Charles Wyplosz

Exchange market mayhem: the antecedents and aftermath of speculative attacks

Exchange market mayhem The antecedents and aftermath of speculative attacks This paper evaluates the causes and consequences of episodes of turbulence in foreign exchange markets. Using data from 1959 through 1993 for twenty OECD countries, we consider the antecedents and aftermath of devaluations and revaluations, flotations, fixings and speculative attacks (which may not be successful). We find that realignments of fixed exchange rates are alike: devaluations are preceded by political instability, budget and current account deficits, and fast growth of money and prices. Revaluations are mirror images of devaluations. Speculative attacks resemble devaluations, but money growth and inflation are more endemic and there is no last-minute attempt to tighten monetary policy. In contrast, few consistent correlations link regime transitions like flotations or fixings to macroeconomic or political variables. Transitions between exchange rate regimes are largely idiosyncratic, and are neither consistently provoked ex ante by systematic imbalances, nor typically justified ex post by subsequent changes in policy. We conclude that there are no clear early warning signals of many speculative attacks, and no easy solutions for policy-makers. — Barry Eichengreen, Andrew K. Rose and Charles Wyplosz

The Unstable EMS

FROM THE STANDPOINT OF EUROPEAN MONETARY AFFAIRS, 1992 opened with a bang and closed with a whimper. In January, the European monetary system (EMS) celebrated five years of exchange rate stability: sixty full months without a realignment. The month before, the representatives of European Community (EC) member-states initialed the Treaty on Economic and Monetary Union concluded at Maastricht in the Netherlands. The transition to European monetary union (EMU) appeared to be fully underway. By the end of the year, the European monetary system had enduredindeed, was continuing to experience-the most severe crisis in its fourteen-year history. Two of ten currencies, the Italian lira and the British

The Stability Pact: more than a minor nuisance?

Stability Pact More than a minor nuisance? The Stability and Growth Pact will lead member countries to aim for cyclically balanced budgets. Until this steady state is reached, Europe will continue its efforts at de.cit cutting. While so doing, politicians are less likely to undertake the dif.cult labour market reforms that are really needed. Is further .scal retrenchment wise? The paper reviews the reasons that have been advanced in favour of a Stability Pact and .nds them wanting. The most serious justi.cations, such as the systemic risk of bank crisis following a government.s failure to service its debt, can be better dealt with in other ways: for example, by prudential limits on banks. exposure to public debts. Moreover, our analysis reveals that the macroeconomic costs of the Stability Pact, while sizeable, are not as dangerous as often believed. The costs will be barely visible once the steady state is reached. The true macroeconomic costs are front loaded; they concern the next few years, after a decade already dominated by convergence efforts. — Barry Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz

Gross Worker and Job Flows in Europe

Despite the impression of Eurosclerosis, labour markets in Europe are in fact quite active. Flows into and out of unemployment are large, countercyclical, and highly coincident in the four European countries examined in this paper. The most surprising finding is that exits from unemployment exhibit a countercyclical pattern, similar to that in Japan and the United States. It may be explained by a matching function, for which estimates are presented. Worker flows seem very different from job flows. Because the links between these necessarily related labour market flows have not been studied so far, we present a model which can match the jobs and worker flows stylized facts.

Fiscal Policy: Institutions versus Rules

The Paper explores how fiscal policy can be made both more disciplined and more counter-cyclical. It first examines whether the decline of public debts observed in the OECD area during the 1990s can be explained either by less activism or by a priority towards consolidation. It then argues that rules, for example the Stability and Growth Pact, are less likely to deliver the desired outcome than institutions. Drawing a parallel with monetary policy, it examines how a Fiscal Policy Committee could reproduce what Monetary Policy Committees have achieved in central banking.

When Does Capital Account Liberalization Help More than it Hurts

In this paper we reconsider the evidence on capital account liberalization and growth. While we find indications of a positive association, the effects vary with time, with how capital account liberalization is measured, and with how the relationship is estimated. The evidence that the effects of capital account liberalization are stronger in high-income countries is similarly fragile. There is some evidence that the positive growth effects of liberalization are stronger in countries with strong institutions, as measured by standard indicators of the rule of law, but only weak evidence that the benefits grow with a countrys financial depth and development. We find more evidence of a correlation between capital account liberalization and growth when we allow the effect to vary with other dimensions of openness. There are two interpretations of this finding, one in terms of the sequencing of trade and financial liberalization, the other in terms of the need to eliminate major macroeconomic imbalances before opening the capital account. By and large our results support the second interpretation.

The economic consequences of President Mitterrand

France under Mitterrand Jeffrey Sachs and Charles Wyplosz While French economic performance has not conformed to the enthusiastic promises of early 1981, this paper argues that the widely held view that it has been an unmitigated failure is unwarranted. First, the general deterioration can largely be dated back to the early seventies. Second, the early and unfortunate attempt at a demand-led expansion was both moderate in size and quickly reversed. Finally, the post-1983 anti-inflationary policies have been successful so that, overall, the disappointing French performance has been on a par with, and in some ways better than, the rest of Europe. But the main theme of the paper is the emphasis on the supply side. The analysis is organized around the NAIRU, the threshold rate of unemployment below which inflation rises. In an attempt to explain the factors which have led to a continuous rise of the NAIRU since 1973, the paper focuses on labour costs, particularly on the ‘wedge’ between the costs borne by employers and net take-home pay. To achieve and sustain a significantly lower level of unemployment, labour taxes must be cut, thus reducing the wedge and the NAIRU, and there must be a corresponding demand stimulus so that actual unemployment can fall to this level.

The Zero Root Problem: A Note on the Dynamic Determination of the Stationary Equilibrium in Linear Models

Singularity of the transition matrix in differential equation systems implies indeterminacy of the stationary equilibrium: we show that this indeterminacy is only apparent, and we provide the unique solution. There are many examples of, and good theoretical reasons for, singular transition matrices. The main result is that, when stability conditions arc satisfied, the resulting stationary equilibrium will depend upon the intial conditions and the parameters describing the speed of adjustment.

Real Exchange Rate Effects of Fiscal Policy

This paper develops a framework for analyzing the effects of fiscal policy on the real exchange rate. The short-run impact of various types of fiscal measures are considered as well as the dynamics of adjustment to long-run steady states. The analysis and related simulations suggest that the effect of fiscal policy changes on the real exchange rate can vary widely and will depend closely on a number of structural features, including the degree of asset substitutability,the composition of government spending, and the initial size of the public debt and net external position.

Ten Years of Transformation: Macroeconomic Lessons

After surveying the facts and distilling the voluminous literature on the transition to market economies, the author arrives at several conclusions: with hindsight, the old debate - Big Bang versus gradualism - was really a problem of feasibility, although many of the arguments in favor of the Big Bang have now been proven right. Once more, inflation has been found to be incompatible with growth and the importance of a good microeconomic structure - especially an effective banking system - has been confirmed. The decline of the state in transition economies is both spectacular and puzzling - combining features that are both desirable and dangerous. Among useful lessons learned: 1) It has paid to start early and move fast. The Big Bang is highly desirable but impractical, and gradualism is unavoidable but ought to be compressed as much as possible. The countries that bit the bullet early and hard have done better over the past decade. 2) Stabilize first; growth next. Macroeconomic stabilization is a prerequisite for growth. The budget deficit need not be eliminated, but the link between deficits and money growth must be severed. 3) Structural reform is important, and microeconomic policies, often overlooked, should be started as soon as possible. This means establishing property rights, hardening budget constraints, building a healthy banking system, and ensuring true domestic competition. 4) The choice of an exchange rate regime, another early controversy, is apparently less important than adherence to a strictmonetary policy. The floaters have tightly managed their exchange rates, while the fixers have repeatedly devalued and have often ended up floating. Some form of monetary targeting is needed, but it matters little which target is chosen so long as it is adhered to. 5) Creating irreversibilities early on allows governments to change without seriously affecting the transition. The less stable the economy, the more politics matters. A shaky economic basis is fertile ground for policy reversals that set the clock back several years (Bulgaria, Romania, Russia).