Christian Opitz

The Singularity of the German Doctorate as a Signal for Managerial Talent: Causes, Consequences and Future Developments

The paper focuses on signaling options for managerial talent under different higher education regimes. The educational paths in a sample of top managers of the 100 largest publicly traded companies in the U.S., France and Germany are consistent with our theoretical conjectures. For the singular role of the German doctorate, the traditional chair system in doctoral education and training is essential. The effects of higher education reforms are discussed. In Germany the doctorate is a powerful signal for managerial talent. Future signaling options are closely tied to German higher education reform.

Zur Filterleistung von Hochschulsystemen - Bildungswege von Topmanagern in den USA, Frankreich und Deutschland

SummaryStarting with Arrow’s hypothesis that higher education is a filter, the paper studies three alternative filter-designs. These designs can be attributed to the higher education systems of three different countries: In the U.S., competition between schools not only leads to a stable and stratified hierarchy of schools but also validates the degrees issued by these schools. In France, the state deliberately sets and validates a hierarchy of schools acting as a monitor and at the same time as an employer of high potentials. In spite of an otherwise egalitarian regulatory environment, in Germany professors still have incentives to economize on individual reputation. Due to the rather strong property rights of German professors, their doctoral students contribute to this reputation. The incentive to employ productive doctoral students may validate the doctoral degree as a signal for talent. A closer look at the educational paths of topmanagers in the U.S., France, and Germany reveals results which are consistent with the theoretical conjectures.

Incentive Structures for Professors in Germany and the United States: Implications for Cross-National Borrowing in Higher Education Reform.

In many countries throughout the world, politicians, scientists, and other citizens debate the effectiveness and international competitiveness of their respective higher education systems. In this debate, higher education in the United States plays a prominent role, at least in part because of its outstanding results in areas such as research output. Thus, in their initiatives to reform their own systems of higher education government, officials and educators in a variety of countries have sought to borrow or copy one or more of the institutional elements that they believe account for the superior performance of the U.S. system. The practice of importing selected parts of the U.S. system of higher education into other national systems is widespread, making these transfers a phenomenon of global relevance and importance. German higher education is not an exception. In order to “introduce incentives for greater efficiency and improved quality” in 2002, the German federal government amended its Higher Education Act. Crucial elements of this reform, implemented throughout the entire public sector of the German higher education system in 2004, are the introduction of explicit performance-related rewards as part of the official salary scheme of professors and the introduction of formal programs in doctoral education. Both innovations were represented as closely mirroring the institutional practices of renowned U.S. universities. Performance-related rewards are explicitly intended to augment the efficiency of professors’ work by strengthening incentives to produce high-quality research and teaching. The development of formal doctoral programs, which replace the current apprenticeship model

Zur Funktion von Studiengebühren angesichts von Informationsasymmetrien auf Humankapitalmärkten

SummaryInstitutions of Higher Education certify students’ quality by issuing degrees and other credentials. Information asymmetries between the university and its clients, however, require valid signals of the universities’ quality, too. A performance based university compensation scheme can be viewed as a bonding-mechanism. Tuition which is not contingent on the value added through Higher Education extenuates the mechanism’s efficiency. We show that tuition nevertheless can create economic value, preventing an adverse selection of wealthy but less talented students and individuals who consume education rather than investing in future earnings. In addition, tuition increases the signaling content of some degrees. Individuals from groups more likely to consume education, like women for example, are able to signal their intention to engage in a lasting and demanding career. Thus, the allocation in some segments of the labor market can be improved.

The More You Know … The More You Enjoy? Applying ‘Consumption Capital Theory’ To Motion Picture Franchises

ABSTRACT In this article, we build on Stigler and Becker’s (1977) “consumption capital theory” and propose a novel conceptualization of film quality for the analysis of motion picture franchises. Generally, this theory predicts that the utility consumers derive from a particular good or service increases with prior consumption. We test our theoretical conjectures by drawing on the population of sequels that were running in the US between 1992 and 2011. The empirical results point to the explanatory power of the proposed framework. Film executives may use our findings to improve the profitability of their sequel productions. From a theoretical point of view, consumption capital theory allows for a more refined analysis of sequel performance along different dimensions. Moreover, it may provide a fruitful basis for the analysis of other serial media content, including books, TV, music, and games.

Talent and publicity as determinants of superstar incomes: empirical evidence from the motion picture industry

ABSTRACT By drawing on the two prevailing economic stardom theories, the paper investigates the sources of superstardom in the US movie industry. For the econometric analysis, we use income and popularity data of screen actresses and actors from the annual Celebrity 100 lists as published by Forbes Magazine. The empirical findings indicate that Hollywood, in contrast to other professional settings, supports two different types of stars. While ‘talent stars’ exploit acting merit, it is media exposure that drives the income of ‘publicity stars’. Apparently, in the motion picture industry both underlying resources are equally important and equally valued. Based on these insights we develop concrete recommendations for the career management of artists and the management of film projects.

Emotionally Attached: Neural Correlates of First Choice Employer Brands - An fMRI Study

Employer branding is becoming increasingly important for organizations, due to the rising importance of service- and knowledge-intensive tasks and products (Berthon, Ewing, & Hah, 2005; Vargo & Lusch, 2004). As a consequence, value-creation becomes ever more decisive in the effort to “create and deliver service quality” (Hartline & Jones, 1996, p. 207) to the customer, and is directly related to repurchase behaviour, customer loyalty (Cardador & Pratt, 2006), and word-of-mouth (Brown, Barry, Dacin, & Gunst, 2005), thereby impacting brand success and profitability (Moroko & Uncles, 2008). Additionally, employees directly and indirectly influence the reputation of organizations in several ways, most notably, communicating information about the company to both potential customers and potential employees (Helm, in press). Attracting and recruiting the best personnel, therefore, is an important driver of long-term firm success. It is surprising that, until very recently, marketing research has been dominated by a focus on consumers of a company’s products and services, while mainly neglecting branding research regarding company employees (Cardador & Pratt, 2006).