Christian Enemark

Disease and Security: Natural Plagues and Biological Weapons in East Asia

Focusing on East Asia, this book sets out a framework for analyzing infectious disease threats in security terms. It covers the security significance of naturally occurring disease outbreak events such as SARS and avian influenza, the development and use of biological weapons by state and non-state actors, and the security risks associated with laboratory research on pathogenic micro-organisms. Christian Enemark devises a conceptual framework for securitization that is useful for policy makers by using the overlaps and synergies between different infectious disease threats. The book draws heavily on material from public health and scientific literature to illustrate the cross-disciplinary requirements for addressing infectious diseases challenges in security terms. Fast-moving, naturally occurring disease threats are of increasing concern to governments and individuals, and it is therefore important to recognize their close relationship to the security challenges posed by Biological Weapons and pathogen research.

Is Pandemic Flu a Security Threat

their effects are mild, they are familiar to physicians, or their geographic occurrence is limited. A particular disease might be deemed a security issue, however, when its effects impose or threaten to impose an intolerable burden on society. That burden can be measured in terms of morbidity and mortality, but also in terms of the way in which a disease is perceived by those who fear infection. The disease described by the World Health Organisation (WHO) as ‘the most feared security threat’ today is pandemic influenza.1 The next pandemic could cause illness and death on a large scale, over a wide area, in a short space of time. Such a prospect arguably sets this disease apart from the many others that may be regarded simply as health issues, and some Western governments have started to frame pandemic influenza as a threat to national security. According to the US pandemic plan, a ‘necessary enabler of pandemic preparedness’ is that this be viewed ‘as a national security issue’.2 The ‘National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom’ assesses an influenza pandemic as the ‘highest risk’ civil emergency.3 And under the Australian pandemic plan, which emphasises ‘maintenance of social functioning’,4 Australians are to receive the best possible health care ‘commensurate with the maintenance of a safe and secure society’.5 Historical experience indicates that the world is overdue for an influenza pandemic, and a virus with pandemic potential – H5N1 avian influenza, Is Pandemic Flu a Security Threat?

Drones over Pakistan: Secrecy, Ethics and Counterinsurgency

Abstract The US government appears to be using drones to launch air strikes inside Pakistan. This article details uncertainties regarding the ethical soundness of these strikes and highlights the consequent need for greater official transparency. Available evidence is assessed in the light of traditional ethical requirements that the use of force is beneficial to a legitimate military objective, that it discriminates between combatants and noncombatants, and that it generates harm that is proportional to the expected military benefit. The murky picture that emerges is an inadequate foundation for determining whether US drone strikes in Pakistan constitute a just or an unjust use of force. Arguably, however, the very persistence of doubt on this point undermines international norms on the use of force and the reputation of the United States as a champion thereof. The US government should therefore either refrain from drone strikes or explain publicly how they are beneficial, discriminate, and proportionate.

Triage, treatment, and torture: ethical challenges for US military medicine in Iraq

Abstract This article assesses some of the ethical challenges faced by US medical professionals seeking to preserve health and lives in the context of the Iraq War. The nature of the relationship between medicine and the military is tested in two areas at opposite ends of the care-giving spectrum. First, in the treatment of sick and wounded soldiers and civilians in Iraq, tough decisions are required on who receives what treatment and when. Second, when medical professionals participate in harmful interrogations, there is a need to decide between medical duties and military imperatives. The ethical principles considered throughout the article include the Hippocratic maxim ‘first, do no harm’, impartiality in the provision of humanitarian assistance, and pursuit of a greater good. The author concludes that the military objectives and medical care-giving requirements of the Iraq War are mismatched, and that medical professionals who participate in interrogations are not entitled to protected status under the Geneva Conventions.

Drones, risk, and perpetual force

This article contributes to the debate among just war theorists about the ethics of using armed drones in the war on terror. If violence of this kind is to be effectively restrained, it is necessary first to establish an understanding of its nature. Because it is difficult to conceptualize drone-based violence as war, there is concern that such violence is thus not captured by the traditional jus ad bellum (just resort to war) framework. Drone strikes probably do not constitute a law enforcement practice, so the peacetime ethics of criminal justice do not apply either. One possible solution is to develop and apply a legitimization framework of jus ad vim (just resort to force) in which vim is “force short of war,” although this depends upon a vim–bellum distinction being a sustainable one. Moving beyond discussion of these three alternative concepts of drone-based violence, the article suggests a fourth—vis perpetua (perpetual force)—and explores the ethical implications thereof. As a form of violence that presents no physical risk to individual users of force, a program of drone strikes poses a moral problem if it is intended to continue indefinitely, leading to the systematic endangerment of innocents without the eventual promise of peace.

Farewell to WMD: The Language and Science of Mass Destruction

This article critically assesses the ongoing use of the term ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (WMD) in policy and academic discourse. Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are commonly lumped together as WMD, but such conflation is misleading from a technological viewpoint and renders the term vulnerable to political manipulation. There are important scientific and strategic differences between weapon types, and glossing over these leads to confusion in accurately assessing and effectively addressing threats of mass destruction. WMD-based language obscures the paramount threat of nuclear weapons, exaggerates the destructive power of chemical weapons, and is unhelpful or counterproductive when used in the context of biological weapons. In the areas of deterrence, defence, and non-proliferation, WMD-based language can mischaracterize the challenges that are uniquely associated with each weapon type, and this potentially generates adverse security consequences flowing from the implementation of inadequate or misdirected countermeasures. The article concludes that it would be both desirable and feasible to abandon the term ‘WMD’.

Gene technology, biological weapons, and the security of science

This article addresses the security challenge posed by laboratory research involving genetic modification of microorganisms that could be applied for both benign and malevolent purposes. The authors propose that, for biological arms control purposes, a global governance culture is required to manage the security risks inherent in such research while minimizing scientific opportunity costs.

‘Non-lethal’ weapons and the occupation of Iraq: technology, ethics and law

The occupation of Iraq is a challenging task for the United States (US) military, which is considering resort to options other than lethal force as a possible just response. From the outset, the notion that a weapon can be deemed ‘non-lethal’ is problematic. Some weapons intended to leave their target alive often have lethal consequences and other weapons intended to have lethal effects often do not kill their target. This article explores ethical and legal challenges that arise from the potential use by US forces in Iraq of two classes of so-called ‘non-lethal’ weapons: incapacitating chemical agents and dazzling laser devices. Such challenges are highly relevant to questions about the role of Just War theory in the context of modern warfare. In particular, they beg the question whether the use of non-lethal weapons supports or subverts the jus in bello requirement that war be waged in a discriminate and proportionate fashion.

Drug-Resistant Tuberculosis : Security, Ethics and Global Health

The worldwide spread of drug-resistant strains of tuberculosis (TB) bacteria is out of control and incidents of harder-to-cure TB illness are rising. This article explores the present and potential impact of extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB)—a deadly, contagious and virtually incurable disease—on human health and state capacity. Detected cases of XDR-TB can occasion the implementation of extraordinary control measures, because some governments are sufficiently fearful of the disease as to frame it as an issue of national security. Such framing has the potential to precipitate more financial resources and stronger legal powers to bolster public health, but it might also increase the risk that emergency response measures will be counterproductive and/or unjust. Framing XDR-TB as a security issue is empirically plausible, and doing so is a good thing provided that increased response efforts promote rather than hinder the provision of universal access to adequate TB treatment over the long term. Two disease control measures that are motivated particularly by security concerns are border control and patient isolation. This article offers an assessment of each measure by reference to public health ethics in order to differentiate good and bad securitisation. *This article is part of a project on infectious diseases, security and ethics sponsored by the Australian Research Council. For their valuable feedback on earlier versions, the author thanks Simon Rushton, Stefan Elbe and the Global Society reviewers.

Infectious Diseases and International Security: The Biological Weapons Convention and Beyond

Threats to the security of states can result from the deliberate use of pathogens (biological weapons), their accidental release from research laboratories, or naturally occurring outbreaks of particular infectious diseases. This article discusses emerging opportunities for international cooperation against infectious diseases through the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the World Health Organization (WHO). The new process for reviewing the BWC could shift the BW problem away from the traditional arms control paradigm and toward broader notions of disease-based threats to security. In addition, proposed revisions to the WHOs International Health Regulations are highly relevant to the challenge of responding to emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases through national and international mechanisms. The article concludes with recommendations for meeting emerging BW threats.