Christian Baatz

Responsibility for the Past? Some Thoughts on Compensating those Vulnerable to Climate Change in Developing Countries

The first impacts of climate change have become evident and are expected to increase dramatically over the next decades. Thus, it becomes more and more pressing to decide who has to compensate those people who suffer from negative impacts of climate change but have neither contributed to the problem nor possess the resources to cope with the consequences. Since the frequently invoked Polluter Pays Principle cannot account for all climate-related harm, I will take a closer look at the much more controversial Beneficiary Pays Principle. It is argued that, appropriately qualified, the Beneficiary Pays Principle can help to identify additional duty-bearers. Based on these results, I briefly comment on three different policy options to generate funds for compensation.

Integrating Sustainable Transport Measures into the Clean Development Mechanism

Abstract While the number of projects under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is expanding rapidly, there currently are relatively few transport projects in the global CDM portfolio. This article examines existing CDM transport projects and explores whether sectoral approaches to the CDM may provide a better framework for transport than the current project‐based CDM. We ask: Would a sectoral approach to the CDM promote the structural change and integrated policymaking needed to achieve sustainable transport policy, making it hence more desirable than the framework of the current project‐based CDM? We conclude that it is possible to design sectoral transport activities within clear project boundaries that fit into a framework of a programmatic or policy‐based CDM. Although we are able to ascertain that transport policy research yields several modelling tools to address the methodological requirements of the CDM, it becomes apparent that sectoral approaches will accentuate transport projects’ problems regarding high complexity and related uncertainties. The CDM may need new rules to manage these risks. Nonetheless, sectoral approaches allow the scaling up of activities to a level that affects long‐term structural change.

Climate Change and Individual Duties to Reduce GHG Emissions

Although actions of individuals do contribute to climate change, the question whether or not they, too, are morally obligated to reduce the GHG emissions in their responsibility has not yet been addressed sufficiently. First, I discuss prominent objections to such a duty. I argue that whether individuals ought to reduce their emissions depends on whether or not they exceed their fair share of emission rights. In a next step I discuss several proposals for establishing fair shares and also take practical considerations into account. I conclude that individuals should not always be obliged to reduce their emissions to what is their fair share for they may depend on carbon-intensive structures. Instead, they have a Kantian imperfect duty to reduce their emissions ‘as far as can reasonably be demanded of them’. In addition, they should press governments to introduce proper regulation. At the end, I further specify both duties.

Can We Have It Both Ways? On Potential Trade-Offs Between Mitigation and Solar Radiation Management

Many in the discourse on climate engineering agree that if deployment of solar radiation management (SRM) technologies is ever permissible, then it must be accompanied by far-reaching mitigation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This raises the question of if and how both strategies interact. Although raised in many publications, there are surprisingly few detailed investigations of this important issue. The paper aims at contributing to closing this research gap by (i) reconstructing moral hazard claims to clarify their aim, (ii) offering one specific normative justification for far-reaching mitigation and (iii) investigating in greater detail different mechanisms that could potentially cause a trade-off between mitigation and SRM. I conclude that the empirical evidence questioning the trade-off hypothesis is inconclusive. Moreover, theoretical reflections as well as economic model studies point to a trade-off. In our current epistemic situation these findings must be taken seriously. They caution against researching and developing SRM technologies before measures to avoid or minimise a trade-off are implemented.

Strong Sustainability as a Frame for Sustainability Communication

The term sustainability has enjoyed great success, but at the cost of overextending its meaning to the point of trivialization. There is such an overabundance of definitions, concepts, models and political strategies that it is not clear anymore whether the terms ‘sustainability’ and ‘sustainable development’ still bear any meaning. The theory outlined in this chapter counters these tendencies by identifying more precisely the normative field that constitutes the very core of the sustainability concept, while avoiding a too narrow understanding. It points out the ethical presuppositions as well as the requirements for a theoretical framework of a consistent and discursively justified concept of sustainability. This rectifies the vagueness of the term as currently used and offers new possibilities for sustainability communication.

In Defense of Emissions Egalitarianism

The idea that every person is entitled to the same amount of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions has gained momentum. It receives broad support from academics, non-governmental organizations, and leading politicians. Given that, according to this view, emissions are to be distributed in an egalitarian fashion, in the following we will refer to Emissions Egalitarianism (EE). In his book ‘One World – The Ethics of Globalization’, Peter Singer (2002) has famously argued for EE and in past writings we endorsed this position as well (Ott et al, 2004; Ott/Baatz, 2012).

Ethik des Klimawandels

In den letzten 20 Jahren hat sich das Feld der so genannten Klimaethik entwickelt. Diese Subdisziplin der Umweltethik befasst sich mit Analysen der moralischen Probleme, die sich durch den anthropogen verursachten Klimawandel ergeben. Ziel klimaethischer Forschung ist zum einen die kritische Reflektion dieser Probleme.

Reply to my Critics: Justifying the Fair Share Argument

Abstract In an earlier article I argued that individuals are obligated not to exceed their fair share of emissions entitlements, that many exceed their fair share at present and thus ought to reduce their emissions as far as can reasonably be demanded. The peer commentators raised various insightful and pressing concerns, but the following objections seem particularly important: It was argued that the fair share argument is insufficiently justified, that it is incoherent, that it would result in more far-reaching duties than acknowledged by me, that it is unable to provide a clear account of individual duties, and that duties to reduce individual emissions are not Kantian imperfect duties. This reply aims at clarifying the fair share argument and at addressing the major challenges.

Individual Duties Regarding Global Environmental Problems – The Example of Climate Change

There now is a broad theoretical discourse regarding individual duties in which arguments for different kinds of duties as well as actions have been developed. The present paper aims at systematizing this discussion and offers an independent argument that there are duties beyond compliance with and promotion of institutions. The paper starts with some clarifications regarding duties to promote. Subsequently, the main section of the paper addresses the question whether individuals ought to reduce GHG emissions in their responsibility even if these do not contribute to promoting institutions via their communicative value. We first critically discuss objections against such a duty. In a second step, we justify the duty by further developing our so called fair share argument. Subsequently, we clarify the substance of these ‘fair share duties’ and show how they relate to duties to promote. In conclusion, we argue that there are three kinds of complementary, equally important duties: duties to comply with institutions, duties to promote institutions and individual behavioral duties not to exceed one’s fair share of emissions entitlements. The final section locates this tripartite distinction of duties in a framework of different levels of non-ideality.

Ethics and sustainable consumption

The paper provides a philosophical-ethical perspective on sustainable consumption. We start by briefly outlining a concept of SD. This serves as a background for developing an understanding of sustainable consumption as encompassing behavior that reduces pressure on humanity’s environmental and social base of livelihood, that respects other individuals’ ability to live a decent human life and that does not overburden it’s addressees. Subsequently, we introduce the distinction between weak and strong sustainable consumption and argue in favor of the latter. We then turn to (what in our view constitutes) the ethical core issue regarding sustainable consumption: Is it legitimate to claim that individuals need to consume more sustainably? We answer this question in the affirmative and distinguish three equally important, complementary individual duties: duties to comply, to promote and to contribute one’s fair share. Finally, we turn back to the claim that such duties must not overburden individuals. We explain why ethics cannot (exactly) delimit an individual’s duties but stress that this does not yield individual duties the least bit less binding.