Charlotte Rommerskirchen

Out of left field? Explaining the variable electoral success of European radical left parties

European radical left parties (RLPs) are gradually receiving greater attention. Yet, to date, what has received insufficient focus is why such parties have maintained residues of electoral support after the collapse of the USSR and why this support varies so widely. This article is the first to subject RLPs to large-n quantitative analysis, focusing on 39 parties in 34 European countries from 1990 to 2008. It uses the ‘supply and demand’ conceptual framework developed for radical right parties to identify a number of socio-economic, political-cultural and party-system variables in the external environment that might potentially affect RLP support. The article finds the most persuasive variables to include political culture (past party success), the level of unemployment, Euroscepticism and anti-globalization sentiment, the electoral threshold and competition from Green and radical right parties. The findings suggest several avenues for future research and provide a framework that can be adapted to explain the electoral success of other party families.

A Panacea for all Times? The German Stability Culture as Strategic Political Resource

The German Stability Culture is frequently pointed to in the literature as the source of the country’s low inflation policies and, at the European Union level, the design of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In Germany, the term was regularly wielded by central bankers and Christian Democrat (CDU–CSU) politicians to legitimise the move to EMU in the face of a large majority of public opinion opposed – and subsequent EU-level policy developments – particularly in the context of the eurozone debt crisis that erupted in 2009. An ordered probit analysis is used to demonstrate the depth of the German Stability Culture, showing support for low inflation cuts across all party and ideological lines. Despite this ubiquity, the term has been wielded with regularity only by the centre-right Christian Democrats and is strongly associated with this party. A strategic constructivist analysis is employed to explain this uneven but persistent usage in German domestic politics.

A Panacea for all Times: the Politics of the German Stability Culture

The German Stability Culture is frequently pointed to in the literature as the source of the country’s low inflation policies and, at the European Union level, the design of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In Germany, the term was regularly wielded by central bankers and Christian Democrat (CDU–CSU) politicians to legitimise the move to EMU in the face of a large majority of public opinion opposed – and subsequent EU-level policy developments – particularly in the context of the eurozone debt crisis that erupted in 2009. An ordered probit analysis is used to demonstrate the depth of the German Stability Culture, showing support for low inflation cuts across all party and ideological lines. Despite this ubiquity, the term has been wielded with regularity only by the centre-right Christian Democrats and is strongly associated with this party. A strategic constructivist analysis is employed to explain this uneven but persistent usage in German domestic politics.

Debt and Punishment: Market Discipline in the Eurozone

This article challenges the conventional wisdom of weak market discipline in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In so doing, we empirically analyse the dynamics of market discipline for all 27 EU member states between 1992 and 2007. The existing literature tends to assert that markets discipline governments, without measuring whether the interest punishment markets impose actually has the purported effect on government policy. To better grasp the dynamics of market discipline it is essential to consider both sides. Market discipline is thus understood as a two-sided phenomenon. On the one hand, financial investors react to policy developments. On the other hand, policy-makers react to market signals. We find strong evidence that although the impact of fiscal policy developments on market punishment slightly decreases with monetary integration, government responsiveness to market punishment increases. This runs counter to the conventional narrative of policy-makers banking on bailout from fellow EMU members.

Fiscal rules, fiscal outcomes and financial market behaviour

Since the outbreak of the eurozones sovereign debt crisis, a range of fiscal policy measures have been adopted at the European Union (EU) and national levels that have given rise to claims of a significant reinforcement of fiscal policy constraint. Given the prominence and reinvigorated political appeal of fiscal rules in the EU and beyond, it is disconcerting how little we actually know about the link between fiscal rules, budgetary outcomes and market behaviour. In this research note, the aim is to take stock of the existing literature and challenge its contribution to the current policy debate on the merits of fiscal rules. Specifically it will focus on problems linked to endogeneity, measurements and contextuality.

Keeping the Agents Leashed: The EU’s External Economic Governance in the G20

Abstract The functioning of the external economic governance of the European Union (EU) hinges on the functioning of the internal economic governance structure to ensure cohesion between the EU’s external voice and its internal actions. Consequently the debate has focused almost in its entirety on the internal aspect of economic governance reform. This article, swimming against this current of economic governance analyses, examines the EU’s external economic governance in the G20 during the Great Recession using a principal–agent framework. More specifically, it argues that although the terms of delegation in the G20 are incomplete and open to the agents’ interpretation, two important sources of agency control limit the discretion of the EU delegation. The system of multiple agents with its inherent inter-institutional rivalry and the presence of the G20/EU members ultimately increase the control of the collective principal at the cost of presenting a unified EU position. At the same time the current design of the EU’s external economic governance has fuelled tensions between the EU and underrepresented developing countries. Along similar lines, looking at the possibilities of interest representation, the terms of delegation, with an unequal collective principal, are biased towards large and powerful EU/G20 member states. On the basis of probit analyses it is argued that these states are likely to oppose the increased delegation that would enable the establishment of an external economic governance.

Bringing Balance to the Force? A Comparative Analysis of Institutionalisation Processes in the G20’s Mutual Assessment Process and the EU’s Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure

ABSTRACT Events from 2008 onwards have bought the old consensus on the sound money and finance paradigm (the ‘Great Moderation’) into bold relief. One manifestation of this crisis of belief is the increased focus on global imbalances, institutionally reflected in the creation of the Mutual Assessment Process (MAP) at the G20 level and subsequently the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) at the European Union (EU) level. Comparing both newcomers to international macroeconomic policy coordination, this article analyses four features that shape (and we show, institutionalise) the process of paradigm contestation: presence, position, promotion and plausibility. We argue that although initially the G20’s MAP scored higher in terms of presence, position and promotion, it is the EU’s MIP, which heralds a more substantial shift in macroeconomic management. Collectively, both indicate the increased prominence of global imbalances as the subject of inter- or supranational management, and a broadening of the notion of necessary or legitimate economic governance.

Research note: Fiscal rules, fiscal outcomes and financial market behaviour

Since the outbreak of the eurozones sovereign debt crisis, a range of fiscal policy measures have been adopted at the European Union (EU) and national levels that have given rise to claims of a significant reinforcement of fiscal policy constraint. Given the prominence and reinvigorated political appeal of fiscal rules in the EU and beyond, it is disconcerting how little we actually know about the link between fiscal rules, budgetary outcomes and market behaviour. In this research note, the aim is to take stock of the existing literature and challenge its contribution to the current policy debate on the merits of fiscal rules. Specifically it will focus on problems linked to endogeneity, measurements and contextuality.

Fiscal rules, fiscal outcomes and financial market behaviour: FISCAL RULES, FISCAL OUTCOMES AND FINANCIAL MARKET BEHAVIOUR

Since the outbreak of the eurozones sovereign debt crisis, a range of fiscal policy measures have been adopted at the European Union (EU) and national levels that have given rise to claims of a significant reinforcement of fiscal policy constraint. Given the prominence and reinvigorated political appeal of fiscal rules in the EU and beyond, it is disconcerting how little we actually know about the link between fiscal rules, budgetary outcomes and market behaviour. In this research note, the aim is to take stock of the existing literature and challenge its contribution to the current policy debate on the merits of fiscal rules. Specifically it will focus on problems linked to endogeneity, measurements and contextuality.