Chris Edmond

Information Revolutions and the Overthrow of Autocratic Regimes

This paper presents a model of information quality and political regime change. If enough citizens act against a regime, it is overthrown. Citizens are imperfectly informed about how hard this will be and the regime can, at a cost, engage in propaganda so that at face-value it seems hard. The citizens are rational and evaluate their information knowing the regimes incentives. The model makes three predictions. First, even rational citizens may not correctly infer the amount of manipulation. Second, as the intrinsic quality of information available becomes sufficiently high, the regime is more likely to survive. Third, the regime benefitsfrom ambiguity about the amount of manipulation, and consequently, as it becomes cheaper to manipulate, the regime is also more likely to survive. Key results of the benchmark static model extend to a simple dynamic setting where there are waves of unrest.

An Integral Equation Representation for Overlapping Generations in Continuous Time

This paper develops a method for solving for the dynamic general equilibrium of a deterministic continuous time overlapping generations model with a finite-horizon life-cycle. The model has isoelastic preferences and allows for general assumptions about individual endowments and demographics. Solving for an equilibrium reduces to solving a nonlinear integral equation. In the special case of log utility, the integral equation is linear and global approximations to a solution are easily computed with linear algebra.

Aggregate Implications of Micro Asset Market Segmentation

An extensive empirical literature finds that micro asset markets are segmented from one another. We develop a consumption-based asset pricing model to quantify the aggregate implications of a financial system comprised of many such segmented micro asset markets. We specify exogenously the level of segmentation that determines how much idiosyncratic risk traders bear in their micro market and calibrate the segmentation to match facts about systematic and idiosyncratic return volatility. In our benchmark model traders bear 30% of their idiosyncratic risk, the unconditional aggregate equity premium is 2.4% annual, and the welfare costs of segmentation are substantial, 1.8% of lifetime consumption.

Income Dispersion, Asymmetric Information and Fluctuations in Market Efficiency

Recessions appear to be times when markets function less efficiently. This phenomenon has been the domain of theories that rely on changes in preferences (demand shocks) or constraints on price-setting (sticky prices). In our simple model of decentralized trade with asymmetric information, income dispersion measures uncertainty about buyer characteristics. Counter-cyclical income dispersion makes the asymmetric information friction stronger in recessions: optimal prices rise and trade volume falls. Unlike preference changes or price-setting constraints, income dispersion is observable. Using income dispersion estimates to quantify the models effect, we find that model prices, sales and markups have properties similar to business cycle data.