Christina L. Catlett

Threats in bioterrorism I: CDC category A agents

Although once considered unlikely, bioterrorism is now a reality in the United States since the anthrax cases began appearing in the fall of 2001. Intelligence sources indicate there are many countries and terrorist organizations that either possess biological weapons or are attempting to procure them. In the future it is likely that we will experience additional acts of bioterrorism. The CDC category A agents represent our greatest challenge because they have the potential to cause grave harm to the medical and public health systems of a given population. Thus, it is imperative that plans be developed now to deal with the consequences of an intentional release of any one or more of these pathogens.

Change in use of allogeneic red blood cell transfusions among surgical patients.

BACKGROUND Although RBC transfusions can be lifesaving, recent evidence suggests that their use is associated with added morbidity and mortality and that a lower transfusion threshold is safe. It is unclear if this new evidence has translated into decreased RBC use among surgical patients. The purpose of this study is to measure the change in use of RBCs during the last decade. STUDY DESIGN We performed a cross-sectional cohort study of all patients who underwent inpatient operations in the 52 hospitals in Maryland in 1997 to 1998 and 2004 to 2005. The primary outcomes variable was whether or not the patient received an allogeneic RBC transfusion. We controlled for confounders related to RBC transfusion, including age, gender, race, type of admission, comorbid conditions, and surgeon patient-volume. RESULTS Patients receiving RBCs were older (63 versus 52 years), were more likely to be admitted through the emergency department (37% versus 24%) or as a readmission (12% versus 6.9%), had more Romano-Charlson index comorbidities, and had a higher unadjusted mortality (6.5% versus 1.1%). Comparing 1997 to 1998 to 2004 to 2005, RBC use in surgical patients increased (8.9% versus 14%), although unadjusted mortality decreased (2.0% versus 1.5%). Factors associated with higher adjusted relative risk (RR) of transfusion include age older than 65 years (RR = 2.45), unscheduled admissions (emergency department RR = 1.32, readmission RR = 1.62), Romano-Charlson comorbidities (RR = 1.04 to 2.71), third quartile of surgeon volume (RR = 1.10), death (RR = 1.24), and having operations in 2004 to 2005 (RR = 1.42). CONCLUSIONS Despite evidence supporting more restrictive use of RBC transfusions, RBC use among surgical patients has increased during the last decade.

Impact of the 2010 Pakistan floods on rural and urban populations at six months

The 2010 Pakistan flood affected 20 million people. The impact of the event and recovery is measured at 6 months. Methods: Cross-sectional cluster survey of 1769 households conducted six months post-flood in 29 most-affected districts. The outcome measures were physical damage, flood-related death and illness and changes in income, access to electricity, clean water and sanitation facilities. Results: Households were headed by males, large and poor. The flood destroyed 54.8% of homes and caused 86.8% households to move, with 46.9% living in an IDP camp. Lack of electricity increased from 18.8% to 32.9% (p = 0.000), lack of toilet facilities from 29.0% to 40.4% (p=0.000). Access to protected water remained unchanged (96.8%); however, the sources changed (p=0.000). 88.0% reported loss of income (90.0% rural, 75.0% urban, p=0.000) with rural households loosing significantly more and less likely to recovered. Immediate deaths and injuries were uncommon but 77.0% reported flood-related illnesses. Significant differences were noted between urban and rural as well as gender and education of the head of houshold. Discussion: After 6 months, much of the population had not recovered their prior standard of living or access to services. Rural households were more commonly impacted and slower to recover. Targeting relief to high-risk populations including rural, female-headed and those with lower education is needed. Citation: Kirsch TD, Wadhwani C, Sauer L, Doocy S, Catlett C. Impact of the 2010 Pakistan Floods on Rural and Urban Populations at Six Months. PLOS Currents Disasters. 2012 Aug 22. doi: 10.1371/4fdfb212d2432.

Characterizing Hospital Workers' Willingness to Respond to a Radiological Event

Introduction Terrorist use of a radiological dispersal device (RDD, or “dirty bomb”), which combines a conventional explosive device with radiological materials, is among the National Planning Scenarios of the United States government. Understanding employee willingness to respond is critical for planning experts. Previous research has demonstrated that perception of threat and efficacy is key in the assessing willingness to respond to a RDD event. Methods An anonymous online survey was used to evaluate the willingness of hospital employees to respond to a RDD event. Agreement with a series of belief statements was assessed, following a methodology validated in previous work. The survey was available online to all 18,612 employees of the Johns Hopkins Hospital from January to March 2009. Results Surveys were completed by 3426 employees (18.4%), whose demographic distribution was similar to overall hospital staff. 39% of hospital workers were not willing to respond to a RDD scenario if asked but not required to do so. Only 11% more were willing if required. Workers who were hesitant to agree to work additional hours when required were 20 times less likely to report during a RDD emergency. Respondents who perceived their peers as likely to report to work in a RDD emergency were 17 times more likely to respond during a RDD event if asked. Only 27.9% of the hospital employees with a perception of low efficacy declared willingness to respond to a severe RDD event. Perception of threat had little impact on willingness to respond among hospital workers. Conclusions Radiological scenarios such as RDDs are among the most dreaded emergency events yet studied. Several attitudinal indicators can help to identify hospital employees unlikely to respond. These risk-perception modifiers must then be addressed through training to enable effective hospital response to a RDD event.

The utility of and risks associated with the use of spontaneous volunteers in disaster response: a survey.

OBJECTIVE The use of spontaneous volunteers (SV) is common after a disaster, but their limited training and experience can create a danger for the SVs and nongovernmental voluntary organizations (NVOs). We assessed the experience of NVOs with SVs during disasters, how they were integrated into the agencys infrastructure, their perceived value to previous responses, and liability issues associated with their use. METHODS Of the 51 National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters organizations that were contacted for surveys, 24 (47%) agreed to participate. RESULTS Of the 24 participating organizations, 19 (72%) had encountered SVs during a response, most (79%) used them regularly, and 68% believed that SVs were usually useful. SVs were always credentialed by 2 organizations, and sometimes by 6 (31%). One organization always performed background checks; 53% provided just-in-time training for SVs; 26% conducted evaluations of SV performance; and 21% provided health or workers compensation benefits. Two organizations reported an SV death; 42% reported injuries; 32% accepted legal liability for the actions of SVs; and 16% were sued because of actions by SVs. CONCLUSIONS The use of SVs is widespread, but NVOs are not necessarily structured to incorporate them effectively. More structured efforts to integrate SVs are critical to safe and effective disaster response.

Critical resources for hospital surge capacity : an expert consensus panel

Background: Hospital surge capacity (HSC) is dependent on the ability to increase or conserve resources. The hospital surge model put forth by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) estimates the resources needed by hospitals to treat casualties resulting from 13 national planning scenarios. However, emergency planners need to know which hospital resource are most critical in order to develop a more accurate plan for HSC in the event of a disaster. Objective: To identify critical hospital resources required in four specific catastrophic scenarios; namely, pandemic influenza, radiation, explosive, and nerve gas. Methods: We convened an expert consensus panel comprised of 23 participants representing health providers (i.e., nurses and physicians), administrators, emergency planners, and specialists. Four disaster scenarios were examined by the panel. Participants were divided into 4 groups of five or six members, each of which were assigned two of four scenarios. They were asked to consider 132 hospital patient care resources- extracted from the AHRQs hospital surge model- in order to identify the ones that would be critical in their opinion to patient care. The definition for a critical hospital resource was the following: absence of the resource is likely to have a major impact on patient outcomes, i.e., high likelihood of untoward event, possibly death. For items with any disagreement in ranking, we conducted a facilitated discussion (modified Delphi technique) until consensus was reached, which was defined as more than 50% agreement. Intraclass Correlation Coefficients (ICC) were calculated for each scenario, and across all scenarios as a measure of participant agreement on critical resources. For the critical resources common to all scenarios, Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to measure the distribution of scores across all scenarios. Results: Of the 132 hospital resources, 25 were considered critical for all four scenarios by more than 50% of the participants. The number of hospital resources considered to be critical by consensus varied from one scenario to another; 58 for the pandemic influenza scenario, 51 for radiation exposure, 41 for explosives, and 35 for nerve gas scenario. Intravenous crystalloid solution was the only resource ranked by all participants as critical across all scenarios. The agreement in ranking was strong in nerve agent and pandemic influenza (ICC= 0.7 in both), and moderate in explosives (ICC= 0.6) and radiation (ICC= 0.5). Conclusion: In four disaster scenarios, namely, radiation, pandemic influenza, explosives, and nerve gas scenarios; supply of as few as 25 common resources may be considered critical to hospital surge capacity. The absence of any these resources may compromise patient care. More studies are needed to identify critical hospital resources in other disaster scenarios.BACKGROUND Hospital surge capacity (HSC) is dependent on the ability to increase or conserve resources. The hospital surge model put forth by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) estimates the resources needed by hospitals to treat casualties resulting from 13 national planning scenarios. However, emergency planners need to know which hospital resource are most critical in order to develop a more accurate plan for HSC in the event of a disaster. OBJECTIVE To identify critical hospital resources required in four specific catastrophic scenarios; namely, pandemic influenza, radiation, explosive, and nerve gas. METHODS We convened an expert consensus panel comprised of 23 participants representing health providers (i.e., nurses and physicians), administrators, emergency planners, and specialists. Four disaster scenarios were examined by the panel. Participants were divided into 4 groups of five or six members, each of which were assigned two of four scenarios. They were asked to consider 132 hospital patient care resources- extracted from the AHRQs hospital surge model- in order to identify the ones that would be critical in their opinion to patient care. The definition for a critical hospital resource was the following: absence of the resource is likely to have a major impact on patient outcomes, i.e., high likelihood of untoward event, possibly death. For items with any disagreement in ranking, we conducted a facilitated discussion (modified Delphi technique) until consensus was reached, which was defined as more than 50% agreement. Intraclass Correlation Coefficients (ICC) were calculated for each scenario, and across all scenarios as a measure of participant agreement on critical resources. For the critical resources common to all scenarios, Kruskal-Wallis test was performed to measure the distribution of scores across all scenarios. RESULTS Of the 132 hospital resources, 25 were considered critical for all four scenarios by more than 50% of the participants. The number of hospital resources considered to be critical by consensus varied from one scenario to another; 58 for the pandemic influenza scenario, 51 for radiation exposure, 41 for explosives, and 35 for nerve gas scenario. Intravenous crystalloid solution was the only resource ranked by all participants as critical across all scenarios. The agreement in ranking was strong in nerve agent and pandemic influenza (ICC= 0.7 in both), and moderate in explosives (ICC= 0.6) and radiation (ICC= 0.5). CONCLUSION In four disaster scenarios, namely, radiation, pandemic influenza, explosives, and nerve gas scenarios; supply of as few as 25 common resources may be considered critical to hospital surge capacity. The absence of any these resources may compromise patient care. More studies are needed to identify critical hospital resources in other disaster scenarios.

Violence in the Health Care Setting

ON A SEPTEMBER MORNING LIKE ANY OTHER, THE son of an 84-year-old woman with cancer shot her surgeon outside his mother’s hospital room in our medical center. He was presumably distraught over a poor surgical outcome. After taking refuge in her room, he proceeded to kill his mother and commit suicide. The surgeon survived the shooting. This triple shooting raises fundamental issues. Has the medical workplace become inherently dangerous, and if so, why? To what extent should health institutions secure the environment?

Hospital Surge Capacity: A Web-Based Simulation Tool for Emergency Planners

The National Center for the Study of Preparedness and Catastrophic Event Response (PACER) has created a publicly available simulation tool called Surge (accessible at http://www.pacerapps.org) to estimate surge capacity for user-defined hospitals. Based on user input, a Monte Carlo simulation algorithm forecasts available hospital bed capacity over a 7-day period and iteratively assesses the ability to accommodate disaster patients. Currently, the tool can simulate bed capacity for acute mass casualty events (such as explosions) only and does not specifically simulate staff and supply inventory. Strategies to expand hospital capacity, such as (1) opening unlicensed beds, (2) canceling elective admissions, and (3) implementing reverse triage, can be interactively evaluated. In the present application of the tool, various response strategies were systematically investigated for 3 nationally representative hospital settings (large urban, midsize community, small rural). The simulation experiments estimated baseline surge capacity between 7% (large hospitals) and 22% (small hospitals) of staffed beds. Combining all response strategies simulated surge capacity between 30% and 40% of staffed beds. Response strategies were more impactful in the large urban hospital simulation owing to higher baseline occupancy and greater proportion of elective admissions. The publicly available Surge tool enables proactive assessment of hospital surge capacity to support improved decision-making for disaster response. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2018;12:513-522).

Maximizing Utility of a Deployable Medical Team from an Academic Medical Center to a Disaster

Deployable medical teams from academic medical centers (AMCs) can be a valuable adjunct to military and NGO response to disasters and humanitarian crises. In 2009, Johns Hopkins created and trained a scalable, rapidly deployable team of nearly 200 healthcare workers and staff from many disciplines. In 2010 the team deployed groups to the Haiti earthquake which provided valuable lessons regarding utility and implementation of such a team. Partnerships with established response organizations are key. Flexibility of the teams structure allows rapid response to evolving needs of requesting agencies, prevents institutional disruption, and sustains response. Careful management of team logistics is critical to the health, welfare, and security of the team. Complex human resource issues must be anticipated and addressed. Finally, AMCs must be willing and able to absorb some costs associated with the response, even when deploying with well-funded and highly resourced agencies.

Association of allogeneic red-blood cell transfusion with surgeon case-volume.

BACKGROUND Surgeon case-volume predicts a variety of patient outcomes. We hypothesize that surgeon case-volume predicts RBC transfusion across different surgical procedures. METHODS We performed a cohort study of 372,670 in-patient surgical cases in the 52 non-federal hospitals in Maryland between 2004 and 2005. The main outcome measure was relative risk of receiving a transfusion. RESULTS Overall, 13.9% of patients received a transfusion. Patients seen by the highest case-volume surgeons (>161 cases/y) were more likely to receive a transfusion (16% versus 11%, P < 0.01) compared with middle case-volume surgeons (89-161 cases/y). After adjusting for confounders, the highest case-volume patients were still at increased risk of transfusion [relative risk (RR) 1.10, 1.07-1.14]. This result was true across many surgery types. CONCLUSIONS Surgeon case-volume is independently associated with the likelihood of RBC transfusion across a broad range of surgical procedures. Future efforts should be directed towards studying and standardization of transfusion practices.