Christel Devue

Here I am: The cortical correlates of visual self-recognition

Recently, interest in the neural correlates of self-recognition has grown. Most studies concentrate on self-face recognition. However, there is a lack of convergence as to precise neuroanatomical locations underlying self-face recognition. In addition, recognition of familiar persons from bodies has been relatively neglected. In the present study, cerebral activity while participants performed a task in which they had to indicate the real appearance of themselves and of a gender-matched close colleague among intact and altered pictures of faces and bodies was measured. The right frontal cortex and the insula were found to be the main regions specifically implicated in visual self-recognition compared with visual processing of other highly familiar persons. Moreover, the right anterior insula along with the right anterior cingulate seemed to play a role in the integration of information about oneself independently of the stimulus domain. The processing of self-related pictures was also compared to scrambled versions of these pictures. Results showed that different areas of the occipito-temporal cortex were more or less recruited depending on whether a face or a body was perceived, as it has already been reported by several recent studies. The implication of present findings for a general framework of person identification is discussed.

The neural correlates of visual self-recognition

This paper presents a review of studies that were aimed at determining which brain regions are recruited during visual self-recognition, with a particular focus on self-face recognition. A complex bilateral network, involving frontal, parietal and occipital areas, appears to be associated with self-face recognition, with a particularly high implication of the right hemisphere. Results indicate that it remains difficult to determine which specific cognitive operation is reflected by each recruited brain area, in part due to the variability of used control stimuli and experimental tasks. A synthesis of the interpretations provided by previous studies is presented. The relevance of using self-recognition as an indicator of self-awareness is discussed. We argue that a major aim of future research in the field should be to identify more clearly the cognitive operations induced by the perception of the self-face, and search for dissociations between neural correlates and cognitive components.

You do not find your own face faster; you just look at it longer

Previous studies investigating the ability of high priority stimuli to grab attention reached contradictory outcomes. The present study used eye tracking to examine the effect of the presence of the self-face among other faces in a visual search task in which the face identity was task-irrelevant. We assessed whether the self-face (1) received prioritized selection (2) caused a difficulty to disengage attention, and (3) whether its status as target or distractor had a differential effect. We included another highly familiar face to control whether possible effects were self-face specific or could be explained by high familiarity. We found that the self-face interfered with the search task. This was not due to a prioritized processing but rather to a difficulty to disengage attention. Crucially, this effect seemed due to the self-faces familiarity, as similar results were obtained with the other familiar face, and was modulated by the status of the face since it was stronger for targets than for distractors.

Angry faces hold the eyes

Efficient processing of complex social and biological stimuli associated with threat is crucial for survival. Previous studies have suggested that threatening stimuli such as angry faces not only capture visual attention, but also delay the disengagement of attention from their location. However, in the previous studies disengagement of attention was measured indirectly and was inferred on the basis of delayed manual responses. The present study employed a novel paradigm that allows direct examination of the delayed disengagement hypothesis by measuring the time it takes to disengage the eyes from threatening stimuli. The results showed that participants were indeed slower to make an eye movement away from an angry face presented at fixation than from either a neutral or a happy face. This finding provides converging support that the delay in disengagement of attention is an important component of processing threatening information.

Do pictures of faces, and which ones, capture attention in the inattentional-blindness paradigm?

Faces and self-referential material (eg ones own name) are more likely to capture attention in the inattentional-blindness (IB) paradigm than other stimuli. This effect is presumably due to the meaning of these stimuli rather than to their familiarity [Mack and Rock, 1998 Inattentional Blindness (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press)]. In previous work, IB has been investigated mostly with schematic stimuli. In the present study, the generalisability of this finding was tested with photographic stimuli. In support of the view that faces constitute a special category of stimuli, pictures of faces were found to resist more to IB than pictures of common objects (experiment 1) or than pictures of inverted faces (experiment 2). In a third experiment, the influence of face familiarity and identity (the participants own face, a friends face, and an unknown face) on IB rates was evaluated. Unexpectedly, no differential resistence to blindness across these three kinds of faces was found. In conclusion, pictures of faces attracted attention more than pictures of objects or inverted faces in the IB paradigm. However, this effect was not dependent on face familiarity or identity.

Attention to self-referential stimuli: can I ignore my own face?

Auto-referential materials (i.e., the own name) have been described as particularly prone to capture attention. Some recent studies have questioned this view and shown that these own name effects are temporary and appear only in specific conditions: when enough resources are available (Harris, C. R., & Pashler, H. (2004). Attention and the processing of emotional words and names: Not so special after all. Psychological Science, 15, 171-178) or when the own name is presented within the focus of attention if it is a task-irrelevant stimulus (Gronau, N., Cohen, A., & Ben-Shakhar, G. (2003). Dissociations of personally significant and task-relevant distractors inside and outside the focus of attention: A combined behavioral and psychophysiological study. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 132, 512-529). In the present study, a stimulus that is unique to each individual was used: the self-face. In Experiment 1, the self-face produced a temporary distraction when presented at fixation during a digit-parity task. However, this distraction was not different from that triggered by another highly familiar face. In Experiment 2, the self-face failed to produce interference when presented outside the focus of attention. These results confirm recent findings showing that auto-referential materials do not automatically summon attention and have a distractive power only in specific conditions.

Disgust- and not fear-evoking images hold our attention.

Even though disgust and fear are both negative emotions, they are characterized by different physiology and action tendencies. The aim of this study was to examine whether fear- and disgust-evoking images would produce different attention bias effects, specifically those related to attention (dis)engagement. Participants were asked to identify a target which was briefly presented around a central image cue, which could either be disgusting, frightening, or neutral. The interval between cue onset and target presentation varied within blocks (200, 500, 800, 1100 ms), allowing us to investigate the time course of attention engagement. Accuracy was lower and reaction times were longer when targets quickly (200 ms) followed disgust-evoking images than when they followed neutral- or fear-evoking images. For the other, longer interval conditions no significant image effects were found. These results suggest that emotion-specific attention effects can be found at very early visual processing stages and that only disgust-evoking images, and not fear-evoking ones, keep hold of our attention for longer. We speculate that this increase in early attention allocation is related to the need to perform a more comprehensive risk-assessment of the disgust-evoking images. The outcomes underline not only the importance of examining the time course of emotion induced attention effects but also the need to look beyond the dimensions of valence and arousal.

The role of fear and expectancies in capture of covert attention by spiders.

Fear-related stimuli are often prioritized during visual selection but it remains unclear whether capture by salient objects is more likely to occur when individuals fear those objects. In this study, participants with high and low fear of spiders searched for a circle while on some trials a completely irrelevant fear-related (spider) or neutral distractor (butterfly/leaf) was presented simultaneously in the display. Our results show that when you fear spiders and you are not sure whether a spider is going to be present, then any salient distractor (i.e., a butterfly) grabs your attention, suggesting that mere expectation of a spider triggered compulsory monitoring of all irrelevant stimuli. However, neutral stimuli did not grab attention when high spider fearful people knew that a spider could not be present during a block of trials, treating the neutral stimuli just as the low spider fearful people do. Our results show that people that fear spiders inspect potential spider-containing locations in a compulsory fashion even though directing attention to this location is completely irrelevant for the task. Reduction of capture can only be accomplished when people that fear spiders do not expect a spider to be present.

Oculomotor guidance and capture by irrelevant faces

Even though it is generally agreed that face stimuli constitute a special class of stimuli, which are treated preferentially by our visual system, it remains unclear whether faces can capture attention in a stimulus-driven manner. Moreover, there is a long-standing debate regarding the mechanism underlying the preferential bias of selecting faces. Some claim that faces constitute a set of special low-level features to which our visual system is tuned; others claim that the visual system is capable of extracting the meaning of faces very rapidly, driving attentional selection. Those debates continue because many studies contain methodological peculiarities and manipulations that prevent a definitive conclusion. Here, we present a new visual search task in which observers had to make a saccade to a uniquely colored circle while completely irrelevant objects were also present in the visual field. The results indicate that faces capture and guide the eyes more than other animated objects and that our visual system is not only tuned to the low-level features that make up a face but also to its meaning.

Contrasting reactive and proactive control of emotional distraction.

Attending to emotional stimuli is often beneficial, because they provide important social and environmental cues. Sometimes, however, current goals require that we ignore them. To what extent can we control emotional distraction? Here we show that the ability to ignore emotional distractions depends on the type of cognitive control that is engaged. Participants completed a simple perceptual task at fixation while irrelevant images appeared peripherally. In 2 experiments, we manipulated the proportion of trials in which images appeared, to encourage use of either reactive control (rare distractors) or proactive control (frequent distractors). Under reactive control, both negative and positive images were more distracting than neutral images, even though they were irrelevant and appeared in unattended locations. However, under proactive control, distraction by both emotional and neutral images was eliminated. Proactive control was triggered by the meaning, and not the location, of distracting images. Our findings argue against simple bottom-up or top-down explanations of emotional distraction, and instead show how the flexible use of cognitive control supports adaptive processing of emotional distractors.