results for transitions and critical points using the same set of data; (3) shows mathematically that inversions in the trend of slope can approximate critical intervals; and (4) demonstrates via diagrams of each states critical change why the disequilibrated system 1885-1914 succumbed to massive world war. Empirical research on systems transformation and major war must incorporate both strategic power balancing and power-role equilibration for states in the central system in a broader concept like general equilibrium.

War and Power Dynamics: Economic Underpinnings

Power cycle theory is a two-part theory of the dynamics of relative capability and the occurrence of major war. The relative capability of a state follows a particular non-linear pattern of evolution that is generalizable across the principal members of the state system. This capability also defines the states systemic role. At four critical points on this curve, where change in the states power position and international political role involve abrupt inversions in the dynamics, the probability of foreign policy misperception and over-reaction is increased and the state is more likely than at other times to trigger major war. Economic considerations underlie relative capability and affect the amplitude and periodicity of the power cycle. Differing central economic strategies that historically have contributed to the evolution of a states power cycle are examined. Economic considerations also influence conflict probabilities directly within the critical interval. A discussion of further research involving the power cycle theory of war causation follows the examination of these economic underpinnings of the theory.

Economics, Philosophy of History, and the “Single Dynamic” of Power Cycle Theory: Expectations, Competition, and Statecraft

What matters in the structural dynamics of any political or economic system is the contradiction between absolute and relative trends. The “single dynamic” of power and role, of state and system, encodes the “perspective of statecraft” in the trends and shifting trends of relative share. The “tides of history” shift counter-intuitively, creating enormous uncertainty, inverting future expectations about role and security, and disrupting the normal stability of statecraft. Power cycle theory reconciles realism and idealism in conceptualizing foreign policy role as coequal in significance with power in a legitimate world order. A “dynamic equilibrium” requires reciprocal adaptation to structural change, and it is explicitly non-hegemonic. This article establishes the philosophical foundations of power cycle theory as a theory of competition actualized in productive interaction.

Modes, Mechanisms, and Turning Points Perspectives on the Transformation of the International System

Analysis of the transformation of international systems involves a determination of what type of systems change and how much change is necessary and sufficient to justify calling a change a transformation. The theoretical discussion covers (1) modes, the political sub stance of change; (2) mechanisms, the manner and rate at which change is expressed; (3) endogenous processes including interdependence, dependence, codependence, autarky, and integration; (4) exogenous processes such as the emergence of new actors and the technological development of weaponry; and (5) the identification of historical turning points where changes in the structure of the system have coincided with fundamental changes in the rules of statecraft and of political order. Complementarity and competitive ness are discussed as examples of complex mechanisms of systems transformation. Several types of counterintuitive mechanisms are also examined, including an extension of the Richardson model to incorporate inversion-of-expectation transformation processes. In short, the challenge in theoretical terms lies in the dynamics of systems transformation.

Anti-Americanism in Canada?

Anti-Americanism is a form of hostile caricature of American values and behavior. In Canada, hostile caricature of things American is sometimes used by politicians for a functional purpose. A government may appeal to a nationalist streak in some Canadians so as to attempt to stay in office or to unify the country against a purported hostile external influence. Anti-Americanism is undermined by cultural, regional, partisan, and individual differences in viewpoint. Governments that too ardently exploit anti-Americanism are thrown out of office. No latent anti-Americanism exists in Canada.

Conflict and Cooperation: Between the Cold War and the Gulf

Several myths about Soviet-American relations vis-à-vis third actors—unlimited military competition during the Cold War; perfect future political harmony; international political status quo and lack of significant change—may get in the way of possible cooperation in conflict avoidance, management, and resolution. This article examines the historical and structural setting that has created a proper climate for parallel U.S. and Soviet initiative and joint diplomatic efforts regarding Third World disputes. Conflicts that may lend themselves most to joint U.S.-Soviet involvement on behalf of conflict regulation or resolution are (1) conflicts outside local spheres of influence, (2) conflicts where the leverage available to Washington and Moscow with respect to one or both disputants is greatest, (3) disputes that can be paired and are subject to workable quid pro quos, and (4) conflict situations that can be submitted to international organizations within which the superpowers hold significant membership. Pragmatism and flexibility will serve the superpowers well in their quest to generate a more stable and secure Third World political environment.

Leading Indicators of the June War: A Micro Analysis of the Conflict Cycle

Predictions of all sorts preceded the June War of 1967, some by the governments themselves, others by newspapermen and academics, many containing a substantial burden of error, others possessing an impressive degree of accuracy and insight. Analysts making these judgments read daily news accounts, noted official government statements, assessed rumors and intelligence leaks, observed levels of military activity, and then tried to estimate whether, when, and with what consequences war might occur.