Christine Daigle

Nietzsche: Virtue Ethics . . . Virtue Politics?

Aristotelian notion of megalopsychia found in Nicomachean Ethics and the figure of the Ubermensch. I will approach this connection in a variety of ways in the first section of my essay and will show how we must go beyond Kaufmann. If one chooses to dismiss the connection between Aristotle’s and Nietzsche’s ethics, as I will do, this does not mean that Nietzsche’s ethics cannot be read as an instance of virtue ethics. In the second section, I will articulate how it is possible to interpret the ethical ideas of Nietzsche as forming a type of virtue ethics that focuses on the character development of the agent. I will define virtue ethics and show how Nietzsche can be seen as a virtue ethicist. I will explain how he shares the critical moment found in the revival of virtue ethics mostly articulated in the twentieth century and also how he shares in the constructive program found therein. 3 In a third section, I will address the problem that awaits those who want to read Nietzsche generously, as I do, as a virtue ethicist. This problem arises with respect to his aristocratic politics found in certain texts. It will then become clear that an articulation of his ethical ideas with respect to his political ideas is problematic. I will attempt to solve this problem, though my proposed solution will emphasize a certain part of the corpus while necessarily overlooking another.

NIETZSCHE’S NOTION OF EMBODIED SELF: PROTO-PHENOMENOLOGY AT WORK?

I present an interpretation of the works of Nietzsche’s middle period as offering a phenomenological inquiry. This constitutes an extension of the famous existentialist interpretation of his philosophy. Nietzsche’s concern with the individual qua individual leads him to consider how the human being experiences 1) himself, 2) the presence of others and 3) how the world and the objects therein appear to him. This concern focuses on the human being as an embodied intentional consciousness. I propose to consider Nietzsche as a phenomenologist avant la lettre, that is, as a philosopher whose inquiry anticipates traditional phenomenology. To flesh this out, I explore Nietzsche’s phenomenological view on embodiment and his notion of the body as “die große Vernunft” (grand reason). I also explore how this view of the situated body forms the ground for Nietzsche’s ethical elaborations. This leads me to conclude that the embodied Übermensch is the phenomenological ethical ideal of Nietzsche’s philosophy, the only one that may allow the individual to flourish.