Chiara Cordelli

Neutrality of what

In what sense should a liberal state be neutral between the conceptions of the good held by its citizens? Traditionally, liberals have provided two different answers to this question. Some have adopted a conception of neutrality of justification, while others a conception of neutrality of effects. Recently, Alan Patten has defended an alternative, novel and sophisticated, conception of neutrality – neutrality of treatment. In this article I assess whether neutrality of treatment is, in fact, a superior conception of neutrality. I try to show that neutrality of treatment suffers from the very same weaknesses that Patten attributes to its alternatives and that, overall, neutrality of justification, properly construed, provides a more promising account of both the sense in which a state ought to be neutral and of the object of neutrality. Finally, I argue for a broader account of the normative bases of liberal neutrality than the one proposed by Patten. This account includes, beyond considerations of fairness, a relational principle of equal standing.

Justice below the State: Civil Society as a Site of Justice

In response to growing economic and political interdependence at the international level, contemporary theories of justice have debated whether the demands of distributive justice extend beyond the nation-state. This article addresses the reverse question: whether and how the demands of justice arise below the state, at the level of civil society associations. This question becomes pressing in light of the increasing fragmentation of national governance, and the resulting institutional interdependence between political institutions and private associations. The article argues that the extent to which these associations are directly bound by egalitarian principles depends on a complex set of factors, including their structure and size, their role in the social provision of important goods, and their institutional relation with political institutions.

Democratic Justice and the Boundaries Problem

This article examines the way in which Albert Weales procedural account of democratic justice understands: (1) the boundaries of the democratic social contract, in terms of who is included or excluded from the contract; and (2) the boundaries of justice (i.e. the scope of entitlements and obligations of justice) that result from the contract. Either Weales empirical method justifies the problematic exclusion of certain groups of agents from the democratic contract and thus potentially from the scope of justice, or his method is not as empirical as Weale wants it to be, because in order to evaluate those exclusions as unjust and to prevent them, the theory needs to postulate thick moral standards that are independent from, and external to, democratic procedures. Furthermore, the boundaries of justice resulting from Weales empirical-contractarian theory are likely to lead to the absence of justice where it would be most needed, especially at the international level. These concerns notwithstanding, Weales book remains a highly significant contribution to both democratic theory and theories of justice, as well as to our understanding of the relationship between them.

Prospective Duties and the Demands of Beneficence

I argue that (1) an agent can be appropriately blamed for failing to assist someone in need, even if her failure to assist is not wrong, and that (2) an agent can be morally required to assist even if assisting is overly costly for her—more costly than what the relevant moral baseline is ordinarily taken to allow. Whether this is the case depends on whether the agent has previously failed (or not) to discharge her “prospective duties.” Once these duties are taken into consideration, even apparently moderate accounts of beneficence appear to be not very moderate after all.

Liberalism and religion: the plural grounds of separation

ABSTRACT In what sense, and to what extent, should a liberal state be secular? Many interpret liberal-egalitarian political theory as dictating a radical separation between church and state. Against this view, Cécile Laborde has powerfully argued that, in fact, liberal-egalitarianism is not committed to strict separation as such. Laborde understands the liberal-egalitarian commitment to separation as ultimately grounded on a principle of neutrality. However, she argues that the conception of neutrality to which liberal egalitarians are committed is much more ‘restricted’ than it is often thought. If a commitment to separation is derivative from a commitment to neutrality, then, if neutrality is restricted, secularism is minimal. This means that not all forms of religious establishment should be regarded as impermissible from a liberal-egalitarian perspective. Contra Laborde, I argue that restricted neutrality should not be understood as the only ground of separation. Separation has plural grounds. Forms of religious recognition that do not violate any of the requirements of restricted neutrality may still be regarded as impermissible from a liberal-egalitarian perspective, if they (1) violate a basic commitment to fairness, (2) treat citizens in a patronizing way and/or (3) violate, in their justification, a requirement of sincerity, as grounded on reciprocity.

Democratizing Organized Religion

Where organized religion begins, democratic rights end. Or so it is often assumed. Traditionally, most political philosophers have agreed that democratic norms should not directly regulate the internal governance of nonpolitical organizations. And while a growing number of scholars have recently argued in favor of democratizing some nonpolitical organizations, most notably business firms, religious associations continue to be regarded as paradigmatic cases of democracy-free zones. Contrary to this view, I defend a pro tanto right to democracy within large and hierarchical churches. I then explain that, once appropriately qualified, this right is not overruled by claims to freedom of religious association and church autonomy. Testing the extension of democratic rights to churches provides an opportunity to tackle, at once, a series of broader normative issues, including the scope of democracy “below” the state, the limits of freedom of association, and the putatively special status of religion.