Chi-Cheng Wu

A holistic knowledge sharing framework in high-tech firms: game and co-opetition perspectives

High-tech companies are renowned for their high level of intellectual works even though they are facing a competitive environment. Knowledge sharing, therefore, plays an important role in a high-tech companys performance and innovation. In implementing knowledge sharing, high-tech firms often encounter setbacks due to neglecting human nature and the knowledge trading mechanism within organisations. This article aims to propose a holistic knowledge sharing framework by applying game theory, co-opetition, agent contest and reward systems, to solve the employees dilemma and free-rider behaviour problems. Based on this framework, we categorise high-tech firms into four types of knowledge sharing, such as job guarantee, individual performance, team performance, and team learning. Empirical results showed that the type of team learning firm with agent contest and reward systems designed for both team and individual could build a co-opetitive knowledge sharing environment.

Is Persuasive Advertising Always Combative in a Distribution Channel

The existing marketing literature suggests that persuasive advertising elicits counteractions from competing manufacturers and consequently leads to wasteful cancellation of the advertising effects. Thus, persuasive advertising is widely perceived to be combative in nature. A series of previously published papers demonstrates that appropriate targeting may partially mitigate the combative nature of persuasive advertising in that either the rival manufacturer or the retailer may benefit. In this paper, we complement their results by demonstrating the possibility that every channel member may benefit from persuasive advertising, i.e., a Pareto improvement along the distribution channel, thereby leading to the conclusion that persuasive advertising need not result in channel conflict.

Probabilistic Selling, Channel Structure, and Supplier Competition*

Probabilistic selling has recently been introduced to facilitate consumer segmentation. It allows the retailer to mix products from multiple competing suppliers to generate a probabilistic good. The probabilistic good effectively creates consumer differentiation, and its presence invites extensive interactions among channel participants. In this article, we show that the equilibrium channel structure may be asymmetric: one supplier retains his brand-name product and the other one delegates to the retailer. We further show that this asymmetric equilibrium can be mutually beneficial for all firms compared with other equilibria. In addition, the introduction of the probabilistic good is beneficial to the channel members.

Effects of Overvalued Equity and Managerial Incentives on Corporate Policy

This paper examines the relationship between overvalued equity, managerial incentives, and corporate policy for firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange. The empirical evidence reveals that firms with higher overvalued equity opt for higher leverage and hold less cash, and the sensitivity of managerial total wealth to the stock price and stock option holdings incentives induce inadequately diversified risk-averse managers to adopt lower leverage and hold more cash. By contrast, higher overvalued equity, the sensitivity of managerial total wealth to the stock price, and stock option holdings incentives induce managers to engage in earnings manipulation.

Parent-protecting advertising in product line extensions: Role of communication strategy, message type and extension type

Product line extension, the introduction of new products under the same brand name in a given product category, is a growing practice of product innovation in many industries. However, when companies launch line extensions, information of the new products positively or negatively affects consumer evaluations of the parent products in the same line, generating the so-called spillover effects. Through two experimental studies, the current research explores how marketers can employ appropriate communication strategies and message types in advertising to induce favourable spillovers or to avoid negative spillovers in product line extensions. Experiment 1 investigates the interaction between communication strategy and line extension type. Results reveal that for vertical high-end extensions and for horizontal line extensions, ads using relational strategy that focuses on the relatedness between products in the line increase consumer valuation of the parent product; for vertical low-end extensions, ads with elaboration strategy that stresses the uniqueness of the extensions avoid negative spillovers on parents. Experiment 2 further examines how message type moderates the spillover effects in elaboration ads. Results show that, compared with numerical messages, literal messages engender smaller valuation decreases on the parents and consequently alleviate undesirable spillover effects for most types of product line extensions.