Christian Schmieder

Bankers Without Borders? Implications of Ring-Fencing for European Cross-Border Banks

This paper presents a stylized analysis of the effects of ring-fencing (i.e., different restrictions on cross-border transfers of excess profits and/or capital between a parent bank and its subsidiaries located in different jurisdictions) on cross-border banks. Using a sample of 25 large European banking groups with subsidiaries in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe (CESE), we analyze the impact of a CESE credit shock on the capital buffers needed by the sample banking groups under different forms of ring-fencing. Our simulations show that under stricter forms of ring-fencing, sample banking groups have substantially larger needs for capital buffers at the parent and/or subsidiary level than under less strict (or in the absence of any) ring-fencing.

Asset Correlations and Credit Portfolio Risk: An Empirical Analysis

In credit risk modelling, the correlation of unobservable asset returns is a crucial component for the measurement of portfolio risk. In this paper, we estimate asset correlations from monthly time series of Moodys KMV asset values for around 2,000 European firms from 1996 to 2004. We compare correlation and value-atrisk (VaR) estimates in a one-factor or market model and a multi-factor or sector model. Our main finding is a complex interaction of credit risk correlations and default probabilities affecting total credit portfolio risk. Differentiation between industry sectors when using the sector model instead of the market model has only a secondary effect on credit portfolio risk, at least for the underlying credit portfolio. Averaging firm-dependent asset correlations on a sector level can, however, cause a substantial underestimation of the VaR in a portfolio with heterogeneous borrower size. This result holds for the market as well as the sector model. Furthermore, the VaR of the IRB model is more stable over time than the VaR of the market model and the sector model, while its distance from the other two models fluctuates over time.

A Framework for Macroprudential Bank Solvency Stress Testing: Application to S-25 and Other G-20 Country FSAPs

The global financial crisis has placed the spotlight squarely on bank stress tests. Stress tests conducted in the lead-up to the crisis, including those by IMF staff, were not always able to identify the right risks and vulnerabilities. Since then, IMF staff has developed more robust stress testing methods and models and adopted a more coherent and consistent approach. This paper articulates the solvency stress testing framework that is being applied in the IMF’s surveillance of member countries’ banking systems, and discusses examples of its actual implementation in FSAPs to 18 countries which are in the group comprising the 25 most systemically important financial systems (“S-25”) plus other G-20 countries. In doing so, the paper also offers useful guidance for readers seeking to develop their own stress testing frameworks and country authorities preparing for FSAPs. A detailed Stress Test Matrix (STeM) comparing the stress test parameters applied in each of these major country FSAPs is provided, together with our stress test output templates.

A New Heuristic Measure of Fragility and Tail Risks: Application to Stress Testing

This paper presents a simple heuristic measure of tail risk, which is applied to individual bank stress tests and to public debt. Stress testing can be seen as a first order test of the level of potential negative outcomes in response to tail shocks. However, the results of stress testing can be misleading in the presence of model error and the uncertainty attending parameters and their estimation. The heuristic can be seen as a second order stress test to detect nonlinearities in the tails that can lead to fragility, i.e., provide additional information on the robustness of stress tests. It also shows how the measure can be used to assess the robustness of public debt forecasts, an important issue in many countries. The heuristic measure outlined here can be used in a variety of situations to ascertain an ordinal ranking of fragility to tail risks.

The Impact of Legislation on Credit Risk - Comparative Evidence from the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany

This study investigates the link between bankruptcy and security legislation and potential credit losses faced by banks based on a cross-country study for the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany. Focusing on corporate credit, we find that legislation produces the highest credit risk in the US, followed by Germany, while UK law is found to be most favorable for banks. US banks gains from the higher number of informal restructurings (without losses) but lose from the low level of recovery in formal proceedings. German banks demand more credit risk mitigants than UK and US banks do, but still recover less than do UK banks. To be at par with UK banks, US banks would have to recover more than twice as much in formal proceedings, while German proceedings would have to be shortened by about one half.

How to Capture Macro-Financial Spillover Effects in Stress Tests?

One of the challenges of financial stability analysis and bank stress testing is how to establish scenarios with meaningful macro-financial linkages, i.e., taking into account spillover effects and other forms of contagion. We come up with an approach to simulate the potential impact of spillover effects based on the “traditional” design of macro-economic stress tests. Specifically, we examine spillover effects observed during the financial crisis and simulate their impact on banks’ liquidity and capital positions. The outcome suggests that spillover effects have a highly non-linear impact on bank soundness, both in terms of liquidity and solvency.

A Framework for Macroprudential Bank Solvency Stress Testing

The global financial crisis has placed the spotlight squarely on bank stress tests. Stress tests conducted in the lead-up to the crisis, including those by IMF staff, were not always able to identify the right risks and vulnerabilities. Since then, IMF staff has developed more robust stress testing methods and models and adopted a more coherent and consistent approach. This paper articulates the solvency stress testing framework that is being applied in the IMF’s surveillance of member countries’ banking systems, and discusses examples of its actual implementation in FSAPs to 18 countries which are in the group comprising the 25 most systemically important financial systems (“S-25”) plus other G-20 countries. In doing so, the paper also offers useful guidance for readers seeking to develop their own stress testing frameworks and country authorities preparing for FSAPs. A detailed Stress Test Matrix (STeM) comparing the stress test parameters applie in each of these major country FSAPs is provided, together with our stress test output templates. JEL Classification Numbers: C58, C93, F3, G21, G32.

The Need for 'Un-Consolidating' Consolidated Banks' Stress Tests

The recent crisis has spurred the use of stress tests as a (crisis) management and early warning tool. However, a weakness is that they omit potential risks embedded in the banking groups’ geographical structures by assuming that capital and liquidity are available wherever they are needed within the group. This assumption neglects the fact that regulations differ across countries (e.g., minimum capital requirements), and, more importantly, that home/host regulators might limit flows of capital or liquidity within a group during periods of stress. This study presents a framework on how to integrate this risk element into stress tests, and provides illustrative calculations on the size of the potential adjustments needed in the presence of some limits on intragroup flows for banks included in the June 2011 EBA stress tests.

A New Heuristic Measure of Fragility and Tail Risks

This paper presents a simple heuristic measure of tail risk, which is applied to individual bank stress tests and to public debt. Stress testing can be seen as a first order test of the level of potential negative outcomes in response to tail shocks. However, the results of stress testing can be misleading in the presence of model error and the uncertainty attending parameters and their estimation. The heuristic can be seen as a second order stress test to detect nonlinearities in the tails that can lead to fragility, i.e., provide additional information on the robustness of stress tests. It also shows how the measure can be used to assess the robustness of public debt forecasts, an important issue in many countries. The heuristic measure outlined here can be used in a variety of situations to ascertain an ordinal ranking of fragility to tail risks. JEL Classification Numbers: G10, G20, G21

Marrying and Breaking Up: Firms and their Relationship Lenders

This study analyzes the circumstances under which firms choose to have a relationship lender and under which firms switch their relationship lender. Relationship lending is measured by the largest lender’s share of debt. Our study is based on a unique dataset for Germany with more than 13,000 observations. We find that young firms and well capitalized firms are more likely to concentrate their borrowing on one bank. These two groups of firms are also more likely to switch their relationship lender. Moreover, firms concentrate their borrowing more heavily on banks with a high share of core deposits. Small firms are also more likely to stay with relationship lenders with a high share of core deposits. Finally, the proportion of debt borrowed from the relationship lender is reduced if the relationship between the lender and the borrower has been close for several years. Our findings suggest that both the decision in favor of relationship lending and the decision to switch the relationship lender are made in such a way as to balance the potential benefits and costs of a relationship lender’s access to private information.