Christian Lessmann

Fiscal Decentralization and Regional Disparity: Evidence from Cross-Section and Panel Data

The advantages and disadvantages of public sector decentralization are widely discussed in economics and political science. Some authors argue that decentralization leads to an optimal provision of public services and promotes economic growth, while others emphasize the dangers of competition between sub-national governments, especially those associated with interregional redistribution. Using cross-section and panel data for 23 OECD countries from 1982 to 2000, this paper empirically studies the impact of fiscal decentralization on regional disparities. We find that a higher degree of decentralization is associated with lower regional disparities. Hence, poor regions experience no disadvantages from decentralization and instead appear to benefit.

Regional inequality and decentralization: an empirical analysis

This paper analyzes the impact of political and fiscal decentralization on regional inequalities, using a unique dataset which covers fifty-four countries at different stages of economic development. Cross-section and panel data estimations show that decentralization decreases regional inequalities in general. However, estimations using an interaction-variable approach imply that the effect depends on the level of economic development. While rich countries benefit from decentralization in that they achieve a more equal regional income distribution, decentralization may lead to higher regional inequalities in developing and emerging economies. The results point in the same direction for measures of fiscal and political decentralization, implying that autonomy in both decision making and fiscal authority are decisive in this context. Thus, when fostering decentralization in developing countries as proposed by international development agencies, the potential negative redistributional consequences should be taken into account.

Decentralization and the shadow economy: Oates meets Allingham–Sandmo

This article studies the impact of decentralization on the shadow economy. We argue that decentralization may decrease the size of the shadow economy mainly through two transmission channels: (1) decentralization enhancing public sector efficiency (efficiency effect), and (2) decentralization reducing the distance between bureaucrats and economic agents, which increases the probability of detection of shadow economic activities (deterrence effect). Using various measures of fiscal, political and government employment decentralization in a cross-section of countries, we find the deterrence effect to be of more importance. The deterrence effect is stronger, the lower the degree of institutional quality. We find no robust evidence of the efficiency effect.

Fiscal federalism and foreign transfers: Does inter- jurisdictional competition increase foreign aid effectiveness?*

This paper empirically studies the impact of decentralization and inter-jurisdictional competition on foreign aid effectiveness. For this purpose we examine a commonly used empirical growth model, considering different measures of fiscal decentralization. Our panel estimations reveal that expenditure decentralization and inter-jurisdictional competition - reflected by the degree of tax revenue decentralization - negatively impact aid effectiveness. We therefore conclude that donor countries should carefully consider how both anti-poverty instruments - foreign assistance and decentralization - work together.