Charles J. Brainerd

Fuzzy-trace theory: An interim synthesis

Abstract We review the current status of fuzzy-trace theory. The presentation is organized around five topics. First, theoretical ideas that immediately preceded the development of fuzzy-trace theory are sketched. Second, experimental findings that challenged those ideas (e.g., memory-reasoning independence, the intuitive nature of mature reasoning) are summarized. Third, the core assumptions that comprised the initial version of fuzzy-trace theory are described. Fourth, some modifications to those assumptions are explored that were necessitated by subsequent experimental findings. Fifth, four areas of experimentation are considered in which research under the aegis of fuzzy-trace theory is in progress: (a) suggestibility and false memories; (b) judgment and decision making; (c) the development of forgetting; and (d) the development of retrieval.

The stage question in cognitive-developmental theory

The term “stage” appears to be used in three general senses in theories of behavioral development: ( a ) as a metaphor: ( b ) as a description of behaviors that undergo age change; ( c ) as an explanation of age-related changes in behavior. Although most existing stage models are purely descriptive, a few of them purport to have explanatory power. One such model, Piagets stages of cognitive development, is considered in this paper. To be viewed as potentially explanatory, a stage model must describe some behaviors that undergo age change, posit antecedent variables believed to cause the changes, and provide procedures whereby the behavioral changes and the antecedent variables can be independently measured. Piagets stages seem to satisfy some but not all of these requirements. Piagets stages describe many agerelated changes in behavior, and some antecedent variables have been proposed. However, procedures do not exist for measuring the two factors independently. In lieu of such procedures, Piaget has outlined a “program” of five empirical criteria whereby the reality of his stages can ostensibly be verified. Some objections to these criteria are considered. The five criteria in Piagets program are invariant sequence, cognitive structure, integration, consolidation, and equilibration. Three of the criteria (invariant sequence, integration, and consolidation) lead to the same sorts of empirical predictions (culturally universal sequences in the acquisition of certain behaviors). Such predictions are subject to the objection that Piagetian invariant sequences are often measurement sequences. A measurement sequence is said to occur when some late-appearing behavior consists of some earlier-appearing behavior plus additional things. The cognitive structure criterion is subject to at least three criticisms: First, it yields, at most, descriptions of behavior; second, these are often nothing more than descriptions of task structure; third, they cannot be regarded as unique to the given stages for which they are posited. The fifth criterion, equilibration, generates some predictions that might be considered as prima facie evidence for the existence of stages. However, these predictions conflict with the current data base on Piagets stages. It is concluded that there is no compelling support for Piagets hypothesis that his cognitive stages do more than describe age-related changes in behavior. Since explanatory statements involving stages appear with some regularity in Piagetian and neo-Piagetian writings, there are grounds for supposing this conclusion to be nontrivial.

Fuzzy-Trace Theory and False Memory

A key problem confronting theories of false memory is that false-memory phenomena are so diverse: Some are characteristic of controlled laboratory tasks, others of everyday life; some occur for traumatic events with legal consequences, others for innocuous events; some are characteristic of one developmental level, others of another developmental level. Fuzzy-trace theory explains false memories via a small set of principles that implement a single representational distinction. Those principles generate new predictions, some of which are counterintuitive.

Gist is the grist: Fuzzy-trace theory and the new intuitionism☆

Abstract Fuzzy-trace theory is a gist-driven interpretation of cognitive development that has descended from, but is distinctly different than, the Piagetian and information-processing traditions. Intuition, rather than deductive logic or computing machinery, is taken as the operative metaphor for cognition, where intuition is defined as it is in the foundations of mathematics—namely, as a fuzzy concept in combination with a construction rule. The theory is orchestrated around seven basic principles: (a) gist extraction; (b) fuzzy-to-verbatim continua; (c) the fuzzy-processing preference (intuition); (d) reconstruction in short- and long-term memory; (e) output interference; (f) resource freedom; and (g) ontogenesis. These principles are illustrated with developmental findings from such familiar reasoning paradigms as class inclusion, framing, mental arithmetic, probability judgment, and transitive inference.

Developmental Reversals in False Memory: A Review of Data and Theory

Can susceptibility to false memory and suggestion increase dramatically with age? The authors review the theoretical and empirical literatures on this counterintuitive possibility. Until recently, the well-documented pattern was that susceptibility to memory distortion had been found to decline between early childhood and young adulthood. That pattern is the centerpiece of much expert testimony in legal cases involving child witnesses and victims. During the past 5 years, however, several experiments have been published that test fuzzy-trace theorys prediction that some of the most powerful forms of false memory in adults will be greatly attenuated in children. Those experiments show that in some common domains of experience, in which false memories are rooted in meaning connections among events, age increases in false memory are the rule and are sometimes accompanied by net declines in the accuracy of memory. As these experiments are strongly theory-driven, they have established that developmental improvements in the formation of meaning connections are necessary and sufficient to produce age increases in false memory.

The Development of forgetting and reminiscence

Many theoretical positions on memory development anticipate that forgetting rates should vary substantially with age. The nature of these age variations is also relevant to many applied questions about child development that have major social policy implications, such as the veracity of childrens eyewitness testimony and the long-term effectiveness of classroom instruction. Surprisingly, developmental studies of long-term retention have repeatedly produced the puzzling finding that forgetting rates are age invariant. It now seems, however, that these null age trends may have been artifacts of variables such as measurement insensitivity, floor effects, and stages-of-learning confounds. Assuming, as some later studies suggest, that forgetting rates vary with age when these factors are controlled, there are three overriding questions that must be dealt with in the developmental analysis of forgetting: the relative importance of storage failure versus retrieval failure, the relative importance of true forgetting processes versus test-induced processes, and the relative importance of storage-based reminiscence versus retrieval-based reminiscence. We describe a framework (disintegration/redintegation theory) that provides a conceptual environment within which research on these questions can progress. This framework, which evolved from fuzzy-trace theory, reinterprets processes such as storage failure, retrieval failure, restorage, and retrieval relearning in terms of levels of featural integration in traces (i.e., the extent to which contextual information is integrated with core semantic gist to produce a coherent representation). The theory is implemented in a mathematical model (the trace-integrity model) whose parameters deliver measurements of relevant memory processes on a common ratio scale. In a series of experiments, the model was used to study the theorys predictions about the contributions of these memory processes to long-term retention in subjects between the ages of 7 and 70. All the experiments were standard long-term retention designs (an initial acquisition session, followed by a 1-2-week forgetting interval, followed by a series of retention tests).(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)

Recollection rejection: False-memory editing in children and adults.

Mechanisms for editing false events out of memory reports have fundamental implications for theories of false memory and for best practice in applied domains in which false reports must be minimized (e.g., forensic psychological interviews, sworn testimony). A mechanism posited in fuzzy-trace theory, recollection rejection, is considered. A process analysis of false-memory editing is presented, which assumes that false-but-gist-consistent events (e.g., the word SOFA, when the word COUCH was experienced) sometimes cue the retrieval of verbatim traces of the corresponding true events (COUCH), generating mismatches that counteract the high familiarity of false-but-gist-consistent events. Empirical support comes from 2 qualitative phenomena: recollective suppression of semantic false memory and inverted-U relations between retrieval time and semantic false memory. Further support comes from 2 quantitative methodologies: conjoint recognition and receiver operating characteristics. The analysis also predicts a novel false-memory phenomenon (erroneous recollection rejection), in which true events are inappropriately edited out of memory reports.

Memory independence and memory interference in cognitive development.

Recent experiments have established the surprising fact that age improvements in reasoning are often dissociated from improvements in memory for determinative informational inputs. Fuzzy-trace theory explains this memory-independence effect on the grounds that reasoning operations do not directly access verbatim traces of critical background information but, rather, process gist that was retrieved and edited in parallel with the encoding of such information. This explanation also envisions 2 ways in which childrens memory and reasoning might be mutually interfering: (a) memory-to-reasoning interference, a tendency to process verbatim traces of background inputs on both memory probes and reasoning problems that simultaneously improves memory performance and impairs reasoning, and (b) reasoning-to-memory interference, a tendency for reasoning activities that produce problem solutions to erase or reduce the distinctiveness of verbatim traces of background inputs. Both forms of interference were detected in studies of childrens story inferences.

What, when, and how about why : a longitudinal study of early expressions of causality

Childrens expressions of causality in natural discourse with adults were examined in terms of linguistic, contextual, and pragmatic influences. Specifically, the causal statements, questions, and responses to causal questions of eight 2-3-year-old children were examined in terms of developments in language content, form, and use. With respect to content, the referential and functional uses of causal expressions for both children and adults were to ongoing or imminent situations, with the speaker commenting on his or her intention to act, or requesting the listener to act. The major categories of reference in all three utterance types were negation, direction, and intention. In terms of form, there were (a) increasing use of connectives to link clauses for all the children, and (b) three main patterns of clause order differentiating among the children: cause/effect, effect/cause, and equal use of both orders. The use of expressions of causality developed in the order: child statements less than adult questions less than child responses less than child questions. The relationship of the linguistic context to these developments was found to be one of mutual influence between child and adult. The results are discussed in terms of previous hypotheses concerning (a) causal reasoning (especially those put forth by Piaget, and by Werner & Kaplan in 1963), (b) the relationship between language and conceptual development, (c) the constraints involved in different discourse situations, and (d) variation in child language.

When Things That Were Never Experienced Are Easier To “Remember” Than Things That Were

Can things that were never experienced be more readily accepted on recognition tests than things that were experienced? A current explanation of false memory predicts that this can happen when things that were never experienced provide superior access to the gist of events. This prediction was tested in three experiments in which the task was to accept all test items that were consistent with the substance of previously studied material, regardless of whether they had been studied. Acceptance rates were consistently higher for some never-studied items (those that provided superior access to gist memories) than for studied items. This effect varied predictably as a function of manipulations of the strength of gist memories and their accessibility. These results have implications for the use of exploratory memory-interrogation procedures in psychotherapy and the law.