Christian Almer

Environmental Crime and Punishment: Empirical Evidence from the German Penal Code

U.S. and E.U. environmental policy employ criminal sanctions to enforce compliance. Recent moves toward revising their use are based on little empirical evidence as to their effectiveness. This paper exploits a unique dataset to study the deterrent effect of criminal enforcement. The dynamic panel data analysis leads to three findings. First, criminal sanctions do provide the intended deterrent effects. Second, standing trial provides one of the most significant deterrents, rather than the probability of conviction or the magnitude of fines. Third, public preferences regarding environmental quality and political economy variables affect reported environmental crime. (JEL K11, Q53)

The Sopranos Redux: The Empirical Economics of Waste Crime

Almer C. and Goeschl T. The Sopranos redux: the empirical economics of waste crime, Regional Studies. Evidence for the argument that enforcement makes environmental policies effective is limited with respect to geography, scope, enforcement tools and regulatory context. Non-US evidence on criminal enforcement of illegal waste disposal is examined using a panel dataset of 44 counties from the German state of Baden-Württemberg for the period 1995–2005. The results support the pro-enforcement argument. Cumulatively, there is clear evidence for a general deterrence effect of enforcement intensity on the amount of waste crime. However, regional economic and political economy factors matter significantly for environmental outcomes. Violations appear to be treated differently depending on their local political economy context.

Strategic behavior in IEAs: When and why countries joined the Kyoto Protocol

We empirically analyze the formation of international environmental agreements within a political economy framework. We develop a theoretical model of state dependent net benefits of ratification predicting (i) strategic behavior with respect to the timing of ratification and (ii) that ratification per se is not necessarily a stronger signal of support compared to signature. Analyzing the signature and ratification process via generalized binary and ordered response models, we find significant evidence for our theoretical predictions. In addition, we show that a wide selection of determinants including economic and political factors influences the decision whether to sign and when to ratify.

Agricultural Shocks and Riots: A Disaggregated Analysis

Combining theoretical and empirical work, this paper explores the impact of economic shocks on the incidence of social unrest (i.e., mass demonstrations and violent riots) in autocracies. Our theory predicts negative economic shocks to boost unrest since-in bad times-fighting the regime to reduce the level of resource diversion becomes cheaper. Using a new dataset on political instability in Africa, our empirical analysis confirms this prediction. The instrumental variables estimates-which take into account the potential endogeneity of economic shocks-suggest a significant increase in the level of social unrest as a response to a decline in real per capita GDP.Every year, riots cause a substantial number of fatalities in less-advanced countries. This paper explores the role of agricultural output shocks in explaining riots. Our theory predicts a negative relationship between the level of rioting and the deviation of the actual output from the average one. Relying on monthly data at the cell level (0.5×0.5 degrees), and using a drought index to proxy for output shocks, our empirical analysis confirms such a negative relationship for Sub-Saharan Africa: A one-standard-deviation decrease in the drought index rises the likelihood of a riot in a given cell and month by 8.4 percent. The use of highly disaggregated data accounts for the fact that riots are temporally and geographically confined events.

How Do Housing Prices Adjust after an Environmental Shock? Evidence from a State-Mandated Change in Aircraft Noise Exposure

We analyze the adjustment of housing prices after an exogenous shock. Using continuous records of the housing market around a major European airport (ZRH, Switzerland) and an unexpected change in flight regulations induced by the neighboring country Germany, we find that apartment rents take about two years to stabilize to a new equilibrium value. After this period we find a constant markup for apartments in regions exposed to less aircraft noise, and a constant discount in regions with more noise. Alternative demand-side indicators like search effort and turnover adapt to the new macro situation and reach pre-shock levels after two years, whereas little evidence is found for supply-side effects.

The effect of Kyoto emission targets on domestic CO2 emissions: A synthetic control approach

We use recent developments in the empirics of comparative case studies to analyze the effect of binding emission targets under the Kyoto Protocol on the development of CO2 emissions of seven major Annex B countries. In particular, we investigate whether committing to a specific greenhouse gas emissions target had an effect on actual CO2 emissions of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Japan by using a synthetic control approach. With the exception of Great Britain, we are not able to reject the hypothesis that there has been no effect of binding emission targets on actual emissions.