Charles W. Tolman

The Metaphysic of Relations in Klaus Riegel’s ‘Dialectics’ of Human Development

The intention of this paper is to criticize Klaus Riegel’s conception of dialectics. Dialectics is distinguished from the metaphysic of properties and the metaphysic of relations. The importance to dialectics of understanding movement, contradiction and development in terms of internal relations is stressed. Accounts in Riegel’s theory of the individual, balance, dialogue, change and development are examined and found to represent a metaphysic of relations in dialectical garb. The principal consequence of the theory’s failure to transcend metaphysics is its inability to solve the problem of balance and to explain development. It is of the highest importance to ascertain and understand rightly the nature of Dialectic. Wherever there is movement, wherever there is life, wherever anything is carried into effect in the actual world, there Dialectic is at work. It is also the soul of all knowledge which is truly scientific. (Hegel, 1892, p. 148)

Further Comments on the Meaning of 'Dialectic'.

While not disputing the claim that the word ‘dialectic’ has many meanings, it is argued that there exists in the diversity a unity which is expressed as a conception of development that possesses four interrelated features: qualitative transformation, process, opposition, and internal necessity. The understanding of dialectic has evolved from ancient times to the present, with materialist dialectic representing the most advanced form. Some conclusions for a dialectical psychology are drawn from the work of Vygotsky and Leont’ev.

For a More Adequate Concept of Development with Help from Aristotle and Marx

I do not believe that the concept of development can usefully be characterized on a continuum of strength in exactly the manner proposed by Dixon, Lerner, and Hultsch. To explain, let me begin by drawing attention to the definition of ‘concept’ in Antony Flew’s A Dictionary of Philosophy: That which a person has when he understands or is able to use some portion of his language. Criteria for possessing a concept may be weak, requiring only an ability to pick out or distinguish that to which an expression applies. For example, to possess the concept sheep could require no more than the ability to say ‘sheep’ in the presence of sheep. Stronger criteria might involve the grasp of the logical or grammatical behaviour of the expression (‘sheep’ is a common noun, not a proper name), factual knowledge (sheep are a source of meat), or the ability to define or give the essence of a sheep. (Flew, 1984, p. 69)

Theoretical Unification in Psychology: A Materialist Perspective

The case for a materialist foundation for psychology is described in which theoretical unification emerges as an on-going historical process, not as a state. Theoretical indeterminacy is overcome through appeal to evolutionary and historical contexts which allow evaluation of theories in terms of essentiality and relevance.

How to reconcile theoretical differences in psychology

Abstract An approach to reconciling theoretical differences is described that relies not merely on appeal to more empirical data, but on putting the difference into a broad evolutionary or historical perspective. An example is given relating to the “innate vs. learned” controversy. One implication for the development of theoretical psychology is discussed.

Pluralistic Monism: William James as Closet-Heraclitean

Pluralistic monism is an attractive solution to problems raised by debates on pluralism and monism in present-day psychology. It is a position to which William James was attracted and one which appears to have been entirely consistent with his pragmatism, though he was reluctant to openly embrace it. An examination of the pluralistic monism of Heraclitus and its historical context indicates that it is coherent only when supported by a distinction between contradiction in nature and logical contradiction. James’s failure explicitly to recognize this distinction-though much of his thinking is marked by an implicit recognition of it-is one of several reasons examined here for his ambivalence on the question. It is concluded that pluralistic monism is not only more characteristically “Jamesian,” but provides a workable resolution to the long-standing debate over the one versus the many.

Bekhterev on Human Immortality

The essence of Bekhterevs understanding of human immortality can be summarized in two propositions. First, it denies the traditional Christian belief that there is an individual soul that survives the bodys death and then, according to the persons merits and the Grace of God, passes on to eternal reward or punishment. Second, it affirms that the individual does live on beyond death in his or her influences upon the thoughts and actions of others.

Intentionality, meaning, and evolution

Abstract According to materialist philosophy, the mental is an attribute of an ultimately physical system. It is not a necessary consequence of materialism, however, that the mental be reducible to, i.e., exhaustively explained by, the physics of that system. Nonreductive materialism recognizes that systems evolve and, in so doing, produce new levels of attributes which require new principles for their understanding and explanation. The mental, or psychosocial, is undoubtedly such a level. In dealing with attributional levels, the theorist is confronted with a dual task. First, the distinguishing features of the level must be identified; second, an account must be sought of the evolution of those features. The present paper is to be understood in this context. Following Brentano it identifies intentionality as a distinguishing feature of the mental and then, with the aid of a materialist theory of mental evolution, seeks to clarify its nature through an account of its probable evolution.