Charles X. Wang

Channel Coordination for a Supply Chain with a Risk‐Neutral Manufacturer and a Loss‐Averse Retailer*

This article considers a decentralized supply chain in which a single manufacturer is selling a perishable product to a single retailer facing uncertain demand. It differs from traditional supply chain contract models in two ways. First, while traditional supply chain models are based on risk neutrality, this article takes the viewpoint of behavioral principal‐agency theory and assumes the manufacturer is risk neutral and the retailer is loss averse. Second, while gain/loss (GL) sharing is common in practice, there is a lack of analysis of GL-sharing contracts in the supply chain contract literature. This article investigates the role of a GL-sharing provision for mitigating the loss-aversion effect, which drives down the retailer order quantity and total supply chain profit. We analyze contracts that include GL-sharing-and-buyback (GLB) credit provisions as well as the special cases of GL contracts and buyback contracts. Our analytical and numerical results lend insight into how a manufacturer can design a contract to improve total supply chain, manufacturer, and retailer performance. In particular, we show that there exists a special class of distribution-free GLB contracts that can coordinate the supply chain and arbitrarily allocate the expected supply chain profit between the manufacturer and retailer; in contrast with other contracts, the parameter values for contracts in this class do not depend on the probability distribution of market demand. This feature is meaningful in practice because (i) the probability distribution of demand faced by a retailer is typically unknown by the manufacturer and (ii) a manufacturer can offer the same contract to multiple noncompeting retailers that differ by demand distribution and still coordinate the supply chains.

Would a risk-averse newsvendor order less at a higher selling price?☆

We model a risk-averse newsvendors decision-making behavior with some commonly used classes of utility functions within the expected utility theory (EUT) framework. Under fairly general conditions of EUT, we show that a risk-averse newsvendor will order less than an arbitrarily small quantity as selling price gets larger if price is higher than a threshold value, i.e., the optimal order quantity decreases as the selling price increases.

A general framework of supply chain contract models

A supply chain is two or more parties linked by a flow of goods, information, and funds. When one or more parties of the supply chain try to optimize their own profits, system performance may be hurt. Supply chain contract is a coordination mechanism that provides incentives to all of its members so that the decentralized supply chain behaves nearly or exactly the same as the integrated one. We have seen a vast literature on supply chain contracts recently. However, little work has been done on the relationships of those supply chain contract models. In this paper, we provide a general framework that synthesizes existing results for a variety of supply chain contract forms.

Random yield and uncertain demand in decentralised supply chains under the traditional and VMI arrangements

Both random yield and uncertain demand are common occurrences in the semiconductor industry. This paper studies a decentralised supply chain comprised of a single manufacturer and a single distributor for a short life-cycle product with random yield and uncertain demand. We analyse two alternatives for doing business. One alternative is the traditional supply chain arrangement, where the distributor is fully responsible for the inventory decision whereas the manufacturer is fully responsible for the production decision. The other alternative is the vendor-managed-inventory (VMI) arrangement, where the manufacturer (vendor) is fully responsible for the entire production and inventory decisions in the supply chain. We characterise the optimal production and inventory decisions under both arrangements. We also compare the individual firms and supply chain performance under the traditional and VMI arrangements. Our results provide insights into how firms can choose the right supply chain arrangement to improve supply chain efficiency.

Markdown money contracts for perishable goods with clearance pricing

It is common in practice that retailers liquidate unsold perishable goods via clearance pricing. Markdown money is frequently used between manufacturers and retailers in such a supply chain setting. It is a form of rebate from a manufacturer to subsidize a retailers clearance pricing after the regular season. Two forms of markdown money are percent markdown money, in which the markdown money is limited to only a certain percentage of the retail price markdown, and quantity markdown money, which is essentially a buyback contract or returns policy with a rebate credit paid to the retailer for each unsold unit after the regular season. We show both forms of markdown money contracts can coordinate the supply chain and we discuss their strengths and limitations.

Newsvendor Models with Alternative Risk Preferences Within Expected Utility Theory and Prospect Theory Frameworks

Newsvendor models are widely used in the literature, and usually based upon the assumption of risk neutrality. Recently there is a growing body of literature that attempts to use alternative risk preferences rather than risk neutrality to describe the newsvendor decision-making behavior. In this chapter, we provide an overview of newsvendor models with alternative risk preferences within the expected utility theory and prospect theory frameworks and identify some directions for future research.

A comparison of two sourcing tactics for a new component

We compare two sourcing tactics for a manufacturer to purchase a new component to be used in a one-time production run of a new product with uncertain and price-elastic demand. One alternative is to issue a request-for-quote (RFQ), which is where the manufacturer requests a price-quantity schedule from suppliers. The manufacturer uses this information to determine a production quantity and the number of components to purchase from each supplier. The other alternative is to post a bid specifying how the manufacturers purchase quantity will depend on the suppliers component price. The suppliers use this information to compete on quantity. We find that relative to RFQ, which is more challenging for the manufacturer to characterize the supplier response due to the possibility of supplier interaction, the benefit to the manufacturer from posting a bid increases with the number of suppliers due to increased intensity of competition. If the new component is from an emerging industry where there is little mutual awareness among candidate suppliers, then regardless of number of suppliers, expected manufacturer profit is higher under RFQ. Posting a bid is more likely to benefit the manufacturer when the new component is from a more established industry with a high degree of awareness among candidate suppliers.