Christine Mahoney

The Power of Institutions

This article investigates the ways in which government activity, or demand-side forces, influence interest mobilization and formal inclusion in the policy-making process in the European Union. Drawing on an original dataset of nearly 700 civil society groups active in the European Union, the paper provides empirical evidence of three routes by which the EU institutions influence interest group activity: (1) direct interest group subsidy; (2) manipulation of the establishment and composition of formal arenas of political debate; and (3) broader, system-wide expansion of competencies and selective development of chosen policy areas.

Lobbying Success in the United States and the European Union

Scholars have avoided studying interest group influence because of the difficulty operationalising the concept. The research presented here introduces a new way of measuring lobbying success and lays out a model of its determinants. To understand why interest groups sometimes succeed and at other times fail, we must consider the institutional structure of the political system within which the advocates are operating; the characteristics of the issue at hand; and finally the characteristics of the interest group itself and their lobbying strategy. I test these factors with original data based on interviews with 149 advocates in Washington D.C. and Brussels active on a random sample of 47 policy issues. From the results, issue context emerges as a much more important determinant of lobbying success than institutional differences. The institutional differences that do emerge suggest that direct elections coupled with private campaign finance lead to winner-take-all outcomes biased in favour of wealthier business interests, while the lack of these institutional characteristics leads to more balanced policy compromises with more advocates achieving some of their policy goals.

Measuring the size and scope of the EU interest group population

We present a new data set enumerating the population of organizations listed and/or registered as lobbyists in the European Union. In the first part of the paper we describe how we arrived at the population data set by drawing on three independent sources (CONECCS; Landmarks; European Parliament registry). We briefly discuss the validity of these registers in the context of recent substantial changes to each of them. In the second part, we present descriptive information on the number and type of groups as well as their territorial origins. In the final section, we outline potential research questions that can be addressed with the new data set for further research on the role of groups in the EU policy process.

Networking vs. allying: the decision of interest groups to join coalitions in the US and the EU

Abstract Ad hoc issue coalitions allow advocates to pool resources and signal support of their position to policy-makers. Ad hoc coalitions, however, are not formed in every instance; groups do not always choose to ally since there are also costs associated with membership. To understand why organizations sometimes decide to band together and sometimes choose to forge ahead alone, I argue that we must consider the institutional structure of the political system; the nature of the issue at hand; and finally the characteristics of the interest group itself. This theory is tested on original data based on interviews with 149 lobbyists active on a random sample of 47 policy issues in the United States and the European Union. The results show that EU advocates are building formal coalitions at a much lower rate than their American counterparts. The qualitative evidence suggests that the democratic accountability of policy-makers may explain these differences.

Converging Perspectives on Interest-Group Research in Europe and America

The European and American literatures on interest groups developed largely separately in previous decades. Europeans were more commonly rooted in studies of policy systems and Americans more concerned with precise tactics of lobbying or the membership calculus following from the work of Mancur Olson. Recent developments suggest that the literatures have begun to be much more closely aligned. We focus on three major points of convergence. First is the impact of governmental structures on the development of national interest group systems. Using examples from the US and the EU, we discuss the co-evolution of groups and the state. Looking both over time and across issue domains, groups are more active when and where the state is more active. Second, we look at the impact of government structures on the locus of advocacy. Originally explored in the US context, multi-level governance structures in European settings have led to consideration of the concept of venue-shopping. Finally, we discuss how groups in both systems adjust their lobbying strategies to their political context. Our review suggests that the study of groups, long divided by different perspectives may begin to benefit from substantially more convergence of research interests.

Forum Section: The Two Faces of Framing: Individual-Level Framing and Collective Issue Definition in the European Union

Policy decisions are greatly affected by the way issues are understood collectively by policy-makers and the public. Naturally, advocates attempt to affect these dynamics by drawing attention to one dimension or another. Lobbyists outside government, such as political leaders and civil servants within governing institutions, try to spin or frame the issues on which they work. Research on framing is difficult, however, because of a methodological complication: no individual actor single-handedly determines how issues are defined collectively. The collective dynamics of agenda-setting and framing are subject to strong competitive forces, maintaining a stable equilibrium at most times, but also to threshold effects that can occasionally lead to rapid shifts in issue definitions. Research strategies used to study one face of framing (at the individual level) are ill suited to study the second face of framing (aggregate shifts in collective issue definitions). We discuss the two faces of framing as they relate to recent literature on policy-making in the European Union and we suggest some avenues for future research.

Forum Section: The Two Faces of Framing

Policy decisions are greatly affected by the way issues are understood collectively by policy-makers and the public. Naturally, advocates attempt to affect these dynamics by drawing attention to one dimension or another. Lobbyists outside government, such as political leaders and civil servants within governing institutions, try to spin or frame the issues on which they work. Research on framing is difficult, however, because of a methodological complication: no individual actor single-handedly determines how issues are defined collectively. The collective dynamics of agenda-setting and framing are subject to strong competitive forces, maintaining a stable equilibrium at most times, but also to threshold effects that can occasionally lead to rapid shifts in issue definitions. Research strategies used to study one face of framing (at the individual level) are ill suited to study the second face of framing (aggregate shifts in collective issue definitions). We discuss the two faces of framing as they relate to recent literature on policy-making in the European Union and we suggest some avenues for future research.

Framing in context: how interest groups employ framing to lobby the European Commission

ABSTRACT Framing plays an important role in public policy. Interest groups strategically highlight some aspects of a policy proposal while ignoring others in order to gain an advantage in the policy debate. However, we know remarkably little about how interest groups choose their frames. This contribution therefore studies the determinants of frame choice during the policy formulation stage in the European Union. We argue that frame choice is a complex process which is simultaneously affected by interest groups as well as contextual characteristics. With regard to interest group characteristics, we expect that frame choice varies systematically across actor type. With regard to contextual characteristics, we hypothesize that the frames that interest groups employ are specifically tailored towards the DGs in charge of drafting the proposal. Our theoretical expectations are tested based on a new and innovative dataset on frame choice of more than 3,000 interest groups in 44 policy debates.

Partners in Advocacy: Lobbyists and Government Officials in Washington

One of the most important demonstrations of power in Washington is the ability to recruit sitting government officials to become active proponents of one’s position. Many have suggested money is the key: Campaign contributions buy friends, access, and perhaps even policy activism. We provide an alternative view based on a deceptively simple observation: Lobbyists rarely lobby alone. We show empirically that government policymakers respond to the overall structure of conflict, not the resources of individual lobbying groups. Our project is based on in-depth interviews with over 300 policy advocates and systematic information on each of more than 2,000 advocates playing a significant role in a random sample of 98 policy issues in the United States federal government from 1999 to 2002.

Measuring interest group framing strategies in public policy debates

Framing plays an important role in lobbying, as interest groups strategically highlight some aspects of policy proposals while ignoring others to shape policy debates in their favour. However, due to methodological difficulties, we have remarkably little systematic data about the framing strategies of interest groups. This article therefore proposes a new technique for measuring interest group framing that is based on a quantitative text analysis of interest group position papers and official policy documents. We test this novel methodological approach on the basis of two case studies in the areas of environmental and transport policy in the European Union. We are able to identify the frames employed by all interest groups mobilised in a debate and assess their effectiveness by studying to what extent decision-makers move closer to their policy positions over the course of the policy debate.